Abstract
This chapter demonstrates that a mutually hurting stalemate in the all-out war of 2012 compelled the two sides to initiate in March 2013 an epic solution process with the mediation of Öcalan. Although this open process involved several actors (e.g. the HDP), the AKP and PKK could not agree on a roadmap for peace. However, the process did not collapse since, as the chapter elucidates, the two parties utilised this ceasefire to advance their other agendas; rather, the process evolved unevenly and endured, thanks to two assertive personalities—Öcalan and Erdoğan. However, the tensions steadily escalated and the triumphs of the PKK’s offshoots in Syria and Turkey in 2015 alarmed the AKP dangerously; the twin bombings by ISIS in July 2015 offered this spark for a new war.
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Notes
- 1.
“PKK Ateşkes Ilan Etti” [“The PKK Declared a Cease-fire”], Vatan, March 23, 2013.
- 2.
For over two months, the “wise men committee” toured the whole length and breadth of Turkey and held nearly 60,000 meetings with state officials and the public. International Crisis Group: “Crying “Wolf”, Why Turkish Fears Need Not Block Turkish Reform” (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2013), 5, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/crying-wolf-why-turkish-fears-need-not-block-kurdish-reform
- 3.
Tezcür, “Prospects for Resolution”: 73; Ünal, “Is It Ripe Yet”: 17–18.
- 4.
Sibel Ultu Bila, “Turkey’s Kurds Rally for Peace, But Mistrust Lingers”, Al-Monitor, March 21, 2013; Constanze Letsch, “Kurdish Ceasefire Boosts Peace Process in Turkey”, Guardian, March 21, 2013.
- 5.
“İşte İmralı’daki Görüşmenin Tutanakları” [“Meaning of that Meeting in Imrali”], Milliyet, March 5, 2013; “Bakan Ergin’den Öcalan Açıklaması” [“Description of Öcalan by Minister Ergin”], Sabah, March 29, 2013.
- 6.
Yeğen, “Kurdish Peace Process”, 9.
- 7.
The TSK slaughtered many PKK fighters when the latter withdrew from Turkey after an appeal by its jailed leader in January 1999. Murat Karayilan, “Gerilla Sınır Sışına Çekilmiyor” [“The Guerrillas Are Not Withdrawing to Outside Borders”], Ajansa Nüçeyan a Firatê, November 9, 2010.
- 8.
Constanze Letsch, “PKK Begins to Withdraw from Turkey”, Guardian, May 8, 2013; Christos Minagias, “Ο Οτζαλάν και ο Τουρκο-Ισλαμικός Μηχανισμός του Ερντογάν” [“Öcalan and the Turco-Islamic Mechanism of Erdoğan”], Geostrategy, March 27, 2016.
- 9.
“PKK ‘Halts Withdrawal’ from Turkey”, Al Jazeera, September 9, 2013; Kadri Gursel, “Time Running Out for Turkey-PKK Peace Process”, Al-Monitor, November 4, 2013.
- 10.
Erika Solomon, “Special Report: Amid Syria’s Violence, Kurds Carve Out Autonomy”, Reuters, January 22, 2014.
- 11.
“PYD Leader Arrives in Turkey for Two-Day Talks”, Hürriyet Daily News, July 25, 2013; Jonathon Burch, “Syrian Kurdish Leader Visits Turkey as ISIS Advances on Kobane”, Rûdaw, October 5, 2014.
- 12.
Paul Scharfe, “Erdoğan’s Presidential Dreams, Turkey’s Constitutional Politics”, Origins 8, no. 5 (2015): 1–10.
- 13.
Immanuel Wallerstein, “Turkey: Dilemma of the Kurds” in Reflections on Taksim—Gezi Park Protests in Turkey, eds. Bülent Gökay and Ilia Xypolia (Keele: Keele University Press, 2013), 31–32.
- 14.
In December 2013, the Gülen-infiltrated judiciary and police initiated a probe on Erdoğan and his associates (mostly ministers and their families) on the grounds of corruption and violation of the international embargo against Iran. This investigation caused a severe intra-governmental crisis and exposed the secret role of Turkey in the violation of the embargo. Orhan Coskun and Ece Toksabay, “Hit by Scandal and Resignations, Turk PM Names New Ministers”, Star Online, December 25, 2013; Berivan Orucoglu, “Why Turkey’s Mother of All Corruption Scandals Refuses to Go Away”, Foreign Policy, January 6, 2015.
