Russian Revisionism

Matlary, Janne Haaland

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-76514-3_3

Russian Revisionism

Janne Haaland Matlary²

Chapter
First Online: 24 May 2018

652 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter presents a timeline of events in terms of Russian revisionism, starting with Georgia in 2008 and continuing with the case of Ukraine and Crimea from 2014 onwards. The chapters contain a detailed analysis based on a variety of contemporary press material. It further provides an analysis of Russian foreign and security policy goals, pointing to the permanent character of these, and points out that Russia, unlike Western Europe, acts strategically and uses hard power at the service of state interests. The chapter also presents the general policy response by the West—in the case of Georgia, there was retreat; in the case of Ukraine, there is a similar response. There is no Western strategy on Ukraine. The Western response was very strong in rhetorical terms, but only the US demanded sanctions and devised such, imposing this policy on the EU.

My chapter ‘Realpolitik Confronts Liberal democracy: Can Europe respond?’ in Matlary, J.H. and Heier. T.(eds.) (2016) Ukraine and Beyond. Russia’s Strategic Security Challenge to Europe, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, is based on excerpts from an earlier version of this chapter, as is my contribution to the proceedings of the Engelsberg seminar 2015, published as War, edited by Almquist, K. and Linklater, A (2016), Ax:son Johnson Foundation. There are also paragraphs on the effect of EU sanctions and general European reactions to the annexation of Crimea below in the chapters on the EU (9) and NATO (10) that are found in these publications.

