Abstract
DPA attacks usually exhibit a “divide-and-conquer” property: the adversary needs to enumerate only a small space of the key (a key sub-space) when performing the DPA attack. This is achieved trivially in the outer rounds of a cryptographic implementation since intermediates depend on only few key bits. In the inner rounds, however, intermediates depend on too many key bits to make DPA practical or even to pose an advantage over cryptanalysis. For this reason, DPA countermeasures may be deployed only to outer rounds if performance or efficiency are critical. This paper shows a DPA attack exploiting leakage from the third round of a Feistel cipher, such as DES. We require the ability of fixing inputs, but we do not place any special restriction on the leakage model. The complexity of the attack is that of two to three DPA attacks on the first round of DES plus some minimal differential cryptanalysis.
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Acknowledgments
The authors wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments. This work was supported in part by the Research Council KU Leuven: C16/15/058. In addition, this work was supported by the Flemish Government, FWO G.00130.13N, FWO G.0876.14N and Thresholds G0842.13; by the Hercules Foundation AKUL/11/19; and through the Cathedral ERC Advanced Grant 695305. Oscar Reparaz is Postdoctoral Fellow of the Fund for Scientific Research - Flanders (FWO). Benedikt Gierlichs is Postdoctoral Fellow of the Fund for Scientific Research - Flanders (FWO).
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Reparaz, O., Gierlichs, B. (2018). A First-Order Chosen-Plaintext DPA Attack on the Third Round of DES. In: Eisenbarth, T., Teglia, Y. (eds) Smart Card Research and Advanced Applications. CARDIS 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10728. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75208-2_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75208-2_3
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