Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

From Biology to Linguistics: The Definition of Arthron in Aristotle's Poetics pp 1–36Cite as

The Problem

  • Chapter
  • First Online:

  • 178 Accesses

Part of the book series: UNIPA Springer Series ((USS))

Abstract

The commentary on the two controversial definitions of Aristotle’s Poetics opens with these discouraging words in the Alfred Gudeman edition of the Poetics. As is universally acknowledged, the greatest difficulties are undoubtedly posed by the definition of ἄρθρον, which is however so closely linked to that of σύνδεσμος that it is impossible to consider one without the other. The following book is therefore an analysis of the two definitions taken as a whole: the problem of how to attribute meaning to one or the other term cannot be solved unless the two definitions are both taken into consideration. But this is still not enough.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   69.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   89.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   89.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    «There are few passages of similar length in the ancient literature, except for spurious or dubious fragments, which present difficulties as unsurmountable to our understanding as the following remarks on σύνδεσμος and ἄρθρον». Gudeman (1934), pp. 344–345.

  2. 2.

    «L’Aristotele linguista con l’Aristotele biologo e naturalista». Laspia 1997, p. 80.

  3. 3.

    Cfr. Laspia (2005), p. 7; now also Laspia (2018).

  4. 4.

    See, lastly, Vegetti-Ademollo (2016), pp. 31–45.

  5. 5.

    Laspia (1997), p. 80.

  6. 6.

    With Bywater (1909), p. 273, Pagliaro (1956), p. 88, Dupont Roc and Lallot (1980), p. 103, and contrary to Schramm (2005), p. 188, footnote 2, it seems appropriate here to restore the καθ′ αὑτόν found in the Parisinus.

  7. 7.

    A detailed history of humanist comments on the Poetics and the amendments proposed is found in Morpurgo-Tagliabue (1967), pp. 33–43; see also Gallavotti (1972), especially pp. 3, 13 ff.

  8. 8.

    So writes Kassel, who reproduces the passage as shown above, but in the critical apparatus remarks: «corrupta et confusa». Even Dupont-Roc and Lallot, to whom we owe one of the most coherent attempts to interpret the passage as a whole, think that the passage is corrupt and pose unsolvable problem. In their own words: «le passage qui va de 56 b 38 a 57 a 10, consacré à la ‘conjonction’ (sundesmos) et à l’ ‘articulation’ (arthron) pose des problèmes insolubles. On se trouve en effet en face d’un texte gravement corrompu (touts les éditeurs s’accordent sur ce point), et dont les corruptions ne peuvent ni être dèlimitèes avec certitude, ni, a fortiori, amendées par des conjectures raisonablement fondées» 1980, pp. 321–2). Barnes is of the same opinion: «The note on connectors, which is immediately followed by a note on articulators, is textually corrupt; and the corruption infects not merely the details but the whole thrust of the note—or rather, of the pair of notes» (2007, p. 175). In one of the more recent Italian translations of the Poetics, the one edited by Pierluigi Donini, the desperation («disperazione») of the interpreters is emphasized, and it concludes with the statement: «il testo non è qui ancora sanato» (Donini 2008, p. 137). Even in the most recent edition of Guastini the text is considered uncertain and corrupt. We read, ad loc.: «Qui il testo risulta particolarmente confuso, e da tutti gli edd. è considerato incerto…è l’intero brano…a non avere un chiaro significato e ad essere probabilmente corrotto» (2010, pp. 310–1).

  9. 9.

    See Tarán and Gutas (2012), pp. 198–199 for the Greek text and p. 284 for the comment.

  10. 10.

    For the Arabic tradition, see in particular pp. 423–424, to which we will return.

  11. 11.

    See Else (1957), p. 567, who notes: «they have very little, astonishing little connection with any other part of Aristotle’s poetry»; on this topic, see Morpurgo-Tagliabue (1967), p. 16, Somville (1975), p. 18, footnote 1.

  12. 12.

    «They are technical in very high degree, specially Chaps. 20 and 21» [Else (1957), p. 357].

  13. 13.

    Against such discomfort however speaks De interpretatione, which reads: οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι ἀφείσθωσαν· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἢ ποιητικῆς οἰκειοτέρα ἡ σκέψις (4, 17 a 5).

  14. 14.

    See Gallavotti (1954), (1972), (1974), whose positions will be discussed in more detail below.

  15. 15.

    See Conj. p. 214, 4 Schneider; see a discussion of the passage, the sources, and the entire ancient debate about it in Dupont-Roc and Lallot (1980), pp. 327–8; Ildefonse (1997), p. 109 and notes; Barnes (2007), especially pp. 186–199 for σύνδεσμος before Apollonius, pp. 119–216 for Apollonius Dyscolus. On the relationship between the definition of σύνδεσμος in Aristotle and what in Posidonius is attributed to Apollonius Dyscolus, see the brief note of Belli (1987).

  16. 16.

    See, in this regard, the observations in Schmitt 2008, to which we refer especially for the opinions of ancient commentators. They considered Aristotle far superior to the Stoics, unlike many modern interpreters (see pp. 608–18, especially pp. 608–18). Among these we naturally find Steinthal 1890; also the contribution of Pohlenz (1939), emphatically titled Die Begründung abendländischen Sprachlehre der durch die Stoa, reflects an opinion that was widely shared between the late 1800s and the first half of the 1900s.

  17. 17.

    Barnes is the most exhaustive and convincing on this point; see Barnes (2007), pp. 168–263; see also Barnes (1996), quoted below.

  18. 18.

    As is well known, the problem was raised mainly by Gudeman and Gallavotti, and it will be discussed later.

  19. 19.

    As far as I know, a similar notation is used for the first time in van Bennekom (1975) and was used again by Dupont-Roc and Lallot (1980), Schramm (2005), as well as in this paper.

  20. 20.

    «Sicher ist hier nur, daß A. unmöglich seinen Zuhörern je zwei Definitionen des σύνδεσμος und ἄρθρον zur beliebigen Auswahl zur Verfügung gestellt hatte. Es ist mir wenigstens trotz der unzuzähligen ὅροι in dem aristotelischen Corpus nicht gelungen, auch nur ein einziges paralleles Beispiel zu entdecken» Gudeman 1934, p. 340). The problem is later greatly amplified in Gallavotti (1954), who, in order to avoid it, proposed—as we shall see—an imaginative rewriting of S2 and an interpretation that reduces and tends to merge σύνδεσμος and ἄρθρον.

