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Beyond Diplomacy: The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Relations with Southeast Asia

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Taiwan’s Political Re-Alignment and Diplomatic Challenges

Part of the book series: Politics and Development of Contemporary China ((PDCC))

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Abstract

The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan lost its final diplomatic partner in Southeast Asia in 1975, but the island’s economic relations with major countries in the region kept on growing, particularly since the late 1980s. This does not mean that diplomacy is not important for Taiwan, however. The island continues to face the challenges of political isolation and economic marginalization in the twenty-first century. This study shows that Taiwan’s thriving political economy with Southeast Asia will continue, even though China has asserted increasing political and economic influence in the area.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    By the end of 2016, there were 624,768 foreign migrant workers in Taiwan, mostly from Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines.

  2. 2.

    Before 1985, US$1 was the equivalent of 40 Taiwan dollars but throughout 1986–1988, Taiwan’s currency appreciated to 25–26 Taiwan dollars to US$1.

  3. 3.

    The Republic of China’s Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economics.

  4. 4.

    Figures in this paragraph are from http://cus93.trade.gov.tw/FSCI/, accessed on 15 May 2017.

  5. 5.

    https://www.trade.gov.tw/App_Ashx/File.ashx?FilePath=../Files/PageFile/b8efa1ee-91b2-4c6c-8624-4aed8e9b8370.pdf.

  6. 6.

    For more about the New Southward Policy, see Chen Hui-ping, “Foreign Affairs: Tsai to chase ‘New Southward Policy’” Taipei Times, 21 March, 2016. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/03/21/2003642086; “Taiwan’s New Southward Policy must go beyond chasing,” Straits Times, 20 May, 2016. http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/taiwans-new-southward-policy-must-go-beyond-chasing-the-china-post.

  7. 7.

    For details, see Christine Chou, “Call the APIC team: Industry, government launch ‘New Southbound Policy’ task force,” The China Post, March 7, 2017. http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/business/2017/03/09/493168/call-the.htm.

  8. 8.

    Regarding Taiwan’s early investment in China and Southeast Asia, see Xiang Ming Chen, “Taiwan Investments in China and Southeast Asia: “Go West, but Also Go South”,” Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 5, May 1996, pp. 447–467; Rong Yung King, “Taiwan and ASEAN: Another Approach to Economic Cooperation,“ Issues and Studies, Vol. 34, No. 11/12, November/December 1998, pp. 181–201.

  9. 9.

    Figures in this paragraph are from https://www.dois.moea.gov.tw/Home/relation3, accessed 15 May 2017.

  10. 10.

    For the details of the New Southbound Policy, please visit: http://www.newsouthboundpolicy.tw/PageDetail.aspx?id=cbf0a167-7c9e-4840-ba5b-2d47b5badb00&pageType=SouthPolicy.

  11. 11.

    In 1949, after the Chinese Communists took over mainland China, roughly 100,000 ROC military and their families retreated from Yunnan province into northern Burma. The Burmese government sued the Nationalist army through the United Nations. In the early 1960s, a UN resolution forced most of them out of Burma and into Thailand. These displaced ROC military were also not welcomed by the Thai government. However, in the early 1970s, the ROC assisted Thailand in putting down a Thai communist insurgency in its northern region. King Bhumibol Adulyadej and the Thai government publicly acknowledged and appreciated their contribution and as a result granted the Chinese Nationalist soldiers Thai citizenship.

  12. 12.

    The New York Times recently reported on one of these villages in northwestern Thailand. See Amy Qin, “In Remote Thai Villages, Legacy of China’s Lost Army Endures”, The New York Times, 14 January, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/world/asia/in-remote-thailand-the-lost-soldiers-of-the-kuomintang.html?_r=0.

  13. 13.

    See http://www.icdf.org.tw/ct.asp?xItem=4283&ctNode=29793&mp=1.

  14. 14.

    http://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=C7C822667A8F469F&sms=11233CCF2D9FD7A7&s=545375B51DA41425, accessed 2 October, 2016.

  15. 15.

    Alain Guilloux, Taiwan’s humanitarian aid/disaster relief: wither or proper?, Taiwan-US Quarterly Analysis, Brookings, August 2016. https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/taiwans-humanitarian-aiddisaster-relief-wither-or-prosper/, accessed 4 October 2016.

  16. 16.

    Ibid.

  17. 17.

    For the 2016 information, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016 Annual Report of the International Cooperation and Development Affairs (Taipei: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China) (http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Upload/RelFile/17/262/a2fe53f1-8839-4a82-819b-d0dd45e2d73d.pdf). For the 2018 figures, see http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aeco/201711040011.aspx.

  18. 18.

    Ibid, p. 26.

  19. 19.

    http://ocacnews.net/overseascommunity/article/article_story.jsp?main=255&sub=106&third=0&id=223444, accessed 6 August 2017.

  20. 20.

    Ministry of Economics: http://www.newsouthboundpolicy.tw/PageDetail.aspx?id=cbf0a167-7c9e-4840-ba5b-2d47b5badb00&pageType=SouthPolicy.

  21. 21.

    The members of the RCEP include the ten ASEAN countries, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand.

  22. 22.