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Notes

1.
Galeotti, M (2016) Heavy metal diplomacy: Russia’s political use of its military in Europe since 2014, European Council on Foreign relations, 19 December.
2.
Galeotti, p. 1.
3.
Galeotti, p. 4.
4.
Galeotti, p. 4.
5.
James Sherr, The New East-West Discord. Russian Objectives, Western Interests, Clingendael Report, December 2015, The Hague, p. 33.
6.
Ibid., p. 34.
7.
Ibid.
8.
Ibid.
9.
Ibid., p. 53.
10.
Ibid., p. 54.
11.
Adamsky, Dmitry Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of Strategy, IFRI Security Studies Center, Proliferation Papers 54, 2015, Paris, p. 19.
12.
Adamsky, p. 20.
13.
Ibid.
14.
Asmus, Ronald, (2010) The Little War that Shook the World, Palgrave Macmillan, UK.
15.
See my chapter on Norway in Matlary, J.H. and Petersson, M. (2011) NATO: The Power of Partnerships, Palgrave Macmillan, London.
16.
INYT, ‘Ukrainian leader was defeated even before ouster’, 5 January 2015, front page and full page 4.
17.
‘Russlands intervensjon på Krim – gjennomføring og konsekvenser’, Norsk Militært Tidsskrift, vol. 184, no. 4, 2014, pp. 16–28.
18.
Ibid.
19.
‘Putins Schlachtplan’, FAZ, 8.9.2014.
20.
The Jamestown Foundation, 14.8.2014, ‘Russian Military Rehearses Ukrainian Peacekeeping Operation’.
21.
‘New Front opens in “Ukraine conflict”, reports that “Russian forces” mount stealth invasion’, NYT, 28 August 2014, front page. See also ‘Ukraine says it stopped Russian incursion’ through artillery strikes, NYT, 16 August 2014.
22.
‘Ukraine braces as convoy nears’ and ‘Fears as Russian trucks roll on’, NYT, 15 August 2014, p. 3; ‘Ukraine says it destroyed Russian military vehicles that crossed the border’, ibid.
23.
‘A White Shining Lie’, by Michael Weiss, Foreign Policy, 14 August 2014.
24.
‘Kremlin is caught putting boots on the ground in the Ukraine’, The Daily Beast, 26 August 2014.
25.
Ibid.
26.
Ibid.
27.
Ibid., p. 85.
28.
Ibid.
29.
Burke-White, W.W. ‘Crimea and the international legal order’, Survival, vol. 56, no. 4, 2014, pp. 65–80, p. 65.
30.
Ibid.
31.
Ibid., p. 66.
32.
Quoted in Burke-White, p. 68.
33.
Quoted in Burke-White, p. 69.
34.
5 September 2014.
35.
Ibid.
36.
‘Hagel, Donner und Raketen’, FAZ, 14 August 2014. The exercise in the summer of 2014 was dubbed a Panzer-Biathlon; participating states were Venezuela, China, India, Kuwait, Serbia, and Mongolia. China brought its own tanks.
37.
‘The EU and Ukraine’, Neil MacFarlane and Anand Menon, Survival, vol. 56, no. 3, pp. 95–101.
38.
Ibid., pp. 96–97.
39.
A contradictory view is that the ‘integration dilemma’ was solvable through negotiations, see Charap, S. and Troitsiy, M., ‘Russia, the West and the Integration Dilemma’, Survival, vol. 55, no. 6, 2016, pp. 49–62.
40.
Ibid., p. 100.
41.
Zadra, R. ‘NATO, Russia, and Missile Defence’, p., 55, Survival, vol. 56, no. 3, 2014, pp. 51–61,
42.
Charap, op.cit. p. 87.
43.
Ibid.
44.
‘Pro-Russian voters defy Kiev at the polls’, INYT, 3 November 2014.
45.
Ibid.
46.
‘Exuding confidence Putin rebuffs European appeals’ INYT, headline 18–19.10.2014.
47.
Ibid.
48.
NYT, ‘At UN, Russian foreign minister asserts US and allies are hypocrites’, 29 September 2014, p. 5.
49.
Ibid.
50.
A year after the disaster on 17 July 2015, The Daily Beast assembled all the evidence in an article entitled ‘How we know Russia shot down the MH17’. The detailed facts and analysis presented there constitute probably the most comprehensive source of what happened. See also ‘Examining the Evidence of Russia’s Involvement in a Malaysia Airlines Crash’, Stratfor, 23 May 2006, which substantiates the claim that a Buk missile from the town of Snizhne shot down the plane, citing satellite imagery.
51.
‘Ukraine and rebels agree to cease-fire’, NYT, 6–7 September 2014.
52.
‘Ukraine and separatists agree to cease-fire’, NYT, 6–7 September 2014.
53.
Interview with EU official, 23 June 2015, Budapest.
54.
Sherr, p. 25.
55.
Sherr, p. 26.
56.
Sherr, p. 26.
57.
‘Ukraine Crisis: Putin’s Nuclear threats are struggle for pride and status’, The Telegraph, 29 August 2014.
58.
‘Don’t mess with nuclear-armed Russia’, The Telegraph, 29 August 2014.
59.
‘Des Kremls neue Militärdoktrin’ FAZ, 8.9.2014.
60.
President of the Russian Federation, V. Putin, ‘Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’, 26.12.2014.
61.
‘In Latvia, fresh fears of aggression as Kremlin warns about Russian minorities’, Washington Post, 29.9.2014.
62.
Ibid.
63.
See also Aftenposten, 17 January 2014 and other international media.
64.