  21. 21.

    Thus van Bennekom (1975), p. 402.

  22. 22.

    Such a case, doubtfully put forward by Gudeman («Ersatzdefinitionen an dem Rand geschrieben» 1934, p. 340), is much more vigorously reproposed in van Bennekom (1975), pp. 401–2; see, in this regard, Schramm (2005), pp. 192–3, which uses the expression quoted above.

  23. 23.

    In the definitions of ‘one’ and ‘being’ given by Aristotle in Book Δ of Metaphysics, a distinction is clearly made between what is (or is unitary) ‘by itself’ and what is (or is unitary) ‘thanks to a connector’ (δεσμῷ, συνδέσμῳ). See Met. Δ 6, 7, 1015 b 16- 1017 b 9, especially 1015 b 36-1016 a 10. At the same time, in Poet. xx, 1457 a 28-30, De int. 5, 17 a 9, as well as in numerous passages of Metaphysics, Aristotle recognizes two types of λόγος: one which ‘manifests the unit’ (ἓν δηλῶν), which is thus unitary by itself, and one which is ‘unitary thanks to a connector’ (συνδέσμῳ εἷς).

  24. 24.

    Thus, for example, Ildefonse (1997), who in almost all his reasoning follows Dupont-Roc and Lallot, who for their part remain scrupulously faithful to the original text and numerous others. Even Gudeman (1934, p. 340) would have gone in this direction, but he did not consider the passage amendable. Choosing to put his faith in the Arabic version, Barnes however expunges S2 and concludes: «It is not difficult to see that there has been some textual interference between the two successive notes, and that a part of the note on articulators has been wrongly anticipated in the note on connectors. In that case, the note on connectors must be severely pruned—and the wild incoherence disappears» (2007, p. 176).

  25. 25.

    See Laspia (2013), especially pp. 109–110 as regards the Arabic edition.

  26. 26.

    See, for example, Dupont-Roc and Lallot (1980), p. 327, Schramm (2005), pp. 195, 201.

  27. 27.

    This has been correctly pointed out, as we shall see, both by Rosén (1990) and by Schramm (2005), whatever the interpretations then chosen by the two authors may be.

  28. 28.

    Probl. xix 20, 919 a 23-6: Καθάπερ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐνίων ἐξαιρεθέντων συνδέσμων οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ λόγος Ἑλληνικός, οἷον τό τε καὶ τὸ καί, ἔνιοι δὲ οὐθὲν λυποῦσιν διὰ τὸ τοῖς μὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι χρῆσθαι πολλάκις, (…) τοῖς δὲ μή.

  29. 29.

    Especially Swiggers and Wouters (2002), pp. 111–2: «Although we have already pointed out that this ‘merology’ is not one of the parts of speech (or word classes—as grammatical-semantic ‘typization’), the fact remains that we should ask ourselves in what way the μέρη τῆς λέξεως correlate with (various) word-classes (or subgroups of word-classes)». The same concept is reiterated with greater force in Rosén (1990), p. 112: He claims that μέρη τῆς λέξεως cannot be read and translated as ‘parts of speech’, with reference to grammatical word classes, because λέξις does not mean ‘speech’ (as ‘language’), but ‘vocal utterance’. «Man muss jedoch vorerst den Begriff der “Redeteile” näher ins Auge fassen; er geht auf μέρη τῆς λέξεως zurück, λέξις bedeutet aber bei Aristoteles nicht “Rede”, sondern “sprachlicher Ausdruck”, und so haben wir es bei der Aufzählung dieser konstitutiven Komponenten, μέρη, gar nichts mit grammatischen Wortklassen zu tun».

  30. 30.

    This seems to be what Swiggers and Wouters (2002) do, admitting as examples of ἄρθρον both the preposition and the article, and they leave the list of referents open.

  31. 31.

    Of all the solutions, the authors discard in fact only my own and that of von Fragstein, according to which ἄρθρον is (or, for me, is also) ‘the copula’; but not without reason. The idea of von Fragstein is in fact only postulated on the basis of De interpretatione 16 b 19-25 and finds no foothold in the text of the Poetics, while my idea of 1997 is erroneous in the explanation of the first example of ἄρθρον. Also Barnes 1996 is forced to admit that ‘to be’ cannot be considered a verb, but he erroneously thinks that the copula, as a ligament, can be considered a connector (σύνδεσμος). We shall see why this conclusion is far from convincing.

  32. 32.

    For this aspect, and more generally for the entire phonetic section of the twentieth chapter of the Poetics, see Laspia (2001), (2008), (2010) and especially 2013: the vowel, pronounced in the metric unit which is the basis for the length of a syllable, is in fact both στοιχεῖον and συλλαβή.

  33. 33.

    The adjective λευκός is in fact defined as ὄνομα in the Poetics (1457 a 16) and ῥῆμα in De interpretatione (20 b 42-43), not without reasons. In the Poetics, which deals with λέξις—i.e., ‘énonciation’, ‘vocal utterance’ (‘énounciation’, ‘sprachliche Ausdruck’), λευκός is defined as ὄνομα because, in Greek, adjective are declined as nouns. In De interpretatione, which deals with λόγος, i.e., ‘proposition’, λευκός is defined as ῥῆμα because, from a logical-syntactical point of view, it acts as a predicate in the proposition (λόγος). I thank my friend and collegue Luisa Brucale for helping me to reflect on this point.

  34. 34.

    For this, and more generally, for the theory of λόγος ὀνοματώδης in Posterior Analytics (93 b 31), see Barnes (1994), pp. 222–223, and references therein; see also Laspia (2018). But above all, see Scarpat (1950), p. 36, footnote 10, also useful for quotes of Philoponus on the Second Analytics.

  35. 35.

    This assumption is shared by many interpreters; see, for example, Gudeman «Diese in aphoristisch hingeworfen Sätzen gegebene Erörterung der μέρη λέξεως ist die beim weiteren die älteste, die uns enthalten ist» (1934, p. 336). Morpurgo-Tagliabue also describes it as «the first linguistic summary of the West» (1967, p. 14), and many other examples can be given.

