Abstract
This chapter examines the changes that have been made to the new financial architecture in the aftermath of the financial crisis. In so doing, the chapter argues that, rather than challenging the management of finance, the reforms have relied mainly upon previous methods albeit in more intensive form. Resilience thinking is apparent, but not the radical post-modern version discussed in Chap. 4. Rather, resilience thinking in policy-making tends to dovetail with other neo-liberal policy reforms and is quite interventionist in its approach in contrast to that predicted by the post-modernist variant of resilience thinking.
The chapter argues that with regard to the financial system, neo-liberal governmentality continues to adopt policies that are analogous to biopolitical strategies. The enframing of the financial system has traditionally been centred around a ‘naturalistic fallacy’. This mode of thinking has clearly continued after the crisis, so that the emphasis has been less on radical reform and more on establishing more restrictive risk parameters and strengthening the nodal points of the system in order that it can withstand economic shocks and the homeostatic ‘norm’ can be reinstated. In addition, the perceived unpredictability of the financial system has led to a stronger emphasis on pre-emption and surveillance. The intensity of surveillance alongside these pre-emptive policies and the degree of coordination between various supervisory bodies since the crisis is such that we can speak of the emergence of a new financial regime. The chapter therefore argues that despite much debate on the emergence of resilience thinking, in the financial sphere at least, there has been little in the way of radical new policy changes of the post-modernist variant discussed in Chap. 4. Rather, resilience thinking in practice actually works symbiotically with and relies upon an array of neo-liberal policies. The chapter also concludes that although the policy of pre-emption has the potential to reinforce the regulatory mechanism, it fails to overcome the paradoxes associated with intervention in a highly complex system.
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Notes
- 1.
This work has heavily drawn upon material from within: J. Glenn. ‘In the aftermath of the financial crisis: Risk governance and the emergence of pre-emptive surveillance’, Review of International Studies, 40(2), pp. 227–246, 2014 © British International Studies Association, published by Cambridge University Press. Reprinted with permission.
- 2.
The verb has been changed from the past as it appeared in the original to the present.
- 3.
Foucault further adds, there is ‘the appearance in this new art of government of mechanisms with the function of producing, breathing life into, and increasing freedom, of introducing additional freedom through additional control and intervention’ (Foucault 2008, p. 67).
- 4.
‘The field of interventions for security dispositifs is organized around the following question: “How should things circulate or not circulate?”’. Foucault defines a security dispositif as a ‘heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions’ (Foucault 1980, p. 194).
- 5.
For example, the German Corporate Governance Code of 2002, the French Financial Security Law of 2003 and the Japanese Financial Instruments and Exchange Act of 2006.
- 6.
Although they could still prepare a client’s tax returns.
- 7.
Although it should be pointed out that a seven-year rotation was supposed to be a commonly adopted standard in the industry anyway.
- 8.
It is estimated that the Big Four spent approximately $9.4 million in campaigning in order to dilute the European Commission’s initiative (Campbell-Verduyn 2014, p. 191).
- 9.
That is, that states will (i) endeavour to direct its economic and financial policies towards the objective of fostering orderly economic growth with reasonable price stability, with due regard to its circumstances; (ii) seek to promote stability by fostering orderly underlying economic and financial conditions and a monetary system that does not tend to produce erratic disruptions; (iii) avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members; and (iv) follow exchange policies compatible with the undertakings under this section.
- 10.
‘Whilst ESRB recommendations are not legally binding they cannot simply be ignored. Addressees of recommendations must state whether they agree with the recommendation or not. If they agree, the addressees are expected to communicate what action they are taking whilst if they disagree and choose not to act, the reasons for inaction must be properly explained’. Refer to Section 3, point 49 in House of Commons Treasury Committee (November 2011).
- 11.
The ESA is made up of three constitutive elements arising from the transformation of previous committees: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA).
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Glenn, J.G. (2019). Securing Finance: Risk, Pre-emption and Resilience. In: Foucault and Post-Financial Crises. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77188-5_5
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