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Introduction to Formal Philosophy pp 93–104Cite as

Nonmonotonic Reasoning

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Abstract

Nonmonotonic reasoning is a theory of the rational use of assumptions. We describe the relations between NMR and Logic, and two main paradigms of NMR, preferential and explanatory one.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Circumscription amounts to using only minimal models satisfying a first-order description.

  2. 2.

    An equivalent construction, called system Z, has been suggested in Pearl [22].

  3. 3.

    See [2].

  4. 4.

    Or, equivalently, if a ⊢ b and a ⊆ u, then u ∩ b≠∅.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, Holon Institute of Technology, Holon, Israel

    Alexander Bochman

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  1. Alexander Bochman
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Correspondence to Alexander Bochman .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Division of Philosophy, Royal Institute of Technology (KTH), Stockholm, Sweden

    Sven Ove Hansson

  2. Center for Information and Bubble Studies, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Vincent F. Hendricks

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Bochman, A. (2018). Nonmonotonic Reasoning. In: Hansson, S., Hendricks, V. (eds) Introduction to Formal Philosophy. Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77434-3_4

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