Abstract
In a country already ravaged by violence, Recife has stood out, for a generation, as a champion of homicides. The share of harm contributed by drug markets to this tragedy must be approached without assuming that violence is inherent to their functioning. The analysis must focus instead on the governance of those markets and on the extent to which their participants are deterred, or not, from resorting to violence. In Recife, inequality structures the scope and limits of that deterrence and the challenges of drug markets governance. Exploring these problems, in such a context, poses in turn peculiar methodological problems whose imperfect solution implies significant trade-offs.
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Albeit one whose exact size is impossible to ascertain, as a large proportion of all homicides in the country are never resolved and as “drug-related” violence, as we show here, can take a wide variety of forms: from assaults to procure drug money or drugs themselves or punishment for those assaults to confrontation between drug gangs that have less to do with the drugs themselves than with the “honour” or reputation of traffickers or gang members.
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Cf. also the official website of the programme: http://www.portais.pe.gov.br/web/sedsdh/programa-atitude1 (accessed 2017 07 13).
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Possession of drugs for the strict purpose of personal use is not criminalized in Brazil, though the law does not clearly establish a threshold, leaving much leeway to police officers and putting users largely at their mercy.
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There is a third state-level police force, called “technico-scientific” and made up of experts who support civil police investigations. Willis (2015): 31–34.
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Daudelin, J., Ratton, J.L. (2018). Introduction: Drug Markets and Violence in Recife, Brazil. In: Illegal Markets, Violence, and Inequality. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-76249-4_1
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