  36. 36.

    As Steinthal does, for example, at the very beginning of his discussion of Aristotle in Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft Griechen und bei den Römern,where he states that Aristotle deals not with how things actually are, but only with their analytical constituents: «Noch nicht: wie die Dinge werden, sondern nur: aus welchen Teilen sie bestehen, ist die Aufgabe, die sich Aristoteles stellt. Er analysirt, abstrahirt, classificirt» (1890, p. 183). It is common opinion that Aristotle is the father of modern treatises, and with this, of specialized science; see, for example, Vegetti (1987), (1992), Vegetti, Ademollo (2016), pp. 31–45. Contra, Lloyd (1968), It. edition 1985, pp. 102–5, Laspia (1997), pp. 79–83, 126–133.

  37. 37.

    So rightly does Pagliaro 1956, as do I (1997, pp. 79-83), though we reach very different conclusions.

  38. 38.

    This is particularly evidenced by Gallavotti, see 1954, pp. 242–5, 1975, pp. 3–7.

  39. 39.

    And in fact Gallavotti (1954), p. 247, proceeds without delay to integrate καί, attributing to σύνδεσμος the examples of ἄρθρον, retranscribing them as he sees fit (οἷόν φημι τὸ καί, τὸ ὅπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα), and considering ἄρθρον as a simple non-technical synonym of σύνδεσμος (pp. 43–4).

  40. 40.

    The conjunction καί is in fact an example of σύνδεσμος in Rhet. Γ 5, 1407 a 26-7, with μέν, δέ, ἐπεί, γάρ, and is again mentioned in 1407 b 39-1408 a 1. The aforementioned Problemata Γ 20, 919 a 23-26 also alludes to καί and τε and to their difference from the σύνδεσμοι that can be freely omitted without weakening the discourse. On the authenticity of some of the Aristotelian Problemata, especially those related to acoustics and music, see Marenghi (1962), (1981), p. 166; Flashar (1991), p. 503; see also the preface by Centrone in Centrone 2011. The common Aristotelian practice of making a collage of quotations from his own works, referring simultaneously to all of them, is enough, I think, to explain the absence of examples in S2, since we find them in Rhet. Γ and in the Problemata. On this topic, see Fazzo (2004), Rashed (2007), Giuffrida (2014), pp. 19–79, especially pp. 38–39. The absence of examples in A2 is due, I believe, to the coincidence of the referents of S1 and A2.

  41. 41.

    This point is insisted upon by all the interpreters who refuse to identify the Aristotelian ἄρθρον with the article: in particular, Gudeman, Dupont-Roc and Lallot, Barnes, and me.

  42. 42.

    Barnes observes: «Aristotelian articulators are odd birds; the Greek grammarians do not accept them as a part of saying—indeed…Greek grammarians never mention them» (2007, p. 176).

  43. 43.

    This is noticed by all interpreters, whether they expunge ἄρθρον [as does, i.e., Rostagni (1945), pp. 119–120, Morpurgo-Tagliabue (1967), pp. 43], or whether they keep it, like Schramm (2005).

  44. 44.

    Attempts to normalize the position of ἄρθρον in the initial list, placing it after σύνδεσμος (in the event it has not been expunged), are practically innumerable. Emblematic is the (bad) example of Steinthal (1890); such an intention can even be found in critical editions [see Hardy (1961), p. 58]. Nevertheless, the different location of ἄρθρον in the initial list is a sort of lectio difficilior: indeed no one, except Aristotle, would have chosen to put it where it is; see, on this subject, Lucas (1968), p. 199–200, Halliwell (1987), pp. 155–57.

  45. 45.

    De comp. verb. 2, 8, 1; the passages are listed in full in Schramm (2005), pp. 189–90, notes 4, 5, and 6.

  46. 46.

    Inst. I, 4, 18.

  47. 47.

    De comp. verb. 2, 7, 2 (= Dem 48, 232, 20 ff).

  48. 48.

    Rhet. Alex. 25, 1435 a 34-b 14: Προσέχε τοῖς καλουμένοις ἄρθροις ὅπως ἐν τῷ δέοντι προστιθῆται (…). Τὸ δὲ προσέχειν τοῖς ἄρθροις ὅπως ἐν τῷ δέοντι προστιθῆται ἐπὶ τῶνδε ὅρα· οὗτος ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦτον τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀδικεῖ. Νῦν μὲν <γὰρ> ἐγγενόμενα τὰ ἄρθρα σαφῆ ποιεῖ τὴν λέξιν, ἐξαιρεθέντα δὲ ἀσαφῆ ποιήσει.

  49. 49.

    On all these issues—which here are marginal—see Pierre Chiron’s excellent edition of the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum recently published by Belles Lettres (2002, p. viii–clxxvii); see, in particular, pp. xl–cvii for the problems of dating and attribution of the work.

  50. 50.

    See Lucas (1968), pp. xxii–xxiv; on this Barnes notes: «In the De Interpretatione A. uses the term ‘σύνδεσμος’, it offers no analysis or explanation. For that we must go to the Poetics, which the source of Dionysios and Quintilianus either did not know or else chose to ignore» (2007, p. 175).

  51. 51.

    See Chiron 2002, p. liv–lvi.

  52. 52.

    Simplicius, In Arist. Cat. (Kalbfleisch 10, 24): καθὸ μὲν γὰρ λέξεις, ἄλλας ἔχουσι πραγματείας, ἃς ἐν τῷ περὶ τῶν τοῦ λόγου στοιχείων ὅ τε Θεόφραστος ἀνακινεῖ καὶ οἱ περὶ αὐτὸν γεγραφότες, οἷον πότερον ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα τοῦ λόγου στοιχεῖα, ἢ καὶ ἄρθρα καὶ σύνδεσμοι καὶ ἄλλα τινά, λέξεως δὲ καὶ ταῦτα μέρη, λόγου δὲ ὄνομα καὶ ῥῆμα. On the passage, see Vahlen (1914), p. 117, Pagliaro (1956), p. 86 note 8, Laspia (1997), p. 117. This is an important document, not only because it solidly attests the presence of ἄρθρον in the peripatetic environment, already attested in Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, but also because it settles the vexed question of the discrepancy between the μέρη τῆς λέξεως in the Poetics and the exclusive mention of ὄνομα and ῥῆμα in De interpretatione and in Rhet. Γ 2, 1404 b 26-7 (ὄντων δ′ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος συνέστηκεν).

