Abstract
This chapter explains that there is an alternative formulation of the first premise in the generic argument for error theory , which does not use conceptual entailment but presupposition instead. It argues that semantic presupposition error theory is implausible, but that pragmatic presupposition error theory is plausible. The claim that is pragmatically presupposed by moral discourse is that there exist categorical moral reasons of rationality. The chapter further argues that this formulation of error theory has convincing replies to the externalism and pervasiveness objections that were problematic for conceptual entailment error theory , and that additional objections that have been wielded against it also fail. Finally, the chapter argues that the preceding discussion also provides sufficient evidence to believe the third and fourth premises in the generic argument.
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Kalf, W.F. (2018). Presupposition Error Theory. In: Moral Error Theory. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77288-2_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77288-2_3
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