Spotlight on Mathematics: Dislocations of Kant and Husserl

  • O. Bradley Bassler


Having “taxonomized” various positions related to the visionary critique of metaphysics in previous chapters, in this chapter I initiate a second level of the project, which I exemplify in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics with respect to the philosophical programs of Kant and Husserl. In each case, a particular feature of Kant’s or Husserl’s philosophy is “dislocated” and emphasized at the expense of others, much as I showed in Chap.  3 how practical rationality is dislocated and emphasized at the expense of theoretical rationality in the philosophies of Kant and Peirce. This chapter serves as an extended exercise in illustrating how visionary critique can be “lifted” to a second level through selective emphasis.


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© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • O. Bradley Bassler
    • 1
  1. 1.University of GeorgiaAthensUSA

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