- 15.
The AKP already possessed 327 (out of 550) seats in parliament and needed three more seats for the revision of the constitution which could be provided only by the bloc of 35 independent deputies (29 were the Kurdish ones).
- 16.
“Erdoğan-Öcalan Anlaşması Resmileşti” [“Erdoğan-Ocalan agreement was formalized”], Aydinlik, November 26, 2013. Aliza Marcus and Halil Karaveli, “How the Kurds’ Power Play Backfired in Turkey”, National Interest, March 27, 2015.
- 17.
“Selahattin Demirtaş, Başkanlık Sistemini Asla Kabul Etmeyeceğiz” [“Selahattin Demirtas: We will Never Accept Presidential System”], Haberler, February 3, 2015; “We Will Not Make you the President, HDP Co-chair Tells Erdoğan”, Hürriyet Daily News, March 17, 2015.
- 18.
For an analysis of the separatist insurgency’s cost, see: Hüseyin Yayman, Türkiye’nin Kürt Sorunu Hafızası [Turkey’s Kurdish Question] (Ankara: SETA Yayınları, 2011).
- 19.
“Kürtler Ile Türkler Ittifak Yapacak!!” [“Alliance between Kurds and Turks!”], Haber7, September 17, 2013; International Crisis Group, “Flight of the Ikarus”, 18–19.
- 20.
Cengiz Çandar, “The Kurdish Question: The Reasons and Fortunes of the ‘Opening’”, Insight Turkey 11, no. 4 (2009): 15.
- 21.
For an in-depth analysis of this issue, see: Ergun Özbudun and William Hale, Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP (London: Routledge, 2010), 55–67.
- 22.
For more information, see: Galip Dalay, “The Kurdish Peace Process: From Dialogue to Negotiation?”(Doha: Aljazeera Center for Studies, 2015), 1, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2015/04/2015422115349145185.html.
- 23.
Cemil Bayık and Hülya Oran were appointed co-chairs of the KCK Executive Council and Presidency General Council. Öcalan remained the overall head of KCK and Murat Karayılan, the former KCK co-chair, was designated as head of the People’s Defence Forces (Hêzên Parastina Gelê or HPG), the PKK’s armed wing. Mutlu Cirivoglu: “PKK Reshuffles Top Leadership of its Executive Council”, Rudaw, July 14, 2013.
- 24.
In 2004 Osman Öcalan and several other commanders who opposed a resumption of the armed struggle were sidelined by an intra-party coup and subsequently ousted by the PKK. White: The PKK, 151–152.
- 25.
“Öcalan’a Ev Ηapsi Yok” [“No House Arrest for Öcalan”], Al Jazeera Türk, January 6, 2003; “Başbakan’dan ‘Öcalan’a Ev Hapsi’ Açıklaması” [“Prime Minister ‘House Arrest Öcalan’ Description”], Sabah, March 30, 2013.
- 26.
Tezcür, “Prospects for Resolution”: 75–77. After all, the PKK is primarily interested in its survival. Güneş Murat Tezcür, “When Democratization Radicalizes? The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey”, Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 6 (2010), 775–789.
- 27.
Analytically, these reforms allowed the education in mother languages (only in private schools), removed the pledge of allegiance to Turkey and Kemalism at public schools, distributed state economic aid to political parties with at least over 3% of the national vote, authorised the election propaganda in non-Turkish minority languages, reinstated the old names for villages and towns. Yeğen, “Kurdish Peace Process”, 9.
- 28.
“Iconic Kurdish Musician Returns to Turkey after 38 Years of Exile to ‘Sing for Peace’”, Hürriyet Daily News, November 16, 2013; “Barzani, Perwer Meet Erdoğan in Diyarbakir”, World Bulletin, November 16, 2013.
- 29.
Fehim Taştekin, “Turkey Returns to Balance in Iraq, KRG Ties”, Al-Monitor, November 14, 2013; Nuray Mert, “The Erdoğan-Barzani Alliance: A Turkish Policy Classic”, Hürriyet Daily News, November 16, 2013.
- 30.
Tezcür, “Prospects for Resolution”: 77.
- 31.
Indicatively, Ankara has not even acknowledged that the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-terrorism Unit (JITEM) actually exists. “JITEM Vardir!” [“There JITEM!”], Milliyet, February 16, 2006; Murat Kuseyri, “JİTEM Ergenekon’un Askeri Kanadıdır” [“JITEM Is the Military Wing of Ergenekon”], Evrensel. October 4, 2008.
