Freedom and Schizophrenia



I end here with a brief argument to show the connection of the holistic conception of the individual with an account of mental crisis and schizophrenia. This chapter is included to show that our attempts at forming coherent self-descriptions, as part of an ongoing project of self-realisation, do not always proceed smoothly. On the contrary, these attempts often result not in autonomy but in alienation and mental crisis. It attempts to point out a line of continuity between healthy but struggling individuals and schizophrenics that might help us sympathise with and better understand their plight as a thoroughly human one. It is also included to show the potential of the ideas outlined here for further fruitful interdisciplinary applications.


selfSelf commitmentsCommitment reasonReason Punctual Self individualIndividual 
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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of KentCanterburyUK

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