Skip to main content

Attitudes Within the 27 Member States on the Future of the EU in the Light of Brexit

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
The EU after Brexit

Part of the book series: Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics ((PSEUP))

  • 1394 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter examines the attitudes of the 27 member states to the prospective UK departure from the European Union (EU) and to the future of the EU, both in terms of the perspective of their governments and of their public opinion. It looks at the risks of the rise or reinforcement of home-grown populists or even of copycat referendums. It also asks whether other member states will seek to slow down or accelerate the process of European integration, or else to buttress the status quo. Finally, it considers some other sensitive issues, such as the balance between representative democracy and the use of referendums on EU matters and the interrelationships between the Brexit process and other challenges to the EU such as those posed by illiberalism in Hungary and Poland.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Pew Research Centre, Global Attitudes and Trends. (June 2016). “Euroscepticism Beyond Brexit”.

  2. 2.

    IFOP, Fondation Jean Jaures, Fondation Européenne d’Études Progressistes, Juillet 2016, “Les Européens et le Brexit”.

  3. 3.

    For the Delo newspaper in July 2016.

  4. 4.

    From Voxmeter, published in Jyllands Posten on 4 July 2016.

  5. 5.

    Public Opinion in the European Union (Spring 2017). Standard Eurobarometer 87.

  6. 6.

    Raines, T., Goodwin, M., and Cutts, D. (June 2017). “The Future of Europe. Comparing Public and Elite Attitudes”. Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

  7. 7.

    Raines, T., Goodwin, M., and Cutts, D. (December 2017). “Europe’s Political Tribes. Exploring the Diversity of Views Across the EU”. Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

  8. 8.

    Such Standard Eurobarometers were first established in 1973, and consist of two reports a year, one in the spring and the other in the autumn, for example number 87 in spring 2017 and number 88 in autumn 2017. They are based on approximately 1000 face-to-face interviews per country.

  9. 9.

    Standard Eurobarometer 87, op. cit.

  10. 10.

    Standard Eurobarometer 88, op. cit.

  11. 11.

    All figures from Standard Eurobarometer 88, op. cit.

  12. 12.

    Standard Eurobarometer 88, autumn 2017.

  13. 13.

    This data comes from the periodic surveys carried out by the Sozialwissenschaftliche Studiengesellschaft on behalf of the Osterreichische Gesellschaft fur Europa Politik (Austrian Society for European Politics). The first such survey after the UK referendum showed an immediate decline in opposition to the EU, and EU support has since further increased, as cited above.

  14. 14.

    First round on 23 April, second round on 7 May.

  15. 15.

    Winning only 34% of the vote compared to 66% for Macron.

  16. 16.

    See, for example, FDP leader Christian Lindner’s speech on Europe at the ALDE Congress in Amsterdam on 2 December 2017.

  17. 17.

    July 2017, op. cit.

  18. 18.

    Janning, J. (5 February 2018). ECFR policy brief, “Crisis and Cohesion in the European Union; a Ten Year Review”.

  19. 19.

    O’Leary, N. (2017). “How Italy Turned Eurosceptic”.

  20. 20.

    Ernesto Galli della Loggia in Corriere della Sera of 31 July 2017.

  21. 21.

    In an interview with Politico on 30 January 2018 (Mortkowitz, S. and Gray, A.) Babiš said that “Europe was an excellent project”, but that Eurosceptic Czechs would turn even more against it on issues such as migrant quotas and cuts in CAP funding. Alread, he said, “we have some parties who would like a Czexit”.

  22. 22.

    Dan Kelemen in a paper of 9 January 2017 has also argued that Hungary has been less criticised by the EU than Poland, at least partly because of Orban’s position within the European People’s Party, see Kelemen, D. (2017). “Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic Union”, published in Government and Opposition, vol. 52, no. 2, pp. 211–237.

  23. 23.

    Standard Eurobarometer 88, results of autumn 2017: those in autumn 2016 and spring 2017 were even more negative for the EU.

  24. 24.

    diaNEOsis Think Tank survey, research December 2016, published in Greek in March 2017, “What Greeks believe in 2017”, in cooperation with University of Macedonia and Professor Nicos Marantzidis.

  25. 25.

    New Pact for Europe, National Report Poland (November 2017), Institute of Public Affairs.

  26. 26.