  53. 53.

    Barnes however notes: «‘articles’ (i.e., as translation for ‘articulators’, ἄρθρα) is wildly misleading—and, as I have already said, Aristotle’s use of ‘ἄρθρον’ has nothing to do with the use of the word in later grammatical texts» (2007, p. 224). Of the same opinion is Davis (1992), p. 105, who renders ἄρθρον with joint but, accepting Hartung’s conjecture, believes that Aristotle here alludes only to prepositions, or little grammatical tools («petits outils grammaticaux») of which Wartelle (1985), p. 29 speaks. The position of Valgimigli is very interesting: in his first edition of the Poetics (1916) he rendered ἄρθρον with ‘articolazione’ on the basis of Margoliouth (1911) and the Arabic version, and rightly intended it to be opposed to σύνδεσμος (pp. 82–3, note 4). In subsequent editions (1934, 1946), he will however trust the authority of Rostagni (1927), quoted in the preface to the second edition (1934, p. xiii) and unfortunately will decide to expunge the reference to ἄρθρον.

  54. 54.

    See Laspia (1997), pp. 119–120; contra, Melazzo (2002), p. 151.

  55. 55.

    It is important to clarify that the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum is not an authentic work of Aristotle. There no longer seems to be any doubt of this; see Chiron (2002), pp. liii–lxvi.

  56. 56.

    See Lanza (1972), Laspia (1997), p. 119.

  57. 57.

    Thus, for example, Steinthal (1890), p. 264; and many others.

  58. 58.

    This would thus confirm the axiom of Castelvetro, according to which the order of the definitions of the twentieth chapter of the Poetics should be from asemantic and indivisible to semantic and divisible («non significativo e non divisibile, al significativo e divisibile»); see Morpurgo-Tagliabue (1968), pp. 29–42, especially p. 33, which embraces this view. It seems to be shared by Belardi, too, who titled his often republished essay Il semplice e il complesso nella teoresi aristotelica della forma linguistica (see 1985, pp. 99–120), where he underlines the logical character of Aristotelican point of view («il carattere logicizzante del punto di vista aristotelico», p. 99).

  59. 59.

    On Aristotle’s definition of συλλαβή, see Laspia 2001, 2008, 2013. I hope to return to this subject.

  60. 60.

    Even for Pagliaro (1956), pp. 103–4 and Rosén 1990 the discrepancy between the order in the initial list and the order in the definitions is not a problem, and the order of ἄρθρον in the initial list is significant; the reasons given by the two scholars, however, are different from the ones I affirm here.

  61. 61.

    Only I, in 1997 (p. 116), tried to interpret φημί as an ‘articulation’, i.e., a kind of enunciative operator, within a definition (‘man I call a terrestrial biped animal, etc.’). The hypothesis has not received, so to speak, «a warm welcome»; Schramm in fact observed: «Speziell gegen Laspia ist zu sagen, daß φημί in solchen Ausdrücken wie “dico – o si dice – ‘uomo’ l’animale terrestre bipede” gerade kein Kopula ist, sondern ein eigenständiges Prädikat» (2005, p. 211, nota 46). My hypothesis has raised similar concerns among reviewers of my book, see Gusmani (1998), p. 135, who claims that I prove convincingly that the metaphor of the articulation has spread throughout the linguistic terminology with a value that is indeed very different from the contemporary one, but I am far from convincing on particular questions, i.e., my interpretation of the Aristotelian copula («L’A. dimostra convincentemente come, sulla base dell’analogia tra enunciato e organismo vivente, la metafora dell’articolazione abbia preso piede nella terminologia linguistica, con una valenza dunque molto diversa da quella moderna. Meno persuasive sono invece le pagine dedicate ad alcune questioni particolari, come l’interpretazione aristotelica della copula, ove si sarebbe dovuta esplicitare la confusione latente col (quasi) omofono verbo ‘esistere’». Melazzo is certainly the scholar who discusses my work in full detail, dedicating a whole paragraph of his essay on ἄρθρον (2002, pp. 147–151) to my hypothesis. On the unsustainability of the interpretation of φημί as copula, unfortunately, he is completely right (pp. 149–150). It is in the rest of his argumentation that I am unable to find any sound reasoning. It seems to boil down to constant references to Pagliaro (1956), whose theses he embraces, and a collage of quotations from later authors.

  62. 62.

    Gallavotti (1954), (1972), especially, insisted on this point, and, more recently, Schramm (2005). We will examine later, in detail, the state of the text and all the solutions proposed so far.

  63. 63.

    Cfr. Waitz (1849), Scarpat (1950).

  64. 64.

    «L’indizio più forte per sospettare interpolazione è il fatto che l’ἄρθρον, fra gli elementi dell’elocuzione, è l’unico a non essere mai più nominato nel corpus aristotelico genuino…mentre le altre unità …sono per Aristotele elemento di riflessione costante» (Belardi 1985, pp. 142–3).

  65. 65.

    See Laspia (1997), pp. 26–31 for its uses in the field of anatomy, pp. 46–48 for uses in the embryological sense, pp. 59–69 for uses in the field of phonetics, and pp. 79–116 in relation to the definition of ἄρθρον of the Poetics. I will explain in further detail below which opinions from my work of 1997 I now withdraw; they relate mainly to the interpretation of the first example of ἄρθρον.

  66. 66.

    On the transition from Aristotle to the post-Aristotelian uses of ἄρθρον, see. Laspia (1997), pp. 117–126.

  67. 67.