- 32.
By 2012, only 62 public officials had been convicted with light sentences for the “dirty war” of the 1990s. Human Rights Watch, “Time for Justice: Ending Impunity for Killings and Disappearances in 1990s Turkey” (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/09/03/time-justice/ending-impunity-killings-and-disappearances-1990s-turkey.
- 33.
“Ocalan: Three Practical Suggestions to the Government”, ANF News, July 9, 2010; Abdullah Öcalan, “Bir Hakikat Ve Uzlaşma Komisyonu Gerek” [“We Need a Truth and Reconciliation Commission”], Ajansa Nûçeyan a Firatê, November 18, 2010.
- 34.
Kurdish Human Rights Project, “The Status of Internally Displaced Kurds in Turkey: Return and Compensation Rights—An Update” (London: Kurdish Human Rights Project, 2006), 34–46, http://www.khrp.org/khrp-news/human-rights-documents/doc_download/97-the-status-of-internally-displaced-kurds-in-turkey--return-and-compensation-rights-an-update.html; Bilgin Ayata and Deniz Yükseker, “A Belated Awakening: National and International Responses to the Internal Displacement of Kurds in Turkey”, New Perspectives on Turkey 32 (2005): 32–37.
- 35.
Alexander Christie-Miller, “The PPK and the Closure of Turkey’s Kurdish Opening”, Middle East Research and Information Project, August 4, 2010.
- 36.
M.P. Roth and Murat Sever: “The Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) as Criminal Syndicate: Funding Terrorism through Organized Crime, A Case Study”, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 10 (2007): 901–920; Mehmet Cetingulec, “Turkey Cracks Down on Drug Cartels”, Al-Monitor, May 29, 2014.
- 37.
Gallia Lindenstrauss, “Back to Square One? The Collapse of the Peace Process with the Kurds in Turkey”, Strategic Assessment 18, no. 4 (2016): 100.
- 38.
For the village guards system in Turkey, see: Evren Balta, “Causes and Consequences of Village Guard System in Turkey”, paper presented at the Humanitarian and Security Affairs Conference, New York (USA), December 2, 2004.
- 39.
“Karayılan: Profesyonel Gerilla Hedefliyoruz” [“Karayilan: Our Aim a Professional Guerrilla Force”], Dicle News Agency, August 15, 2013; “Pınar Ogunc, “Kürtler Demokratik Ozerklikle Ne Istiyor?” [“What Are the Kurds Demanding With Democratic Autonomy?”], Radikal, April 29, 2014.
- 40.
International Crisis Group, “Turkey and the PKK: Saving the Peace Process” (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014), 23–24, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/turkey-and-pkk-saving-peace-process
- 41.
Thanks to higher fertility, the growth rate of the Kurdish population critically outpaces the Turkish one and creates a “siege mentality” among the policy-making circles in Ankara. Palash Gosh, “A Kurdish Majority in Turkey Within One Generation?”, International Business Times, June 5, 2012; Burak Bekdil: “Uncle Tayyip’s ‘graying Turkey’ vs. A more Kurdish Turkey”, Hürriyet Daily News, May 15, 2015.
- 42.
Abdüllatif Şener, “The Analysis of 2014 Local Elections of Turkey”, Research Turkey 3, no. 5 (2014): 19–37.
- 43.
The statistics are derived from an unpublished survey (of 7100 people) by the Ankara think-tank TEPAV. International Crisis Group, “Turkey and the PKK”, 25–26.
- 44.
Michiel Leezenberg, “The Ambiguities of Democratic Autonomy: The Kurdish Movement in Turkey and Rojava”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 16, no. 4 (2016): 671–690.
- 45.
Deniz Serinci, “On Language Day, Kurds Demand Education in Mother Tongue”, Rudaw, May 16, 2014; Fréderike Geerdink, “Kurds Not Giving Up on Education in Mother Tongue”, Al-Monitor, September 23, 2014.
- 46.
Henri Barkey and Direnç Kadioglu, “The Kurdish Constitution and the Kurdish Question” (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for Peace, 2011), http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/08/01/turkish-constitution-and-kurdish-question-pub-45218.
- 47.
