Abstract
The French share the major strategic power role with Britain, and France has retained its FPP to a greater extent than Britain. The French president takes major decisions by himself, aided by the Security Council, but able to retain surprise and secrecy. In this chapter the French strategic review of November 2017 is analysed, showing strategic continuity and logic. French strategic interests are found in the South of Europe—a lie migration, terrorism, and unrest that is ‘imported’ into France, which declared a state of emergency after the terror attacks in 2015 and kept this until recently. The French are the clear leaders in the MENA region among the Europeans, and the only leader in military operations in the Mali and the Sahel where the US does not have any important role. France regards Russia as a partner and resisted having to cancel the delivery of warships to Russia in 2014 for as long as possible, but had to cede to US and NATO pressure.
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Notes
- 1.
‘We can’t afford to rule the waves anymore’, 12 January 2018, The Times.
- 2.
Hellmann, M. (2016) ‘Assuming great power responsibility: French strategic culture and international military operations’, in Britz et al., op.cit., p. 27.
- 3.
Excerpt from the chapter on France in my book European Union Security Dynamics: In the NEW National Interest, Palgrave, 2013, UK.
- 4.
Livre blanc défense et sécurité nationale 2013, Direction de l’information légale et administrative, Paris, 2013.
- 5.
‘…la France devait mener de front la relance de l’Union européenne en matière de la défense.’
- 6.
Livre blanc, Chapters 3 and 4.
- 7.
Boyer, p. 96.
- 8.
French strategic defence review published on 29 April 2013; article in The Economist, 4 May, p. 33.
- 9.
This document, which was ordered by the new President Macron is shorter than the White Paper, but it presents an updated view of threats and risk.
- 10.
Preface, p. 6: ‘I have decided to continue and to renew both parts of our nuclear deterrent; it is the ultimate guarantee of our vital interests, our independence, and more broadly, our freedom to make decisions.’
- 11.
Ibid., p. 53, number 152, ‘a strong conflict regarding humanitarian and migratory issues’.
- 12.
Ibid., p. 64, number 210, ‘the Gulf is an essential strategic area for France’.
- 13.
Ibid., numbers 173 and 175, pp. 56–57 (‘national cohesion and resilience in the fundamental functions of the state and nation constitute the indispensable basis for our freedom of action … the armed forces play a socializing role here’).
- 14.
Ibid., p. 55, number 167 (Geography continues to be an important parameter in determining our priorities.)
- 15.
Ibid., p. 59–60, numbers 185–189.
- 16.
Ibid., see heading on p. 58: ‘La construction d’une autonomie strategique europeenne.’
- 17.
Ibid., p. 60.
- 18.
‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: Global action for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy’, EU Commission, adopted by the member states in June 2016.
- 19.
Ibid., p. 63: ‘In the new security architecture that is developing France will propose various formats for integration to various states according to the criterion of the “willing and able.”’
- 20.
Ibid., p. 69.
- 21.
Ibid., p. 82, ‘Entrer en premier’.
- 22.
Boyer, 2013, “France: The State with Strategic Vision”, p. 143.
- 23.
Ibid., p. 149.
- 24.
Ibid., p. 149.
- 25.
These ideas were firmly suppressed by the Russian Revolution and have not been resurrected thereafter.
- 26.
François Heisbourg, ‘Preserving post-Cold War Europe’, Survival, vol. 57, no. 1, pp. 31–48.
- 27.
Gomart, op.cit., p. 147.
- 28.
Les Echos, online, ‘La violence des propos de Poutine soude les Européens’, 17 November 2014.
- 29.
Ibid., ‘Putin is more in a logic of escalation than of provocation … the hardening of his tone is accompanied on the ground by the deployment of Russian military forces.’
- 30.
Rieker, P. (2017) French Foreign Policy in a Changing World: practising grandeur, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, p. 61.
- 31.
Rieker, op.cit., p. 71.
- 32.
NYT, 6–7 November 2014, ‘A Wise Delay on Warships’.
- 33.
NYT, ‘France says Russia may never receive two warships’, p. 3, 6–7.12.2014.
- 34.
French strategic defence review published on 29 April 2013, conversations with experts on French strategy, 2–3.2.2015.
- 35.
Rieker, p. 75.
- 36.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017 (London: Routledge for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015). 304–306.
- 37.
Saxi, Håkon L, op.cit., p. 13.
- 38.
Rieker, op.cit, p. 145.
- 39.
Op.cit., p. 146.
- 40.
Rieker, op.cit, p. 145.
- 41.
Op.cit., p. 137.
- 42.
Op.cit., p. 142.
- 43.
Op.cit., p. 145.
- 44.
Op.cit., p. 52.
- 45.
Ibid., p. 149.
- 46.
Ibid., p. 151.
- 47.
Ibid., p. 152.
References
Boyer, Y., “France: The State with Strategic Vision”, pp. 141–160,in Matlary, J. H. and Petersson, M., 2013, Nato’s European Allies: Miltiary capability and Political Will, Palgrave Macmillan.
Direction de l’information légale et administrative. (2013). Livre blanc défense et sécurité nationale. Paris: Direction de l’information légale et administrative.
EU Commission. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: Global Action for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. EU Commission, Adopted by the Member States in June 2016.
Faure, S. (2018, forthcoming). La Cooperation franco-britainnique malgre le Brexit. les deux roles du Royaume-Uni. ler premier role militaire et ‘en meme temps’ un second role industriel. In J. H. Matlary & R. Johnson (Eds.), Britain’s Defence Role in the Age of Brexit: Coalitions and Partnerships. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
French strategic review, 23rd November 2013.
Hellmann, M. (2016). Assuming Great Power Responsibility: French Strategic Culture and International Military Operations. In Britz et al., op.cit.
Rieker, P. (2017). French Foreign Policy in a Changing World: Practising Grandeur. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
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Matlary, J.H. (2018). France. In: Hard Power in Hard Times. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76514-3_8
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