    As Lucas expresses very well: «If the passage were a later interpolation one would expect the account of ἄρθρον to be current in the interpolator’s own time» (1968, pp. 201–2). Even Dupont-Roc and Lallot, although aware of the problems posed by the definition (see note 4 above), after wondering if one needs, along with many other editors, to get rid of ἄρθρον («faut-il, avec de nonbreuses éditors, se débarasser de l’arthron?», 1980, p. 322), answer: «Unfortunately, if one may say, one cannot get off so cheaply: (a) che corruption (if admitted of) of the former definition does not imply that the latter one, and in general the whole passage, are interpolated; (b) the very oddity and the difficulty of the passage contradict the interpolation hypothesis: it would be very unlikely that a copyist well read in grammar, who is going to complete Aristotle’s grammatical theory, gives for ἄρθρον, which since the end of the second century a. C. Seems to be fixed to the sense of ‘article’, a description so little consistent with that sense, and above all exemplified by prepositions («Malheureusement, si l’on peut dire, il n’est possibile de s’en tirer à si bon compte: a) la corruption (supposée admise) d’un définition n’implique en rien que l’autre, et, plus généralement, l’ensemble du passage consacré à l’arthron, soit interpolée; b) l’étrangeté même, et la difficulté du passage plaident contre l’hypothèse de l’interpolation: il paraît exclu qu’un copiste féru de grammaire, voulant compléter la théorie grammaticale d’Aristote, donne d’arthron, qui, dès la fin du II siècle avant notre ère (Aristarque, Denys le Thrace), semble fixé au sens d’’article’, une description aussi peu compatibile avec ce sens, exemplifiée au surplus par des prépositions» pp. 322–23).

  68. 68.

    «The text is not completely satisfactory—in particular, the clause ‘for example…and the rest’ cannot be right (…). Something must also be done about the illustrative examples; but so far as I can see, that is a matter of pure speculation» (Barnes 2007, p. 176).

  69. 69.

    Thus, for example, Lanza (1987), to which we refer for a list of the previous examples.

  70. 70.

    Thus, for example, Ildefonse (1997), to which we refer for the others who adopted the same solution; Barnes 2007 however expunges S1, on the basis of the Arabic version of the Poetics.

  71. 71.

    Thus van Bennekom (1975), Rosén (1990), Schramm (2005), and many others.

  72. 72.

    Thus, for example, Morpurgo-Tagliabue (1968), Zanatta (2004). A similar solution is compatible both with the total expunction of ἄρθρον (Morpurgo-Tagliabue, Belardi) and with its conservation (Zanatta). Usually, those who move the examples also refer the definition (A1) to σύνδεσμος. Zanatta instead keeps both A1 and A2, and moves only the examples, which seems highly questionable, if we consider that ἄρθρον in this sense is probably an Aristotelian neologism, while σύνδεσμος was already known to Isocrates and to pre-Aristotelian rhetoric.

  73. 73.

    As mentioned above, the Stoics called prepositions προθετικοὶ σύνδεσμοι and the distinction between the two classes is not attested before Dionysius Thrax (see Belli 1987). But when he discusses the σύνδεσμοι at length in the third book of Rhetoric, Aristotle mentions only examples of coordinative and conjunctive particles and sees in their correct correspondence the principle of correctly spoken Greek, see Rhet. Γ 5, 1407 a 19-30. Examples of correct coordination regard μέν and δέ, to which ἐπεί, γάρ, τε and καί are added in a later example.

  74. 74.

    Thus, for example Rostagni, 1945, followed by Valgimigli in his two editions of the Poetics after the 1916 edition; also Belardi (1985), and unfortunately von Fragstein 1967, who would have had every reason to consider the definition of ἄρθρον authentic. Further details on the various interpretive positions in Zanatta (2004), Schramm (2005).

  75. 75.

    On this subject, see the ample discussion in Barnes (2007), pp. 168–263.

  76. 76.

    Kassel (1965), p. v.

  77. 77.

    «Translationem arabicam (saec. x, ad syriacum exemplar noni ut videntur saeculi confectam)» (Kassel 1965, p. x). On the Arabic version of the Poetics see Gallavotti (1954), (1972); Rosén (1990), and now especially Gutas in Tarán & Gutas 2012.

  78. 78.

    See Gallavotti (1954), pp. 251–4. It is nice that what we learn from the Arabic version appears to prove him wrong quite regularly, but he proceeds straight on his way. One can find a comprehensive review of the terminology used in the Arabic version of the Poetics, enriched with comparisons with Hebrew and other languages, in Rosén (1990), pp. 117–119. But the best gloss on our passage is certainly Gutas’ long note on the Arabic version, in Tarán and Gutas (2012).

  79. 79.

    See Pagliaro (1956), and above all Schramm (2005), which is discussed below, as well as Laspia (1997).

  80. 80.

    «Dabei scheint der überlieferte Text weitgehend intakt zu sein…Trotz der gute Überlieferung steht die Interpretation vor große Schwierigkeiten» (Schramm 200, pp.187–9).

  81. 81.

    Unfortunately, Theophrastus is not a very well known; quite few scholars write on him nowadays; relevant exceptions are Falcon (2012), Cerami and Falcon (2015), Pignatone (2017).

  82. 82.

    For a similar interpretation of the rapid decline of the Peripatetic school, see Lennox (1991), pp. 110–130.

  83. 83.

    Thus Schmitt (2008), p. 620.

  84. 84.

    «Völlig unerfahrene Naivität sowol in Betreff des Wesens des Denkens und der Begriffe, als auch mancher Gegenstände der Erkentiss, namentlich auch der Grammatik: so dass ich mich beim Lesung der aristotelischen Werke bald von Bewunderung ergriffen finde, bald von Ueberdruss erfüllt, bald zum Lächeln geneigt» (Steinthal (1890), p. 185). Such statements speak for themselves. Steinthal will be remembered for writing these words—and frankly I do not envy him.

  85. 85.

    «Verdächtig»p. 184.

  86. 86.

    «Die Stelle, welche die Definition von σύνδεσμος und ἄρθρον enthält, ist leider so verderbt, dass sich keine Conjektur wahrscheinlich machen lässt» (1890, p. 263).

  87. 87.

    «…weil der schlechteste Grammatiker die Sache besser gemacht haben würde» (1890, p. 265).

  88. 88.

    «Es gibt m.W. in der antiken Literatur nur wenige Stellen änlichen Umfangs, von unleserlichen oder verstümmelten Fragmenten abgesehen, die dem Verständnis so unüberwindliche Schwiergkeiten bieten wie die folgende Erörterung über den σύνδεσμος und das ἄρθρον, und zwar trägt dazu nicht nur, wie bereits oben dargelegt wurde, der heillose verderbdte Zustand der Überlieferung bei. Denn selbst wo der Text unversehrt zu sein scheint, ist der Inhalt höchst problematisch». Gudeman (1934), pp. 329–340. Gudeman is thus the founder of the latest exegetical trend, which sees the problems as lying principally in the content and wording of the definitions.