    Due to the “One-China policy”, China continues to block Taiwan from joining these economic organizations. See, Christopher M. Dent, “Taiwan and the New Regional Political Economy of East Asia,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 182, June 2005, pp. 385–386.

  23. 23.

    With regard to Taiwan’s economic relations with ASEAN, see Hong Zhao, “Taiwan-ASEAN Economic Relations in the Context of East Asian Regional Integration,” International Journal of China Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, April 2011, pp. 39–54.

  24. 24.

    http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnMobile/News_Content.aspx?s=812442E092DF7B2B.

  25. 25.

    Ibid.

  26. 26.

    “Siew delivers message to Xi as Boao Forum opens,” Taipei Times, 29 March, 2015: http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/03/29/2003614643.

  27. 27.

    Taiwan’s bid for the AIIB was a last minute submission, just before the deadline for applications closed. See Lawrence Chung, “Taiwan in last-minute bid to join AIIB as founding member,” South China Morning Post, 31 March, 2015. http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1751994/taiwan-last-minute-bid-join-aiib-founding-member.

  28. 28.

    Chen-Yuan Tung, “The East Asian Economic Integration Regime and Taiwan”, Asian Perspective, Vol. 34, No. 2, April/June 2010, pp. 83–112.

  29. 29.

    http://www.newsouthboundpolicy.tw/PageDetail.aspx?id=cbf0a167-7c9e-4840-ba5b-2d47b5badb00&pageType=SouthPolicy.

  30. 30.

    Ibid.

  31. 31.

    The ROC terminated diplomatic ties with then the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) in April 1975 when the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), led by Ho Chi Minh, was taken over by the Vietnamese Communists.

  32. 32.

    Issuing visas for visitors was one of the few functions that could be carried out.

  33. 33.

    Taiwan now has two offices in Indonesia, located in Jakarta and Surabaya, and two offices in Vietnam, located in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.

  34. 34.

    Interviews conducted with high-level Taiwanese officials in Southeast Asian countries, July 2016.

  35. 35.

    ASTEP commenced on 19 April 2014

  36. 36.

    Shih Hsiu-Chuan, “Taiwan, Indonesia ink MOU to develop Indonesian island,” Taipei Times, December 6, 2012.

  37. 37.

    Interview with a Taiwanese businessman in Jakarta, August 2015.

  38. 38.

    Based on the author’s two decades of field studies in Southeast Asia, it can be concluded that Taiwan does not face significant problems in initiating and signing agreements with desired countries in Southeast Asia.

  39. 39.

    The Foreign Minister and Defense Minister did not, however, participate in these exchanges.

  40. 40.

    The ROC President serves up to two four-year terms. President Ma was successfully reelected, serving two full years; President Chen Shui-bian also served for eight years.

  41. 41.

    For more information, see Charles Hutzler and Jake Maxwell Watts, “China’s Xi Jinping and Taiwan’s Ma Ying-jeou Meet in Singapore,” The Wall Street Journal, November 8, 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-s-xi-jinping-and-taiwan-s-ma-ying-jeou-meet-in-singapore-1446880724.

  42. 42.

    Mr. Lin served as Foreign Minister from September 2012 to May 2016 and was Taiwan’s Representative to Indonesia from 2003 to 2007.

  43. 43.

    Throughout the Ma administration, there were 22 diplomatic partners, but as of July 2017, there are now only 20. In November 2013, Gambia withdrew its diplomatic recognition and then established diplomatic relations with China in March 2016. Since May 2016, President Tsai’s administration has lost another two, Sao Tome Principe on 20 December, 2016 and the Republic of Panama on 13 June, 2017.

  44. 44.

    These six countries include Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines.

  45. 45.

    http://f100clt.blogspot.tw/p/visa.html.

  46. 46.

    One US reporter points out, “Mr. Trump’s antagonism towards China is a gamble without an upside.” (Edward Luce, “Donald Trump’s collision course with China”, Financial Times, 18 December 2016. (https://www.ft.com/content/5d9df7d4-c3c3-11e6-81c2-f57d90f6741a, accessed 19 May 2017).

  47. 47.

    Alison Hsiao, “Ministry regrets lack of ICAO invitation”, Taipei Times, 24 September 2016. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/09/24/2003655812.

  48. 48.

    “No 1992 consensus, no basis for Taiwan to attend WHA: China,” Focus Taiwan, May 8, 2017. http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201705080010.aspx.

  49. 49.

    Chris Horton, “Blocked by China, Taiwan Presses to Join U.N. Agency’s Meeting,” The New York Times, May 8, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/08/world/asia/taiwan-world-health-china-.html?_r=0.

  50. 50.

    “Taiwan problem is one of “success story”: Powell,” The China Post, 12 June, 2002. Available at: http://www.chinapost.com.tw/news/2002/06/12/27410/Taiwan-problem.htm.

  51. 51.

    Figures in this paragraph are from http://dmz9.moea.gov.tw/GMWeb/common/CommonQuery.aspx, accessed 15 May, 2017.

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Ku, S.C.Y. (2019). Beyond Diplomacy: The Political Economy of Taiwan’s Relations with Southeast Asia. In: Lee, Wc. (eds) Taiwan’s Political Re-Alignment and Diplomatic Challenges. Politics and Development of Contemporary China. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77125-0_11

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