Abstract
This chapter explains the role of organizational leadership in the development of covert scientific programs. The chapter traces the development of Corona and Future Imagery Architecture satellite programs. It finds that, under similar threat conditions, the two programs, which were similar in many respects, led to different outcomes. This chapter reveals that existing explanations based on organizational process do not completely explain the outcomes of the two programs. Through process tracing, the chapter articulates the role that those in leadership positions played in the development of the Corona and FIA programs for intelligence gathering, thereby providing evidence for an explanation based on bureaucratic politics.
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Notes
- 1.
Allison (1971) uses the term “Organizational Process” in his seminal work titled, “Essence of Decision”, in which he explores decision-making by then-White House Administration during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The organizational process framework views government action as the result of decisions made by its constitutive organizations. For instance, foreign policy decisions made by the White House administration are viewed as the consequence of interaction between its agencies such as the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the members from the Intelligence community. These departments employ standard operating procedures or routines that are fixed (Allison concedes that organizational change is possible. Organizations undergo change in response to budgetary changes or drastic failures in the operating environment). These agencies (or organizations), operating within their capacities and constraints provide outputs which in turn shape government behavior.
- 2.
Bomber Gap and Missile Gap refer to belief during the Cold War period that the Soviet Union had outstripped the United States in the number and superiority of its aviation and missile development.
- 3.
Even though DCI Allen Dulles was a proponent of using human intelligence, he supported both the U-2 and the satellite reconnaissance programs. While the reason is not directly evident, it may be speculated that it has to do with the difficulty of obtaining intelligence from the Soviet Union, and support of both of these programs by R.M. Bissell, who was Assistant to the DCI.
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Sudharsan, S. (2018). Organizational Process, Leadership, and Technology for Intelligence Gathering: Development of Photo-Reconnaissance Satellites in the United States. In: Kosal, M. (eds) Technology and the Intelligence Community. Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75232-7_4
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