  89. 89.

    Gudeman (1934), p. 345. Previous attempts at interpretation, represented then by the commentaries of Vahlen and Bywater, are in fact treated by Gudeman as elements of a lively imagination: «Hypothesenbauten, wie z.B die Vahlens…und Bywaters …, die den überlieferten, aber eigenstandenermaßen verderbten Text wie Karten durcheinendermischen, mit Athetesen, Änderungen, Verschiebungen und Lücken operieren…führen sich selbst ad absurdum und sind günstisten Falles ein geistreiches Spiel der Phantasie» (1934, p. 340). If Gudeman’s opinions appear harsh, at least his intent to make use of more sober and motivated philological observations is laudable.

  90. 90.

    «Über das ἄρθρον im aristotelischen Sinne läßt sich mit Sicherheit nur negativ sagen, daß es wie σύνδεσμος noch kein einheitlicher Begriff war, und vor allem noch nicht den ‘Artikel’ bezeichnet» (1934, p. 341). A similar judgment is closely echoed in the aforementioned Barnes (2007), p. 224.

  91. 91.

    1934, p. 340.

  92. 92.

    See Laspia (1997), (2001), (2008), (2010), (2013), but the interest was already alive in my B.A. thesis (1985). I hope to publish a monograph on this subject soon.

  93. 93.

    In Barnes’s opinion, this is an error in Aristotle’s grammatical views: «Thus, Aristotle started logic down the wrong grammatical road» (Barnes 1996, p. 180)».

  94. 94.

    As in the case of ‘it is raining’, as someone brought into play in the attempt to tame our definition; see Valgimigli (1916), p. 83, note 3, who complains that Aristotle neglects to add that «anche βαδίζει è significativo di per sé». But βαδίζει, taken by itself, is a καθηγορούμενον, a καθ’ ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖον (De int. 3, 16 b 7); it is therefore not at all ‘significant by itself’.

  95. 95.

    On this definition see the recent, and excellent, work of Graffi (2015), to whose bibliography I refer for the most exhaustive mention I have found of editions, translations, and comments, ancient and recent, of Poetics (pp. 450–55). On the subject, see also Ax (2000), Baratin-Desbordes (1981), Thornton (1986), and by the same author, Graffi (1986), (2004).

  96. 96.

    Gudeman (1934), p. 340. Gallavotti, too, moves away from this arbitrariness and is the only publisher besides Gudeman who eliminates the brackets, as far as I know: see Gallavotti (1974), p. 74, 178–179.

  97. 97.

    See Gallavotti (1974), pp. 175–6, ad loc. A lot could be said about Gallavotti’s edition of the Poetics: of all the editions it is the one which presents the most extreme (and imaginative) solutions.

  98. 98.

    «Fra i luoghi della Poetica più manomessi da editori e interpreti, è nel cap. 20, la breve trattazione della coniunctio (o convictio, secondo il calco quintilianeo di syndesmos). Ma una maggiore fiducia nella tradizione manoscritta è stata anche recentemente suggerita, e sostenuta con vigoroso sforzo esegetico; e dobbiamo senza dubbio salvaguardare il testo quanto più possibile da ogni ritocco formale» (1954, p. 141). The reference here is to Antonino Pagliaro, who published, also in 1954, the first edition of his essay Il capitolo linguistico della Poetica di Aristotele («Ricerche Linguistiche» III, 1954, pp. 1–55), republished in Nuovi saggi di critica semantica, D’Anna, Messina-Firenze 1956, pp. 77–151.

  99. 99.

    «Non possiamo – data l’incertezza del testo e dell’interpretazione – attribuire all’autore una dottrina, che secondo la precisa testimonianza delle fonti, gli era estranea; non possiamo ammettere che a breve distanza sia ripetuto tale e quale un intero periodo senza nessuna giustificazione logica e stilistica; (4) Non possiamo ammettere che di un unico concetto l’autore fornisca più di una definizione in maniera alternativa o addirittura contrastante». (Gallavotti 1954, p. 142)

  100. 100.

    The problem is discussed in Belli 1987. The author examines the positions of Pagliaro, Belardi, and Gallavotti in relation to the testimony of Posidonius and basically agrees with Gallavotti.

  101. 101.

    «Quindi il paragrafo sul syndesmos comprende solo i tre periodi che ho qui sopra indicato…Essenziale, nella mia interpretazione, è il supplemento di <οὐ γάρ> a principio di (2): ma il vantaggio che se ne trae per il testo è decisivo: non c’è più contraddizione concettuale, non ci sono duplici definizioni del medesimo oggetto, non c’è un elemento del linguaggio denominato arthron e diverso dal syndesmos, non c’è nessun’altra correzione o espunzione da eseguire nel testo al fine di ristabilire il concetto o la forma del passo» (1972, p. 6–7). Wonderful. But, at this point the text no longer exists. Aristotle is no longer present. Similar ‘conservative restoration’ makes us bitterly regret the «Ausübung der ars nesciendi» of Gudeman—which is saying quite a lot.

  102. 102.

    «But in view of the confessedly unfinished and sketchy state of the Poetics, this is in itself no ground for athetizing one or both alternatives. For all we know, it may have been Aristotle’s intention to work them up into a whole or to select either as the more adequate» (1975, pp. 402–3).

  103. 103.

    I am informed of the existence of this work only by Schramm 2005, p. 192 ff.

  104. 104.

    «Il testo venga trattato con molta libertà al fine di eliminare in esso presunte interpolazioni e errori» (Pagliaro 1956, p. 79),

  105. 105.

    «La tradizione della Poetica non merita tanta diffidenza» (Pagliaro 1956, p. 80).

  106. 106.

    «Si sa che è buona norma dubitare del testo e cercare di correggerlo…Ma quando il senso sembra che manchi del tutto, e si tratta di un testo di tradizione non grosslana, come può essere quella di uno scritto aristotelico, il rispetto che si deve alla cultura bizantina impone più che mai l’obbligo di lasciare da parte i tagli, le sostituzioni, gli spostamenti che, mancando un qualsiasi appiglio alla tradizione, si risolvono in atti arbitrari» (Pagliaro 1956, pp. 80–1).

