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Validity in Positive Law: A Mere Summary Concept

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Legal Validity and Soft Law

Part of the book series: Law and Philosophy Library ((LAPS,volume 122))

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Abstract

One can distinguish at least four phases respectively consecutive properties of a legal norm: (1) A norm in positive law emerges and hence begins to exist as or by a thought and speech-act, as well as its intended language-manifestations in space and time. (2) A legal norm obligates, forbids, allows, authorizes, etc. those who are subject to the law. A legal norm also creates or affirms subjective rights or positions or changes a legal status. (3) A legal norm needs and gives justification because as free beings we primarily want to be guided only by our own will. (4) A legal norm obtains efficacy in a narrow sense as it is acknowledged and followed, at least partially. These four phases respectively properties of a positive, legal norm are very profound natural as well as social phenomena. In addition, the concepts corresponding to them, partly from antiquity, are in any case time-honored concepts of the everyday world, as well as for academics, and they have an unequivocal function and a fairly clear meaning. Why then do we need the much more obscure and problematic artificial concept of validity besides these four necessary and acknowledged phases resp. consecutive properties of a legal norm? The concept of validity seems to be, in its overwhelming importance, an invention of general philosophy, which some legal philosophers and legal theorists took up and overvalued in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, with more harm than good to their own research and legal philosophy in general. Legal validity has become the most acclaimed concept of legal positivism in the twentieth and twenty-first century. In addition, even nonpositivists are infected by this virus. Today we still carry the burden of this overvaluing with far too much emphasis. There is only a limited, pragmatic area of application of the concept of validity in applied law: like other lately (and subsequently for pragmatic reasons) introduced summary concepts, e.g. “something,” “entity,” or “interest,” which are much less directly related to reality, the concept of validity, firstly, summarizes the normative force or function of a legal norm, that is obligation, permission, authorization, status determination, etc., and, secondly, summarizes different types of legal norms by leaving open the author and addressee of the norm and thus includes also three- and multidimensional norms.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Besides norms, we find other speech-acts in law, such as statements, definitions, descriptions etc. As different types of speech-acts are only arbitrary means to attain the aims of law, any type of speech-act can become part of the law. Hence, it is impossible to define law by reference to a specific type of speech-act, e.g. rules or norms or principles. Cf. von der Pfordten (2015), p. 172.

  2. 2.

    One could also assume that a whole legal system might be qualified as valid or invalid. However, this qualification has the assumption and understanding of legal systems as necessary conditions, which is debatable. In addition, significant parts of law can be qualified as valid or invalid, e.g. the codification of an area of law, e.g. the Code Civil, Code Pénal, ABGB, StGB, BGB, etc. However, the necessary conditions for codifications are not clear. They might be, for our purposes, seen at least as a multitude of norms. Cf. for arguments attributing validity to norms: Grabowski (2013), pp. 242ff.

  3. 3.

    There is a discussion as to whether speech-acts are themselves norms or only create norms. This discussion cannot be taken up here. However, the thesis that speech-acts only create norms seems to reduce the concept of a norm to the second element distinguished here, the result, function or force of the speech-act.

  4. 4.

    These are the locutionary acts in the sense of the speech-act theory of Austin. See Austin (1962), pp. 94ff.

  5. 5.

    And which therefore imply a sort of general duty of acceptance. Sartor (2000), pp. 585–625, has proposed characterizing this doxastic obligation as legal validity. The problem with this view is that legal validity is a property of legal norms and the description of validity a descriptive statement. The doxastic obligation is only the implication of a valid norm not identical with validity. See for a different approach: Sartor (2006).

  6. 6.

    These are both the illocutionary and per locutionary acts in the sense of the speech-act theories of Austin and Searle. See Austin (1962), pp. 98ff. and 101ff.; Searle (1969), pp. 23ff. and 25ff.

  7. 7.

    Some try to qualify all these functions or forces as imperatives resp. obligations (Befehle, Verbindlichkeiten), e.g. Meyer (2011), pp. 30ff. Already Larenz (1929), pp. 15, 25, has emphasized the obligatory, normative character of law. See for a general critique of these attempts: Hart (1994), pp. 20ff. This issue cannot be discussed here. If these attempts were successful, legal validity would indeed be identical with obligation.

  8. 8.

    See for concepts in law in general: Hage and von der Pfordten (2009).

  9. 9.

    Up until now there exists—as far as I know—no empirical historical study of the emergence of the concept of validity in positive law. Munzer (1972), p. 37, refers to the Oxford English Dictionary, which gives a first date of 1571 for the following sense of “valid”: “Good or adequate in law; possessing legal authority or force; legally binding or efficacious.” Munzer’s study of 1972 is still the best treatment of the subject of validity, and one wonders why it has gained so little attention: one can imagine that his very careful, painstaking and convincing critique of validity in Ross, Kelsen and Hart was not very welcome to the leaders and followers of legal positivism as the hegemonic theory of our times. This is one striking example of how opinion is nudged in academia.

  10. 10.

    See e.g. Habermas (1998). Despite its title, this book gives no definition or conceptual analysis of the concept of “Geltung” at all. Moreover, the juxtaposition of “Faktizität” and “Geltung” is wrong. The opposite of “Faktizität” is “Normativität” and of “Geltung” is “Nicht-Geltung.”

  11. 11.

