Do We Have Duties to Nonhumans?
This chapter addresses the question, to whom do we owe justice? Or, in other words, who belongs to the moral community? Traditional moral theories usually limit the moral community to humans. Environmental ethicists, in contrast, argue that at least some nonhuman entities have moral status. This chapter reviews arguments concerning the moral status of animals, species, ecosystems, and nature itself. It includes discussion of intrinsic and instrumental value, as well as Elizabeth Anderson’s pluralist-expressivist value theory.
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