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After Fordism: The Politics of Industrial Conflict Patterns in the Global South

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Technology, Institutions and Labor

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Abstract

This chapter situates the findings from Turkey and Argentina in a broader sample and presents findings on how federalism has a prolonging impact on labor mobilization in developing countries. Based on panel data analysis, it shows that federal systems are more conducive to prolonged labor mobilization in contrast to their unitary counterparts. The discussion documents empirical support for this argument based on a sample of 37 middle and lower-middle income countries (including Turkey and Argentina in the sample) for the period between 1990 and 2012. These findings offer important clues to further unpack how the organization of government influences labor responses to industrial upgrading in Turkey and Argentina.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    According to existing approaches, strike duration is classified as long if the median duration is longer than 20 days. Strikes with an average duration of five days or less are classified as short (Baah and Reilly 2009, 461–462).

  2. 2.

    A revolutionary episode is “a period of rupture within an established political order that involves a mass siege of an established government by its own population with the aims of displacing the incumbent regime and substantially altering the political or social order, irrespective of whether oppositions actually succeed in displacing incumbent regimes” (Beissinger 2014, 10–11).

  3. 3.

    These countries are Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, Algeria, Ecuador, Egypt, Guyana, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Mexico, Mauritius, Malaysia, Namibia, Nigeria, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Romania, El Salvador, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, South Africa, Zambia.

  4. 4.

    For an overview of how POLCON V is calculated, see the codebook available for download at http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/.

  5. 5.

    Unemployment rate is an ILO estimate and refers to the percentage of unemployed who are available and actively seeking for employment within the total labor force. The data is taken from the World Bank and covers the period between 1990 and 2012.

  6. 6.

    Inflation is measured as the yearly percentage increase in the consumer price index (calculated as the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services in a given year). The data is taken from the World Bank and covers the period between 1990 and 2012.

  7. 7.

    Crisis Dummy: This is coded as 1 if the country-year is experiencing a major economic crisis and 0 if otherwise. It is calculated based on information included in the Reinhardt and Rogoff (2011) database on economic crises and World Bank/IMF indicators on banking crises (Laeven and Valencia 2012).

  8. 8.

    Share of FDI as a percentage of GDP is calculated by dividing total flow of FDI investments in USD by GDP in USD for a given country/year. The data is taken from the World Bank and covers the period between 1990 and 2012.

  9. 9.

    GDP/Capita is calculated by dividing gross domestic product by the mid-year population, and is in current USD. The data is taken from the World Bank and covers the period between 1990 and 2012.

  10. 10.

    Political System: Countries are coded as presidential (0) or parliamentary (1) for a given year based on information in Beck et al.’s (2001) database on political institutions at the World Bank.

  11. 11.

    Electoral System: The data on whether electoral rules in a given country/year follow majoritarian and/or proportional representation are taken from Beck et al.’s (2001) database on political institutions at the World Bank.

  12. 12.

    ILO Conventions: In order to control for institutional framework that regulates labor rights, I coded the number of relevant ILO conventions that have been ratified and in force in a given year for each country based on the information available on ILO NATLEX database. A greater commitment to protecting labor rights may prolong worker protests and increase the average number of workdays lost per worker.

  13. 13.

    Latin America Dummy: I also control for regional effects by including a Latin America dummy in the sample, given the longer history of contentious labor mobilization and concentration of federal systems in South America.

  14. 14.

    On the optimum number of counts when modeling using negative binomial regression models, see Hilbe 2007.

  15. 15.

    For a discussion of multiple varieties of populist legacies in Mexico in comparative perspective, see Gibson 1997; Knight 1998; Murillo 2001; Snyder 2001. For an overview of populism and populist legacies in Brazil see French 1989; Perruci and Sanderson 1989; Panizza 2000.

  16. 16.

    In terms of training, technicians, engineers, and managers in auto-parts producers were the ones who were exposed to new techniques, and the blue-collars were not embedded in a network of coordinated vocational education schemes (Carrillo 2004, 150).

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    Fulya Apaydin

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Appendix

Appendix

Below is the table summarizing descriptive statistics for the dataset used in the analysis (Table 5.4).

Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics
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Apaydin, F. (2018). After Fordism: The Politics of Industrial Conflict Patterns in the Global South. In: Technology, Institutions and Labor. International Political Economy Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77104-5_5

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