  107. 107.

    «Il punto di vista da cui muove l’analisi» (Pagliaro 1956, p. 87).

  108. 108.

    «L’elocuzione appare ad Aristotele come un nastro fonico-semantico in cui sono individuabili varie unità» (Pagliaro 1956, p. 87).

  109. 109.

    Cfr. Laspia 2008, 2013, 2018a.

  110. 110.

    La fonologia di Aristotele (1956, pp. 140–5).

  111. 111.

    «Secondo noi, la duplicità delle definizioni deriva, come si è già accennato, dal duplice criterio a cui si ispira l’analisi aristotelica delle parti del discorso …e cioè il criterio morfologico-lessicale e quello sintattico-logico» (Pagliaro 1956, p. 90).

  112. 112.

    Barnes, who omits S1, maintains it is A2 that refers to expletive particles that ‘articulate’ the sentence without unifying it (pp. 223–5). He implicitly shares, therefore, the worst idea of Dupot-Roc and Lallot: that ἄρθρον has a weaker function than σύνδεσμος.

  113. 113.

    «La congettura di Hartung ἀμφί è l’unica paleograficamente plausibile». Pagliaro 1956, p. 94, note 13.

  114. 114.

    In his own words: «Questa interpretazione ha bisogno di attenta considerazione. Epperò per prima cosa è necessario affermare che per arthron non si può intendere se non il pronome dimostrativo e l’articolo che ne deriva, con esclusione di ogni altra parte del discorso, e in particolare della preposizione, che fa parte del syndesmos» (Pagliaro 1956, p. 85).

  115. 115.

    «Il Pagliaro ne dà una spiegazione espremamente elegante, sebbene un po’ capziosa» (Morpurgo-Tagliabue 1967, p. 54).

  116. 116.

    «ἀμφί e περί non sono dati nel testo come esempi di ἄρθρα (come si è detto, mai le preposizioni sono state considerate appartenenti a tale categoria e perciò la loro presenza dà luogo a una situazione interpretativa impossibile e disperata); sono invece esempi del διορίζειν attribuito all’ἄρθρον, si riferiscono quindi al διορισμόν e non a tutta la definizione» (Pagliaro 1956, p. 100).

  117. 117.

    The author, in fact, has published numerous works on the subject, such as the critical edition of the grammar of Dionysius Thrax (1989) and the syntax of Apollonius Dyscolus (1997).

  118. 118.

    1980, p. 322.

  119. 119.

    Interesting clarifications of the meaning of λέξις are also found in Rosén (1990), p. 112, Ricoeur (1996), pp. 347–349, and Guastini (2010), pp. 306–8. All the authors agree that λέξις is to be understood as the elocution, that is, the material, phonetic or graphic enunciation, which has its semantic representation in the λόγος. However, it must not be forgotten that λόγος, amound its many meanings, also includes the one of ‘simple proposition’. It is not contradictory, therefore, that the λόγος is part of the λέξις. On the meanings of λόγος before Aristotle, see in particular Gianvittorio (2010); for the meanings of the term in Aristotle, see Scarpat (1950), Matthen (1983), De Rijk (2002), Laspia (2018), and above all, Graffi (2015), just quoted above.

  120. 120.

    This hypothesis is also supported by Van Bennekom (1975), p. 409, Rosén (1990), p. 114, Ildefonse (1997), p. 108, Swiggers and Wouters (2002), p. 111, and Schramm (2005), p. 200. For a partial correction, see below where I discuss the ‘false connectives’ of the period (Laspia 1997, pp. 93–100).

  121. 121.

    More specifically, S1 is denoted thus: position+, liaison+, unification—(neutral), démarcation—; S2 presents only liaison as a positive value, A1 only the value of démarcation, A2 only the value of position and not also that of liason as in S1, though it is identical to it (1980, p. 324).

  122. 122.

    Unfortunately, it is above all this classificatory vocation that is emphasized in studies related to linguistics, which owe a lot to this edition, like for example Swiggers and Wouters 2002.

  123. 123.

    About seventy years before this, Bywater had observed far more correctly: «Both σύνδεσμος and ἄρθρον were terms taken by grammar from anatomy; the former is properly a ‘ligament’, and the latter a ‘joint’ (…). The joint-word in grammar, therefore, would naturally imply a more structural and organic connexion than is to be found when the λόγος is simply strung together with σύνδεσμοι» (1909, p. 273).

  124. 124.

    «on peut se démander si les ‘articulations’ ne se caractérisent pas, par rapport aux ‘conjonctions’ par leur ‘pauvreté’ relative, dans la mesure où leur fonction distinctive (qui leur vaut leur nom), l’articulation ou démarcation, est déjà remplie par les conjonctions, mais comme une function sécondaire en regard de la fonction primaire conjonctive, plus ‘riche’: le ligament (sens de sundesmos en anatomie) fait plus de l’articulation (sens d’arthron en anatomie)» (1980, p. 325).

  125. 125.

    The author had already obtained recognition for a terse but excellent study of the section of the twentieth chapter of the Poetics devoted to phonetics (Rosén 1974), commented in Belardi (1986).

  126. 126.

    «Ein transphrasales Ausdrucksmittel» (1990, p. 114).

  127. 127.

    For the full interchangeability of the two terms, see for example Hist. An. Α 15, 493 b 30-494 a 2; Γ 5, 515 b 3-5, quoted in full in Laspia 1997, p. 27 note 30. The two terms are used interchangeably already in Plato’s Timaeus, see Tim. 74 a-e, quoted in Laspia 1997, p. 27 note 29.

  128. 128.

    De motu animalium 1, 698 a 8-b 2; 8, 702 a 21-32, cited in full in Laspia (1992), pp. 28–31.

  129. 129.

    See De an. Γ 10, 433 b 21-5, cited in paragraph 10 below, with the passage of the De motu animalium.

  130. 130.

    Even Schramm, 2005, p. 201, n. 32, reproduces my affirmation, with which he seems to agree.

  131. 131.

    On Aristotle’s notion of περίοδος see Kennedy (1958), Fowler (1982), and Rapp (2001). For extended references of the passages on λέξις εἰρομένη and κατεστραμμένη see Laspia (1997), pp. 84–92.