    See for a careful critical analysis of several conceptions of validity: Grabowski (2013), pp. 247–357.

  12. 12.

    It is no accident that Munzer (1972), discusses only three legal positivists: Alf Ross, Hans Kelsen and H. L. A. Hart.

  13. 13.

    Radbruch (1999), § 10, pp. 78–85; Larenz (1929); Alexy (1992), pp. 139–153.

  14. 14.

    See already my critique: von der Pfordten (2011a), p. 145.

  15. 15.

    Moreover, “binding force” might be another expression of this summary-concept. Cf. Sartor (2006, 2007).

  16. 16.

    See for a careful analysis of the discourse of validity: Grabowski (2013), pp. 455–535.

  17. 17.

    Guastini (1994), p. 212.

  18. 18.

    See for a similar critique of the identification of existence and validity of a norm: Munzer (1972), pp. 13ff. Munzer criticizes Alf Ross convincingly. However, the critique might be extended to all Scandinavian “realists.” Scandinavian Realism considers law as fact and neglects the normative force or function. It cannot understand legal validity as a summary concept of normative function and so shifts it mistakenly to the existence of a norm.

  19. 19.

    See Hobbes (1991), chap. 26.

  20. 20.

    Kant (1968b), p. 230.

  21. 21.

    Kant (2007), p. 159; Kant (1968a), p. 85.

  22. 22.

    Lotze (1912), p. 511.

  23. 23.

    Lotze (1912), p. 514.

  24. 24.

    Lotze (1912), p. 512.

  25. 25.

    Lotze (1912), p. 513: “One has to understand this concept as being a self-contained fundamental notion, of which everyone can know the meaning, but which we cannot construct from other components that do not already contain it (the concept) themselves.” (“Man muss auch diesen Begriff als einen durchaus nur auf sich beruhenden Grundbegriff ansehen, von dem jeder Wissen kann, was er mit ihm meint, den wir aber nicht durch eine Konstruktion aus Bestandteilen erzeugen können, welche ihn selbst nicht bereits enthielten.”)

  26. 26.

    Frege (1986), pp. 48ff.

  27. 27.

    Windelband (1920), pp. 213, 426.

  28. 28.

    Lask (1911), p. 12.

  29. 29.

    Lask (1923), p. 283.

  30. 30.

    Lask (1923), p. 283.

  31. 31.

    Liebert (1914), p. 4.

  32. 32.

    Kelsen (1960), p. 7.

  33. 33.

    Kelsen (1960), p. 196.

  34. 34.

    Kelsen (1960), p. 8.

  35. 35.

    Kelsen (1960), p. 9.

  36. 36.

    Kelsen (1979), p. 22.

  37. 37.

    Kelsen (1960), p. 5.

  38. 38.

    Kelsen (1960), p. 11.

  39. 39.

    Kelsen (1960), p. 5.

  40. 40.

    This is an almost completely new version of his previous book “Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie” of 1914.

  41. 41.

    Radbruch (1999), p. 79.

  42. 42.

    Radbruch (1999), p. 82.

  43. 43.

    Radbruch (1999), p. 82.

  44. 44.

    Munzer (1972), pp. 3, 23, 37, 39f., 41.

  45. 45.

    Munzer (1972), p. 39.

  46. 46.

    Hart (1963), p. 103.

  47. 47.

    Ehrlich (1989).

  48. 48.

    Munzer (1972), pp. 44–69.

  49. 49.

    Dworkin (1977), pp. 14–80.

  50. 50.

    Radbruch (1999), p. 216: “Der Konflikt zwischen der Gerechtigkeit und der Rechtssicherheit dürfte dahin zu lösen sein, daß das positive, durch Satzung und Macht gesicherte Recht auch dann den Vorrang hat, wenn es inhaltlich ungerecht und unzweckmäßig ist, es sei denn, daß der Widerspruch des positiven Gesetzes zur Gerechtigkeit ein so unerträgliches Maß erreicht, daß das Gesetz als ‘unrichtiges Recht’ der Gerechtigkeit zu weichen hat. Es ist unmöglich, eine schärfere Linie zu ziehen zwischen den Fällen des gesetzlichen Unrechts und den trotz unrichtigen Inhalts dennoch geltenden Gesetzen; eine andere Grenzziehung aber kann mit aller Schärfe vorgenommen werden: wo Gerechtigkeit nicht einmal erstrebt, wo die Gleichheit, die den Kern der Gerechtigkeit ausmacht, bei der Setzung positiven Rechts bewußt verleugnet wurde, da ist das Gesetz nicht etwa nur ‘unrichtiges Recht’, vielmehr entbehrt es überhaupt der Rechtsnatur.”

  51. 51.

    Cf. von der Pfordten (2011b, 2013), pp. 53ff., 66ff.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Georg-August-University of Goettingen, Goettingen, Germany

    Dietmar von der Pfordten

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  1. Faculty of Law, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Pauline Westerman

  2. Faculty of Law, University of Maastricht, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Jaap Hage

  3. Faculty of Law, University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria

    Stephan Kirste

  4. Faculty of Law, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands

    Anne Ruth Mackor

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von der Pfordten, D. (2018). Validity in Positive Law: A Mere Summary Concept. In: Westerman, P., Hage, J., Kirste, S., Mackor, A. (eds) Legal Validity and Soft Law. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 122. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77522-7_1

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