Iraq: Iraqi Kurdistan, Unresolved Issues, and Changing International Priorities

Chapter
Part of the Federalism and Internal Conflicts book series (FEINCO)

Abstract

Chapter six examines how federacy has been used in post-2003 Iraq to convince the Kurds to remain part of Iraq. It highlights that after over a decade of de facto independence from the rest of Iraq the Kurds were wary post-Saddam recentralisation. It shows that constitutional ambiguity around hydrocarbon management and the disputed territories weakened the ability of the domestic infrastructure to stabilise the TSG institutions. It argues that international actors, notably the US and Turkey, attempted to discourage Kurdish secession. However it also finds that economic self-interest and the grave security threat posed by ISIS led to policies which did not always prioritise this aim strongly underlining how wider determinants of policy can encourage secessionist momentum.

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of Law and GovernmentDublin City UniversityDublinIreland

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