Abstract
Deontic logic is the logic of normative concepts such as obligation, permission, and prohibition. This non-technical overview of the area has a strong emphasis on the connections between deontic logic and problems discussed in moral philosophy. Major issues treated are the distinction between ought-to-be and ought-to-do, the various meanings of permissive expressions, the logical relations among norms, the paradoxes of deontic logic, and the nature of moral conflicts and moral dilemmas. It is concluded that deontic logic has resources for precise treatment of important issues in moral philosophy, but in order to make full use of these resources, more co-operation between logicians and moral philosophers is needed.
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Notes
- 1.
For more details, see Chap. 1.
- 2.
The dyadic predicate can replace the monadic one, since we can define Op as O(p∣⊤), where ⊤ is a tautology.
- 3.
- 4.
Also discussed in the Chap. 1.
- 5.
However, if P satisfies positivity, and O is definable from P in the usual way (Op ↔¬P¬p), then O satisfies contranegativity: If Op and ¬p ≥¬q then Oq.
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Hansson, S.O. (2018). Deontic Logic. In: Hansson, S., Hendricks, V. (eds) Introduction to Formal Philosophy. Springer Undergraduate Texts in Philosophy. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77434-3_32
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