Baskin Oran, “Exploring Turkishness: ‘Turkish’ and Türkiyeli” in Turkey and the Politics of National Identity: Social, Economic and Cultural Transformation, eds. Shane Brennan and Marc Herzog (London: IB Tauris, 2014), 23–37.
- 48.
Emre Akoz, “Turkey’s Real Concern: Greater Kurdistan”, Al-Monitor, October 2, 2014.
- 49.
Approximately 57% of the respondents in a nationwide public survey supported the solution process. International Crisis Group, “Turkey and the PKK”, 31.
- 50.
Ünal: “Is It Ripe”: 18; Lindenstrauss, “Back to Square One”: 103.
- 51.
International Crisis Group, “Turkey and the PKK”, 10–12.
- 52.
“Turkey: Eight Journalists and 37 Politicians on KCK Trial Released”, E-Kurd Daily, March 27, 2014; “Turkey: Kurdish Politician Hatip Dicle Tried in KCK Case Released”, E-Kurd Daily, June 29, 2014.
- 53.
Law No. 6551, “Terörün Sona Erdirilmesi ve Toplumsal Bütünleşmenin Güçlendirilmesine Dair Kanun” [“Law to End Terror and Strengthen Social Unity”]; “Çözüm Süreci Toplumdan Yüksek Bir Onay Alıyor” [“Solution Process Receives Wide Backing from Society”], Anadolu Ajansi, July 4, 2014.
- 54.
Wladimir van Wilgenburg: “Turkey’s Gulen Movement Could Endanger PKK Peace Process”, Rûdaw, June 18, 2013; Galip Dalay, “The Kurdish Peace Process in the Shadow of Turkey’s Power Struggle and the Upcoming Local Elections” (Doha: Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2014), 1, studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/03/2014324115034955220.html.
- 55.
Ali Hussein Bakeer, “New Turkey: 2014 Presidential Elections and Future Implications” (Doha: Al Jazeera Center for Studies, 2014), studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2014/08/201482791917421354.html.
- 56.
Kurtuluş Tayiz, “Ahmet Davutoğlu and Turkey’s Peace Process”, Daily Sabah, September 23, 2014.
- 57.
The violent protests raged for three days (8–10 October 2014) in south-eastern and eastern Turkey (where the vast majority of the Kurds reside) and cost the lives of 34 people in total; only the appeal of Öcalan pacified the angry Kurdish crowds. Metin Gurcan, “Kurdish Activist Violence Brings Kobani Conflict to Turkish Streets”, Al-Monitor, October 8, 2014.
- 58.
Turkish Hezbollah acted as an organ of the “deep state” in the “dirty war” against the PKK in the 1990s and earned the hatred and fear of the pro-PKK supporters. Carolin Goerzig, Talking to Terrorists: Concessions and the Renunciation of Violence (London: Routledge, 2010), 109–110; Mustafa Gürbuz, “Revitalization of Kurdish Islamic Sphere and Revival of Hizbullah in Turkey” in Understanding Turkey’s Kurdish Question, eds. Bilgin and Sarihan, 168–169.
- 59.
Metin Gurcan, “Kurd vs Kurd: Internal Clashes Continue in Turkey”, Al-Monitor, October 9, 2014; Sibel Hurtas, “Can PKK, Turkey’s Hezbollah Reconcile?”, Al-Monitor, June 24, 2015.
- 60.
The AKP had abolished the Protocol on Cooperation for Security and Public Order (Emniyet Asayiş Yardımlaşma Protokolü) that authorised the army to intervene at will in public events vaguely defined as “pro-terrorist”. Gulnur Aybet, “Turkey: For Peace to Succeed, PKK and HDP Must Part”, Middle East Eye, September 25, 2015; “Former Interior Minister Blames Security Forces for PKK’s Strengthening”, Today’s Zaman, September 30, 2015.
- 61.
“Demirtaş: Desteğimiz Sürecek” [“Demirtaş: Our Support Will Continue”], Vatan, October 2, 2014; Cagri Ozdemir, “Kargaşa içinde Türk-Kürt Barış Süreci” [“Turkish-Kurd Peace Process in Disarray”], Vatan, November 16, 2014.
- 62.