BBC webpage, 22 January 2015.
65.
NYT, online, 19 February 2015, ‘Ukraine’s forces retreat from strategic town’.
66.
The Times, ‘Kiev cries foul as Putin’s tanks roll over the border’, 13 February, online.
67.
The Times, online, 19 February 2015, ‘US threatens Russia as battle nears end’.
68.
The Times, online, same title and date as in text.
69.
‘Hvorfor Ukraina trenger våpen’, Verdens Gang, 20 February 2015.
70.
Die Welt, ‘Ukraine fördert tödliche Waffen con Europa’, online, 19 February 2015
71.
The Telegraph, editorial, 18 February 2015, online.
72.
Die Zeit, online, ‘Putin streicht seine Gewinne ein’, 12 February 2015, see also FAZ, ‘Aqud einer Position der eindrückener Überlegenheit’, online, 11 February 2015 and “Pro-Russian rebels to gain ground under Ukraine deal”, The Times, 9 February, online.
73.
Ibid.
74.
Sherr, op.cit., p. 28.
75.
Ibid., p. 29.
76.
‘Russia and Eurasia’, chapter 5, The Military Balance, 2017, IISS, London, p. 184.
77.
Ibid.
78.
Adam Garfinkle, ‘How to Misunderstand what didn’t Happen’, The American Interest, 5 April 2016.
79.
War on the Rocks, ‘How Moscow took control of the battlefield and negotiating table’, 28 June 2016.
80.
Baev, Pavel ‘For Moscow, talks are about sowing discord, not solving conflicts’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol 13, issue 35, 22 February 2016; Roger McDermott, ‘Russia Raises the Stakes in Aleppo’, Ibid., 9 February 2016, Crowly, PC, ‘Putin’s Payoff in Syria’, BBC, 15.3.2916 Breaking News.
81.
The Military Balance, p. 187.
82.
‘Russian Actions in Syria overshadow Kremlin’s Diplomatic Maneuvers on War in Eastern Ukraine’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol 13, issue 169, 26 October 2016.
83.
Leader, 19 March 2016, and main briefing ‘Russia’s wars’ in same issue.
84.
Åslund, A and Commander, S, ‘Russia’s Gloomy Prospects’, project syndicate, 23 May 2015.
85.
The Military Balance, p. 191.
86.
‘A Vital Nuclear Agreement at Risk’, NYT, 5 January 2015.
87.
‘US and Russia in danger of returning to era of nuclear rivalry’, The Guardian, 4 January 2015.
88.
Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russian Strategic Deterrence’, Survival, pp. 7–26, July 2016, vol 58, issue 4.
89.
Ibid.
90.
Ibid.
91.
Tamnes, R (2017) ‘The Significance of the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Contribution’, pp. 8–32, in Olsen, J. A. (ed.) NATO and the North Atlantic, revitalizing Collective Defence, Whitehall Paper 87, RUSI March.
92.
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
93.
‘INF treaty increasingly in danger as Russia balks at new missile defence base in Romania’, by Pavel Felgenhauer, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol 13, issue 93, 12 May 2016. See also ‘Putin commits to countering new strategic “threat” to Russia’, Ibid., issue 95, by Pavel Baev; and ‘Putin warns Russia will respond to NATO missile shield’, www.military.com, 18 May 2016.
94.
Ibid., Baev article.
95.
NYT, 11 December 2014.
96.
Ibid.
97.
Die Welt, ‘Westen will in Moskau Regimestürz provozieren’, 22.11.2014, online ‘Der Westen zeigt unzweideutig, dass er (Russland) nicht zwingen will, seine Politik zu ändern, sondern dass er einen Regimewechsel erreichen möchte’.
98.
Die Welt, ‘Was hinter Putins geheime Krimrede steckt’, 14 August 2014, online ‘braucht eine patriotische Mobilisering der Gesellschaft gegen Russlands “Feinde”, um bei Wirtschaftsprobleme seine Popularität nicht zu verlieren’.
99.
See note 7.
100.
BBC, 28 January 2015.
101.
Foreign Policy, 30 December 2014, ‘Yes, Russia’s Military is Getting more Aggressive’, James T. Quinlivan, pp. 1–8 online.
102.
Ibid., p. 8.
103.
‘“Aggressive and erratic” Russian fighter jet barrel-rolls within 15 m of US plane’, The Independent, 18 April 2016; see also ‘Russia defends jet fighter barrel roll over US reconnaissance plane’, The Telegraph, 6 May 2016.
104.
Heisbourg, F., ‘Preserving post-cold war Europe’, Survival, 5 February 2015, 57, 1, pp. 31–48, p. 38.
105.
The Valdai speech: 19 October, Official site of the President of Russia; Sotchi. ‘The World Order: New Rules or a Game without Rules.’
106.
‘Russia prepares to repel the US all fronts’, The Jamestown Foundation, 26.9.2014.
107.
Aftenposten, 19 January 2015, pp. 4–5.
108.
Dagens Næringsliv, ‘Kapitalflukten doblet’, 20 January 2015, p. 31.
109.
Ibid., 15 January 2015.
110.
The American Interest, 29 December 2014, “Moscow Dissects Central-Eastern Europe”.
111.
