Abstract
In the previous two chapters, we have investigated dynamics security games with asymmetric information, in which the extra or the missing information is inherent to the underlying security problems. In this chapter, we switch the gear and further consider the possibility of proactively creating information asymmetry in security games for the defender’s benefit. Particularly, deception will be investigated as a concrete tool to achieve this objective. However, most existing deception techniques are designed for static scenarios. The objective of this chapter is to illustrate a foresighted deception framework that allows the defender to better align its deception strategy with its conventional defense strategy and the dynamics in the environment. In addition, a network protection game is taken as a concrete example to illustrate the advantage of the foresighted deception achieved by the SDG framework over the conventional myopic deception.
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He, X., Dai, H. (2018). Dynamic Security Games with Deception. In: Dynamic Games for Network Security. SpringerBriefs in Electrical and Computer Engineering. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75871-8_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75871-8_5
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