This address concerned (1) the definition and content of democratic politics; (2) the national and local dimensions of a democratic solution; (3) the legal guarantees of citizenship; (4) the delimitation of the state-society relations; (5) the socio-economic dimensions of the resolution process; (6) the demarcation of the society-military ties; (7) the legal warranties for policies on women, culture and ecology; (8) the pluralist definition of identity; (9) the definition of the constitutional basis for a democratic republic and (10) the parameters of a democratic constitution. International Crisis Group, “A Sisyphean Task? Resuming Turkey-PKK Peace Talks” (Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014), 5, https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/western-europemediterranean/turkey/sisyphean-task-resuming-turkey-pkk-peace-talks.
- 63.
“Duran Kalkan: Somut Olan Çatışmasızlığın Seçime Kadar Süreceğidir” [“Duran Kalkan: What Is Concrete Is That the No-Action Condition Will Continue Until Elections”], Bianet, March 3, 2015; International Crisis Group, “Sisyphean Task?”, 5.
- 64.
Caleb Laurer, “Party in a Hard Place: Turkey’s HDP and the Peace Process”, Middle East Eye, February 19, 2015. On the positive role of the HDP in the initiation and continuation of the peace process, see: Ödül Celep, “Can the Turkish Left Contribute to Turkey’s Democratization?”, Insight Turkey 16, no. 3 (2014): 165–180.
- 65.
“Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Haberim Yok, Olumlu Bakmıyorum” [“President Erdoğan: I Didn’t Know, I Don’t Approve”], Haber Türk, March 20, 2015; “Erdoğan Renounces Dolmabahçe Declaration, Says HDP Should Try its Best for PKK’s Disarmament”, Daily Sabah, July 15, 2015.
- 66.
Alexandra Sims, “Ahmet Davutoglu: President’s Handicapped Prime Minister Resigns”, Independent, May 6, 2016; Alon Ben Meir, “How Turkey Became a De Facto Dictatorship”, Huffington Post, May 12, 2016.
- 67.
Alberto Nardelli, Kate Lyons, Constanze Letsch and Daan Louter, “Turkey Election 2015: A Guide to the Parties, Polls and Electoral System”, Guardian, October 28, 2015.
- 68.
Tim Arango and Ceylan Yenginsu, “Erdoğan’s Governing Party in Turkey Loses Parliamentary Majority”, New York Times, June 7, 2015; Burcu Özçelik, “What the HDP Success Means for Turkey”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 11, 2015.
- 69.
Fulya Ozerkan, “Erdoğan Announces Snap Elections as Coalition Bid Fails”, Times of Israel, August 21, 2015.
- 70.
Semih Idiz, “US Support of Syrian Kurds Ruffles Turkey’s Feathers”, Al-Monitor, August 4, 2015; Jonathan Steele, “The Syrian Kurds Are Winning”, New York Books, November 4, 2015.
- 71.
Indicatively, in 2014 the PKK carried out 293 attacks with firearms and 785 attacks with explosives and caused substantial casualties (9 security officers and 49 civilians dead) according to the TSK. “TSK’dan Çok Sert Açıklama” [“Very Harsh Statement from Turkish Security Sorces”], Sabah, June 9, 2014. But the military, fatally weakened, could only voice its concerns.
- 72.
Tezcür, “Prospects for Resolution”: 79–80.
- 73.
Aslin Aydintabas, “Turkey’s Unwinnable War”, January 5, 2016; Firat Demir, “Erdoğan’s War”, Foreign Affairs, March 18, 2016.
- 74.
Ilke Toygür, “Turkey on Its Way to Snap Elections: A Political Gamble?”, Elcano Royal Institute, September 30, 2015; Thomas Seibert, “Is Turkey’s President Dragging His Country to War for Votes?”, The Daily Beast, August 9, 2015.
- 75.
For an analysis of the ups and downs of the HPD in 2015, see: Ioannis Grigoriadis, “The People’s Democratic Party (HDP) and the 2015 Elections”, Turkish Studies 17, no. 1 (2016): 39–46.
- 76.
Metin Gurcan, “Is PKK Real Target of Turkish Strikes?”, Al-Monitor, July 27, 2015.
- 77.
Mustafa Akyol, “Who Killed Turkey-PKK Peace Process?”, Al-Monitor, August 4, 2015; Spyridon Plakoudas: «Η Τουρκία στη Δίνη της Βίας» [“Turkey in a Spiral of Violence”], KEDISA, August 25, 2015.
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Plakoudas, S. (2018). The “Solution Process” (2013–2015). In: Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Turkey. Palgrave Pivot, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75659-2_4
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