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Abstract

In this final chapter I sum up the master argument of the book and give some indications of where the argument might prove helpful, and ways in which it might be expanded, for example into theorizing about the nature of artificial moral agents (AI), and into political philosophy.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Indeed, this aspect of Løgstrup ’s thought is an inheritance from his Lutheran background and is not necessary to the view of morality as other-regarding . This is in no way to attack Lutheranism in general, but only where it sees self-interested action as necessarily sinful. I am only reiterating that such a view of self-interest is not implied by the self-other model of morality.

  2. 2.

    Though see Moyal-Sharrock ’s gloss on Wittgenstein ’s use of the word ‘proposition’ here (2005, 111–12).

  3. 3.

    Though the Victorian practice of displaying the pickled heads of aboriginal peoples is not a million miles away from this.

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Correspondence to Neil O’Hara .

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O’Hara, N. (2018). Conclusion. In: Moral Certainty and the Foundations of Morality. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75444-4_7

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