  132. 132.

    See Laspia (1997), pp. 97–100.

  133. 133.

    See Laspia (1997), pp. 93–116; numerous other interpreters, such as Bywater (1909), Dupont-Roc and Lallot (1980), Wartelle (1985), and Barnes (2007), interpret A2 in relation to various types of conjunctions, expletive particles, disjunctives, etc., in short, in relation to «des petits outils grammaticaux» (Wartelle 1985, p. 29), but none in my opinion explain the identicalness of S1 and A2.

  134. 134.

    I do not understand therefore why Schramm (2005, p. 208 note 42) states: «nur Dupont-Roc/Lallot (1980), 321–328 und van Bennekom (1975) sehen sie (sc. die Beispielreihe in A1) als Präposition».

  135. 135.

    This conclusion is compatible with the hypothesis formulated initially by von Fragstein (1967), according to which Aristotelian ἄρθρον would be «die Kopula»; the Author, however, does not make such a conjecture in relation to the text of Poetics.

  136. 136.

    As cleverly noted by Rosén 1990, p. 114.

  137. 137.

    «Un possibile esempio di copula in un discorso definitorio» (Laspia 1997, p. 116).

  138. 138.

    As concerns εἶναι as copula, Scarpat (1950) may be considered a seminal contribution. Unfortunately, the definition of ἄρθρον in the Poetics is, according to Scarpat, to be considered spurious (pp. 43–5), and thus he does not apply to the subject that interests us his insightful recognition that «to be predicated as a third element» is asemantic.

  139. 139.

    «Es dürfte in der griechischen Literatur nicht viele Passagen geben, die auf vergleichbar knappen Raum dem Verständis so viele Problemen bereiten wie das 20. Kapitel von Aristoteles Poetik zu σύνδεσμος und ἄρθρον» (2005, p. 187). The passage closely recalls the statement of Gudeman cited in the incipit of this work. But the conclusions are, as we shall see, very different.

  140. 140.

    «Eine Gleichsetzung von ‘Teilen’ des sprachlichen Ausdrucks, bzw. ‘Redeteilen’ mit grammatikalischen ‘Wortklassen’, verbietet sich schon deshalb, weil λόγος unter den μέρη τῆς λέξεως subsumiert wird, und nicht ein Teil von sich selbst sein kann» (2005, pp. 191–2). About his affirmations as a whole there is nothing to say, but there is definitely something objectionable about this last matter. Aristotle in fact clearly understood that the function of λόγος was recursive, given that ‘the man is white’ is a λόγος, but so is ‘the white man walks’ (although συνδέσμῳ εἷς), and even the entire Iliad is too. Thus, I believe the enjoyable objections of Barnes (2007, p. 180) to the idea that the Iliad is an example of λόγος συνδέσμῳ εἷς are answered.

  141. 141.

    According to André Wartelle, (1985), p. 29, ἄρθρον designates the article and other little grammatical tools («l’article et d’autres petits ‘outils grammaticaux’)». We fully agree with the second statement, at least with respect to A2, though we have strong doubts about the first, which is probably suggested to the author by the translation in the edition of Hardy (1932). Vahlen, Bywater, and Dupont-Roc and Lallot (about A2) move however in the direction of ἄρθρα as minute particles of connection, especially between the κῶλα of the period.

  142. 142.

    «To define the meaning of arthron is incomparably difficult because of the unique place within the Corpus Aristotelicum and the above-mentioned problems of the text tradition». («Die Bedeutung des ἄρθρον zu bestimmen, ist aufgrund der singulären Stellung innerhalb des Corpus Aristotelicum und den gennanten Problemen der Textüberlieferung ungleich schwieriger» Schramm (2005), p. 200).

  143. 143.

    Γ 4, 667 a 6-8: ἔχουσιν δὲ καὶ διαίρεσίν τινα αἱ καρδίαι, παρπαλησίαν ταῖς ῥαφαῖς. Οὐκ εἰσὶ δὲ συναφεῖς ὥς τινος ἐκ πλειόνων συνθέτου ἀλλά, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, διαρθρώσει μᾶλλον.

  144. 144.

    See Laspia 1997, pp. 46–8, 92.

  145. 145.

    Laspia (1997), p. 92, quoted in Schramm (2005), p. 201, note 32.

  146. 146.

    As regards negation, see the acute and interesting observations of Vahlen (1914, p. 115). The essays of Cavini, even if they do not deal with our case, are very important and clarifying: (2007), (2007a), (2008).

  147. 147.

    Rosén (1990), p. 113, also quoted in Schramm (2005), p. 211.

  148. 148.

    It was already interpreted in this way by Tyrwhitt (1806, p. 66) before the conjecture of Hartung.

  149. 149.

    «Sowohl als Artikel als auch als Präposition interpretiert werden kann» (Schramm 2005, p. 212).

  150. 150.

    Schramm actually does so, affirming, against van Bennekom, that the definition of ἄρθρον in the Poetics is really Aristotle’s (pp. 212–3), and against Pagliaro, affirming that ἄρθρον indicates only the article, and not also the pronoun (p. 207); very small differences in my opinion.

  151. 151.

    My statement echoes, moreover, a similar one by Gallavotti: «Il primo esempio è incomprensibile, e pare dettato lettera per lettera» (1954, p. 247).

  152. 152.

    Even Schramm (2005, p. 211) reproduces my explanation in his main text, not in a footnote.

  153. 153.

    In 2009, Schramm returns to this issue in a collective volume dedicated to the Poetics, but he does not advance any new arguments, referring only to his 2005 article. While recognizing the value of his contribution, the solutions he proposes do not convince me. In particular, it seems implausible that the article is explicitly mentioned in our definition of ἄρθρον.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Scienze Umanistiche, University of Palermo, Palermo, Italy

    Patrizia Laspia

Authors
  1. Patrizia Laspia
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Patrizia Laspia .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Laspia, P. (2018). The Problem. In: From Biology to Linguistics: The Definition of Arthron in Aristotle's Poetics. UNIPA Springer Series. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77326-1_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77326-1_1

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-77325-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-77326-1

  • eBook Packages: Social SciencesSocial Sciences (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation