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Introduction

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Moral Error Theory

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Abstract

This chapter formulates the most general argument for moral error theory, which error theorists need to precisify by undertaking specific commitments about moral semantics and moral metaphysics before they can use it in defence of their position. It then lists the commitments that the version of error theory that will be defended in this book undertakes. In addition to explaining what the argument for error theory will look like, this chapter explains two further questions that will be asked, and answered, in this book. These are the now what question and the question as to whether my version of error theory enables us to solve an important problem in normative ethics. Finally, this chapter lists three theses that will be assumed in this book without argument.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands

    Wouter Floris Kalf

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  1. Wouter Floris Kalf
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Kalf, W.F. (2018). Introduction. In: Moral Error Theory. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77288-2_1

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