    “Confidence in the Future, 2017–2021 Coalition Agreement” of 10 October 2017, People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), Christian Democratic Alliance (CDA), Democrats ‘66 (D66) and Christian Union (CU)’.

  27. 27.

    Zusammen fur Unser Osterreich. Regierungsprogramm 2017–2022 (Together for our Austria, Government Programme 2017–2022).

  28. 28.

    Eurostat figures show that the Eurozone GDP grew by 2.5% in 2017, the fastest rate since 2007 and confidence in the economy was at a 17 year peak (cited in Politico of 31 January 2018).

  29. 29.

    “Confidence in the Future”, Coalition Agreement 2017–2021, published on 10 October 2017 between VVD, CDA, D66 and Christian Union, op. cit.

  30. 30.

    Op. cit.

  31. 31.

    232nd resolution of the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic, delivered on the 8th session held on 19 July 2017.

  32. 32.

    V4 Statement on the Future of Europe (2018).

  33. 33.

    “Initiative pour l’Europe-Discours d’Emmanuel Macron pour une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique” (26 September 2017), Sorbonne.

  34. 34.

    Martin Schulz outlined this at the SPD Party Conference in Berlin in December 2017.

  35. 35.

    Citation from an LSE Brexit blog by Oliver, T. (2015). “How the EU Responds to a British Withdrawal Will be Determined by Five Key Factors”.

Bibliography

Public Opinion Surveys

  • De Vries, C., and Hoffmann, I. (2017/3). Bertelsmann Stiftung: “German and European Public Opinion in Times of Political Polarisation”.

    Google Scholar 

  • IFOP, Fondation Jean Jaures, Fondation Européenne d’Études Progressistes, Juillet 2016. “Les Européens et le Brexit” (Europeans and Brexit).

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Leary, N. (19 December 2017). “How Italy Turned Eurosceptic” (Article for Politico).

    Google Scholar 

  • Raines, T., Goodwin, M., and Cutts, D. (June 2017). The Future of Europe. Comparing Public and Elite Attitudes. Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

    Google Scholar 

  • Raines, T, Goodwin, M., and Cutts, D. (December 2017). Europe’s Political Tribes. Exploring the Diversity of Views Across the EU. Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs.

    Google Scholar 

  • Standard Eurobarometers 87 Spring 2017, 88 Autumn 2017; Public Opinion in the European Union.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stokes, B. (Spring 2016). “Euroskepticism Beyond Brexit”. Pew Research Centre.

    Google Scholar 

  • TUI Foundation. (May 2017). “Young Europe 2017”: Youth Study Carried Out by YouGov.

    Google Scholar 

Attitudes of Other Member States to the Future of the EU

  • Declaration on “Bringing the EU Forward in 2018”, adopted at the 4th Summit of the Southern European Countries, Rome, 10 January 2018.

    Google Scholar 

  • De la Baume, M. (4 December 2017). “Dutch Prime Minister Says More EU Integration Not the Answer”, Article in Politico on Mark Rutte’s Speech at the ALDE Congress.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dutch Coalition Government Programme 2017–2021. “Confidence in the Future”.

    Google Scholar 

  • Katrougalos, G. Europe Minister of Greece. (6 October 2017). “The Future of Europe from a Greek Perspective”. DCU Institute Workshop.

    Google Scholar 

  • New Pact for Europe Project; National reports for Belgium, France, Finland, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal.

    Google Scholar 

  • Simon Coveney, T.D. Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. (28 November 2017). Speech: “The Europe We Want”, Sutherland School of Law, University College Dublin.

    Google Scholar 

  • “Together for Our Austria: Government Programme 2017–22”, December 2017 of OVP/FPO Coalition Government.

    Google Scholar 

  • V4 Statement on the Future of Europe. (January 2018). (Under Hungarian Presidency of the Visegrad Group).

    Google Scholar 

Other Material

  • Fossum, J.-E. (2016). “Norwegian Reflections on Brexit”. The Political Quarterly . Volume 87, no. 2, pp. 269–279.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelemen, D. (2017). “Europe’s Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe’s Democratic Union”. Government and Opposition. Volume 52, no. 2, pp. 211–237.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Francis B Jacobs .

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2018 The Author(s)

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Jacobs, F.B. (2018). Attitudes Within the 27 Member States on the Future of the EU in the Light of Brexit. In: The EU after Brexit . Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77279-0_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics