Abstract
This chapter presents the first variable/hypothesis with a theoretical background, then it applies the theory to the case studies and gives evidence that Turkey passed from securitization to some forms of autonomization to resecuritization again during the democratization and that Indonesia took the opposite path. This chapter therefore discusses rational choice theory in comparative politics, an approach that sees elites’ rational decision on costs and benefits as the reason for every policy. In brief, when the political costs of toleration are higher than the political costs of repression, the state will choose a path of accommodation; in the converse case, the state will choose repression and securitization. In the cases of both Turkey and Indonesia, the findings are that the elites’ power interests have been important in contributing to the alternations between autonomization and securitization of ethnic minorities.
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Notes
- 1.
Ruth Collier, Paths toward Democracy: The working class and elites in Western Europe and South America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 18.
- 2.
Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, “Introduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic Regimes,” in Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe, edited by John Higley and Richard Gunther (London: Cambridge University Press, 1992) p. 8. Cited in Collier, Paths toward Democracy, p. 18.
- 3.
Barbara Geddes, “What do we know about democratization after twenty years?,” Annual Review of Political Science, 2:115–44, 1999, p. 129.
- 4.
Patrick Dunleavy, Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Models in Political Science (London: Pearson, 1991).
- 5.
The Elite Theory was developed at the end of the nineteenth century by the so-called Italian School of Elitists. In 1956, Charles Wright Mills retook the concept in The Power Elite, arguing about a system of power in the USA based on political, economic, and military groups that make ordinary citizens powerless in the hands of these groups.
- 6.
Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
- 7.
Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971).
- 8.
Barry R. Weingast, “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 2 (June, 1997), pp. 245–263.
- 9.
The problem of collective action, also called the coordination dilemma, is based on the fact that coercion or specific benefits must be present in order for a group to act collectively for the common interest. For public goods, for example democracy, we need groups, but it is difficult to get everybody to collaborate and pay the costs as individuals prefer to free ride, which is why we need organizations, like a bureaucratic state, to make individuals do their part, like paying taxes, for example. See Mancur Olson, The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
- 10.
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The logic of political survival (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003).
- 11.
See Chap. 2.
- 12.
Jocelyn Cesari, The awakening of Muslim democracies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 229–233.
- 13.
Michelle Ann Miller, Rebellion and reform in Indonesia: Jakarta’s security and autonomy policies in Aceh (London, New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 2.
- 14.
Janine R. Wedel, Shadow elite (Basic Books, 2009).
- 15.
Söyler, Mehtap, The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2015).
- 16.
Kerem Öktem, Turkey since 1989: angry nation (London: Zed Books, 2011).
- 17.
Marcus Mietzner, “The president, the ‘deep state’ and policy making in post-Suharto Indonesia: a case study of the deliberation of the civil service act,” Report for the Partnership on Governance Reform (Jakarta: Kemitraan, 2014).
- 18.
The Gulen movement is as an Islamic transnational civil society movement that seeks a balance between Islamic and modern values, considering Islam a “way of life” in the Sufi spiritual tradition. Unlike other Islamic movements like Wahhabism, its goal is not to proselytize but to serve in a kind of “missionary” spirit, so instead of building mosques or madrasas it builds schools and hospitals and is active in interfaith dialogue. It is guided by a Turkish preacher, an ex-imam, Fethullah Gulen, who has been living in exile in the USA since 1999. See http://fgulen.com/en/.
- 19.
With the lack of freedom of press and transparency in Turkey, little information is available on the relationship between the Turkish economic elites and business class and the government. There are only allegations that Erdogan is enriching his family and the business elite close to him, as in December 2015 when Russia accused the Erdogan family of profiting from the illegal smuggling of oil from territory held by ISIS. See Reuters, “Turkish leader’s son denies Russian allegations of Islamic State trade,” December 8, 2015, accessed September 30, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-russia-idUSKBN0TR15I20151208.
- 20.
Raziye Akkoc, “A parallel state within Turkey? How the country’s democracy came under attack from two men’s rivalry,” The Daily Telegraph, February 24, 2015, accessed September 30, 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/11397876/A-parallel-state-within-Turkey-How-the-countrys-democracy-came-underattack-from-two-mens-rivalry.html.
- 21.
See, among many, BBC News, “Turkey coup: Purge widens to education sector,” accessed September 30, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36838347.
The National, “Turkey arrests 32,000 people in coup probe,” September 28, 2016, accessed September 30, 2017, http://www.thenational.ae/world/europe/turkey-arrests-32000-people-in-coup-probe.
- 22.
Erdoganism has been compared by several analysts with Kemalism, given the attitude of Erdogan as a “new sultan” or “new Ataturk” wanting to monopolize power to create a new Islamist, even if moderate, Turkey.
- 23.
Senem Aslan, “Different faces of Turkish Islamic nationalism,” in Rethinking Nation and Nationalism, Project on the Middle East and Political Science, POMPES studies n. 14, June 2, 2015, p. 10.
- 24.
“Turkish gov’t criticizes Erdogan over Kurdish process,” Daily News, March 21, 2015, accessed September 30, 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-govt-criticizes-erdogan-over-kurdish-process.aspx?pageID=238&nID=79989&NewsCatID=338.
- 25.
Erdogan Albay, “Turkey’s President Erdogan Shows Machiavellian Instincts Yet Again,” Foreign Policy Journal, May 13, 2016, accessed September 30, 2017, http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2016/05/13/turkeys-president-erdogan-shows-machiavellian-instincts-yet-again/.
- 26.
Tim Arando and Ceylan Yeginsumay, “How Erdogan Moved to Solidify Power by Ousting a Pivotal Ally,” New York Times, MAY 5, 2016, accessed September 30, 2017, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/06/world/europe/ahmet-davutoglu-turkey-prime-minister.html?_r=0.
- 27.
Carter Findley, Turkey, Islam, nationalism, and modernity: A history, 1789–2007 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010).
- 28.
Dimitar Bechev, “The Travails of Democracy in Turkey,” in Valeria Talbot, The Uncertain Path of the ‘New Turkey’ (Milan: ISPI, 2015) p. 11.
- 29.
Senem Aslan, “Different faces of Turkish Islamic nationalism,” 2015.
- 30.
Soner Cagaptay, “From Ataturk to Erdogan: Reshaping Turkey,” Washington Post, August 14, 2011, accessed September 30, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/from-ataturk-to-erdogan-reshaping-turkey/2011/08/11/gIQA5lKjFJ_story.html. See also Senem Aslan, “Different faces of Turkish Islamic nationalism,” 2015.
- 31.
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed September 30, 2017, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database.
- 32.
Global Fire Power, online database, accessed September 30, 2017, http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp.
- 33.
Sumanto Al Qurtuby, “Interethnic Violence, Separatism and Political Reconciliation in Turkey and Indonesia,” India Quarterly 71(2) (6/2015): 126–145.
- 34.
CIA Factbook, Turkey, 2016, accessed September 30, 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html.
- 35.
David Romano, “The long road toward Kurdish accommodation in Turkey: the role of elections and international pressures,” Ch. 9 in Jacques Bertrand and Oded Haklai (eds.) Democratization and Ethnic Minorities: Conflict or Compromise? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014): 165.
- 36.
This was possible because the candidates presented themselves as independents in an alliance with left-wing parties, the Thousand Hope Candidates in 2007 and the Labour, Democracy, and Freedom Bloc in 2011.
- 37.
Omer Tekdemir and Oghuzan Goksel, “A turbulent Turkey in a region in turmoil,” Open Democracy, September 17, 2015, accessed September 30, 2017, https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/omer-tekdemir-o%C4%9Fuzhan-g%C3%B6ksel/turbulent-turkey-in-region-in-turmoil.
- 38.
Al Serhun, “Kurds, state elites, and patterns of nationhood in Iraq and Turkey,” in Rethinking Nation and Nationalism, Project on the Middle East and Political Science, POMPES studies n. 14, June 2, 2015, p. 6.
- 39.
Tulin Daloglu, “Talks with Öcalan Offer Slim Hope for Turkey-PKK Deal,” Al Monitor, January 2013, accessed September 30, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/originals/2013/01/kurds-pkk-ocalan.html.
- 40.
Constitutional amendments in Turkey require a three-fifths majority to be put to referendum and a two-thirds majority to be ratified directly. The AKP reached an agreement to be presented in a referendum in January 2017, thanks to the help of the right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which has supported the AKP since the end of peace negotiations with the PKK and the resecuritization of the Kurdish issue.
- 41.
Desmond Butler and Suzan Fraser, “Erdogan slams brakes on Kurdish peace process ahead of polls,” Salon, April 8, 2015, accessed September 30, 2017, http://www.salon.com/2015/04/08/erdogan_slams_brakes_on_kurdish_peace_process_ahead_of_polls/.
- 42.
Ofra Bengio, “The ‘Kurdish Spring’ in Turkey and Its Impact on Turkish Foreign Relations in the Middle East,” Turkish Studies 12(4) (2011): 623.
- 43.
Mustafa Akyol, “Who Killed the Turkey-PKK Peace Process?,” Al Monitor, August 4, 2015, accessed September 30, 2017, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/08/turkey-syria-iraq-pkk-peace-process-who-killed-kurds.html.
Amberin Zaman, “A Bombing in Ankara and Erdogan’s Political War for Total Power,” Foreign Policy, October 15, 2015, accessed September 30, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/15/a-bombing-in-ankara-and-erdogans-political-war-for-total-power/.
- 44.
This book does not analyze the possibly deep but hidden relationship between business and political elites, apart from a few obvious elements like President Yudhoyono choosing businessman Yusuf Kalla as his vice president in 2004, as well as efforts to bring business elites within the government sphere.
- 45.
Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Jakarta: Equinox, 2007).
- 46.
Dan Slater, Ordering power: Contentious politics and authoritarian leviathans in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
- 47.
Aleksisu Jemadu, “Democratization, the Indonesian Armed Forces and the Resolving of the Aceh Conflict,” in Verandah of violence, edited by Anthony Reid, Singapore: Singapore University Press, pp. 272–292.
- 48.
Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The military and democracy in Indonesia. Challenges, politics and power, RAND, National Security Research Division, 2002.
- 49.
Indonesia, Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite, April 2008–September 2013, Southeast Asia Program Publications at Cornell University, No. 98 (October 2014), pp. 91–139.
- 50.
Rabasa and Haseman, The military and democracy in Indonesia, p. 26.
- 51.
Ibid., p. 27.
- 52.
Ibid., p. 49.
- 53.
Indonesian National Armed Forces, US database, accessed September 30, 2017, http://datab.us/i/Indonesian%20military.
- 54.
SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed September 30, 2017, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database.
- 55.
Marcus Mietzner, The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance (Washington: East-West Center, 2006).
- 56.
Hamid Awaluddin, “Why is peace in Aceh successful?” Conciliation Resources, Accord issue: 20, 2008, p. 25.
- 57.
Vedi Hadiz, “Reorganizing political power in Indonesia: A reconsideration of so-called ‘democratic transitions,’” The Pacific Review, Volume 16, Issue 4 (2003).
- 58.
Dan Slater, “Indonesia’s Accountability Trap: Party Cartels and Presidential Power after Democratic Transition,” Indonesia, Volume 78 (October 2004), 61–92.
- 59.
As Jocelyn Cesari argued for the Indonesian case, see: Cesari, 2014, pp. 229–233.
- 60.
Jan Woischnik and Philipp Müller, Islamic parties and democracy in Indonesia, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung International Reports, n. 10, 2013.
- 61.
Ibid., p. 61.
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Geri, M. (2018). Political Elites’ Power Interest and Rational Decision Making. In: Ethnic Minorities in Democratizing Muslim Countries. Minorities in West Asia and North Africa. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75574-8_5
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