Klassekampen, ‘Klamrer seg til hard linje: EU stadig mer splittet i synet på sanksjoner og press mot Russland’, pp. 14–15, 21 January 2015.
112.
‘Putin’s Bubble Bursts’, NYT, 2 January 2015.
113.
‘Russia’s lost time’, NYT, 2 January 2015, p. 9.
114.
FAZ, online, 2 October 2014, Finnlands Ministerpräsident im Gespräch: ‘Die Integration Russlands in den Westen war eine Illusion’ (copyeditor’s translation).
115.
Ibid., p. 2.
116.
Die Welt, ‘Putin erklärt seine neue Weltordnung’, 1.12.16, unity in Russia, chaos elsewhere (annual address).
117.
Die Welt, ‘Putin erklårt seine neue Weltordnung’, 1.12.16, unity in Russia, chaose elsewhere (annual address).
118.
Oxford University Press, 2013.
119.
Ibid., p. 204.
120.
Ibid., p. 118.
121.
Ibid., p. 121.
122.
Alexej Arbatov ‘Russian Foreign and Security Policy’, Carnegie Moscow Center, 21 June 2016.
123.
Ibid.
124.
Ibid.
125.
Ibid.
126.
Galeotti, p. 5.
127.
Ibid, p. 5.
128.
BBC, 18 June 2016, ‘German minister warns NATO against “war-mongering”’.
129.
The UN Pact, which is ius cogens, that is, peremptory norms in international law, states that ‘all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered’ (art 2,3), and furthermore, ‘all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’ (art. 2,4). Thus, threats are prohibited, as is meddling in the internal affairs of another state, such as ‘Finlandizaton’ in the Cold War and subversion in general.
130.
Allison, R. (2013) Russia, the West, and Military Intervention, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 159.
131.
Ibid.
132.
Asmus, R. D. A Little War that Shook the World. Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2010.
133.
Ibid., p. 5.
134.
Alexandra Gheciu comes to similar conclusions, see Gheciu, A. (2005) (ed.) NATO in the new Europe. The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War, Stanford University Press.
135.
Ibid., p. 8.
136.
Ibid.
137.
Freedman, Lawrence, ‘Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management’, Survival, 23 May 2014, vol 56, no 3, pp. 7–42.
138.
Ibid., p. 15.
139.
Ibid., p. 28.
140.
‘Putins Fehler’, Der Spiegel, 27 January 2015, online. The paper says that this is detrimental to Putin, that he isolated himself by this absence, but fails to notice the ominous signal that is sent. We can assume that Putin would have cherished such an occasion, with good reason. That he abstains from participating shows that he does not want to try to establish political dialogue.
141.
The Telegraph, same title, online, 11 February 2015.
142.
The Independent, online, 19 February 2015, same title.
143.
The Times, online, 6 February 2015.
144.
House of Lords, 6th Report of Session 2014–15, The Stationary Office Ltd.
145.
Ibid., executive summary, p. 6, and BBC News online, ‘Ukraine: UK and EU “badly” misread Russia’, 20 February 2015.
146.
‘The Ukraine Freedom Support Act’, 2014.
147.
‘Putin must be stopped. And sometimes only guns can stop guns’, The Guardian, 1 February 2015, online.
148.
Article by same name, online, The Telegraph, 4 February 2015.
149.
‘It’s time to call Ukraine a war’, The Daily Beast, online, 4 February 2015.
150.
‘Russian grinds down Ukrainian troops while Western support is elusive’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol 12, issue 21, 3 February 2015, online.
151.
‘Russian Threat Perceptions: Shadows of the Imperial past’, warontherocks.com , Hanna Smith, 2 February 2015.
152.
Talbott, S. et al., Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Aggression: What the US and NATO must do, Report by the Atlantic Council, Brookings, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, February 2015, online.
153.
‘US considers supplying arms to Ukraine forces, officials say’, NYT, 1 February, online.
154.
‘The escalation advocates are wrong on Ukraine’, warontherocks.com , February 2015.
155.
Ibid.
156.
FAZ online, same title, 2 February 2015 ‘Wir liefern der Ukraine keine tödlichen Waffen’.
157.
Wolfgang Ischinger, ‘How to stabilize Ukraine without playing Putin’s Game’, Spiegel online, 2 February 2015.
158.
Ibid.

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Department of Political Science, Blindern, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
Janne Haaland Matlary

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Matlary, J.H. (2018). Russian Revisionism. In: Hard Power in Hard Times. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76514-3_3

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76514-3_3
Published: 24 May 2018
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