Conclusion

Abstract

Putin’s original strategy in the early 2000s addressed real problems, and initially scored important successes. Wages, pensions, and foreign debts were soon paid on time, a fiscally strict macro-economic policy was set up, and some order restored to the country. However, as Cherkesov emphasized, policy implementation contained a potentially fatal flaw, which threw Russia off course. Privileged groups of ex-KGB siloviki, while occupying high administrative posts, developed their own business activities and accelerated the growth of an already pervasive system of corruption. Worse still, the groups started recklessly fighting each other, to try to seize the country’s most lucrative assets. In this situation, Putin saw that only some rather sharp changes could preserve his power and wealth. These were to adopt a more aggressive, Russian-nationalist ideology, playing to popular feelings of deprivation of international status. This is what he has done with notable but undoubtedly not secure success in recent years.