Abstract
Algebraic Side-Channel Attack (ASCA) models the cryptographic algorithm and side-channel leakage from the system as a set of equations and solves for the secret key. The attack has low data complexity and can succeed in unknown plaintext/ciphertext scenarios. However, it is susceptible to error and the complexity of the model may drastically increase the runtime as well as the memory consumption. In this paper, we explore the attack by examining the importance of various Hamming weights in terms of success of the attack, which also allows us to gain insights into possible areas of focus for countermeasures, as well as successfully launch ASCA on AES with a larger error tolerance.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Barenghi, A., Pelosi, G., Teglia, Y.: Improving first order differential power attacks through digital signal processing. In: Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Security of Information and Networks, SIN 2010, pp. 124–133. ACM, New York (2010). https://doi.org/10.1145/1854099.1854126
Daemen, J., Rijmen, V.: AES - The Advanced Encryption Standard. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)
Liu, F., Cruz, W., Ma, C., Johnson, G., Michel, L.: A tolerant algebraic side-channel attack on AES using CP. In: Beck, J.C. (ed.) CP 2017. LNCS, vol. 10416, pp. 189–205. Springer, Cham (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66158-2_13
Fei, H., Daheng, G.: Two kinds of correlation analysis method attack on implementations of advanced encryption standard software running inside STC89C52 microprocessor. In: 2016 2nd IEEE International Conference on Computer and Communications (ICCC), pp. 1265–1269, October 2016
Grosso, V., Standaert, F.-X.: ASCA, SASCA and DPA with enumeration: which one beats the other and when? In: Iwata, T., Cheon, J.H. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2015. LNCS, vol. 9453, pp. 291–312. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48800-3_12
Jayasinghe, D., Ragel, R., Ambrose, J.A., Ignjatovic, A., Parameswaran, S.: Advanced modes in AES: are they safe from power analysis based side channel attacks? In: 2014 IEEE 32nd International Conference on Computer Design (ICCD), pp. 173–180, October 2014
Kocher, P., Jaffe, J., Jun, B.: Differential power analysis. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, pp. 388–397. Springer, Heidelberg (1999). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-48405-1_25
Lu, Y., O’Neill, M.P., McCanny, J.V.: FPGA implementation and analysis of random delay insertion countermeasure against DPA. In: 2008 International Conference on Field-Programmable Technology, pp. 201–208, December 2008
Luo, C., Fei, Y., Ding, A.A.: Side-channel power analysis of XTS-AES. In: Design, Automation Test in Europe Conference Exhibition (DATE), pp. 1330–1335, March 2017
Mangard, S.: A simple power-analysis (SPA) attack on implementations of the AES key expansion. In: Lee, P.J., Lim, C.H. (eds.) ICISC 2002. LNCS, vol. 2587, pp. 343–358. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36552-4_24
Michel, L.D., Van Hentenryck, P.: Constraint satisfaction over bit-vectors. In: Milano, M. (ed.) CP 2012. LNCS, pp. 527–543. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33558-7_39
Mohamed, M.S.E., Bulygin, S., Zohner, M., Heuser, A., Walter, M., Buchmann, J.: Improved algebraic side-channel attack on AES. J. Cryptogr. Eng. 3(3), 139–156 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13389-013-0059-1
Mpalane, K., Gasela, N., Esiefarienrhe, B.M., Tsague, H.D.: Vulnerability of advanced encryption standard algorithm to differential power analysis attacks implemented on ATmega-128 microcontroller. In: 2016 Third International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Pattern Recognition (AIPR), pp. 1–5, September 2016
Oren, Y., Kirschbaum, M., Popp, T., Wool, A.: Algebraic side-channel analysis in the presence of errors. In: Mangard, S., Standaert, F.-X. (eds.) CHES 2010. LNCS, vol. 6225, pp. 428–442. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15031-9_29
Oren, Y., Renauld, M., Standaert, F.-X., Wool, A.: Algebraic side-channel attacks beyond the hamming weight leakage model. In: Prouff, E., Schaumont, P. (eds.) CHES 2012. LNCS, vol. 7428, pp. 140–154. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-33027-8_9
Oren, Y., Weisse, O., Wool, A.: Practical template-algebraic side channel attacks with extremely low data complexity. In: Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy, HASP 2013, pp. 7:1–7:8. ACM, New York (2013). https://doi.org/10.1145/2487726.2487733
Oren, Y., Wool, A.: Side-channel cryptographic attacks using pseudo-boolean optimization. Constraints 21(4), 616–645 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10601-015-9237-3
Ors, S.B., Gurkaynak, F., Oswald, E., Preneel, B.: Power-analysis attack on an ASIC AES implementation. In: International Conference on Information Technology: Coding and Computing, Proceedings, ITCC 2004, vol. 2, pp. 546–552, April 2004
Örs, S.B., Oswald, E., Preneel, B.: Power-analysis attacks on an FPGA – first experimental results. In: Walter, C.D., Koç, Ç.K., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2003. LNCS, vol. 2779, pp. 35–50. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45238-6_4
Renauld, M., Standaert, F.-X.: Algebraic side-channel attacks. In: Bao, F., Yung, M., Lin, D., Jing, J. (eds.) Inscrypt 2009. LNCS, vol. 6151, pp. 393–410. Springer, Heidelberg (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16342-5_29
Renauld, M., Standaert, F.-X., Veyrat-Charvillon, N.: Algebraic side-channel attacks on the AES: why time also matters in DPA. In: Clavier, C., Gaj, K. (eds.) CHES 2009. LNCS, vol. 5747, pp. 97–111. Springer, Heidelberg (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04138-9_8
Song, L., Hu, L., Sun, S., Zhang, Z., Shi, D., Hao, R.: Error-tolerant algebraic side-channel attacks using BEE. In: Hui, L.C.K., Qing, S.H., Shi, E., Yiu, S.M. (eds.) ICICS 2014. LNCS, vol. 8958, pp. 1–15. Springer, Cham (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-21966-0_1
Standaert, F.-X., Mace, F., Peeters, E., Quisquater, J.-J.: Updates on the security of FPGAs against power analysis attacks. In: Bertels, K., Cardoso, J.M.P., Vassiliadis, S. (eds.) ARC 2006. LNCS, vol. 3985, pp. 335–346. Springer, Heidelberg (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/11802839_42
Standaert, F.-X., van Oldeneel tot Oldenzeel, L., Samyde, D., Quisquater, J.-J.: Power analysis of FPGAs: how practical is the attack? In: Y. K. Cheung, P., Constantinides, G.A. (eds.) FPL 2003. LNCS, vol. 2778, pp. 701–710. Springer, Heidelberg (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-45234-8_68
Standaert, F.-X., Örs, S.B., Preneel, B.: Power analysis of an FPGA. In: Joye, M., Quisquater, J.-J. (eds.) CHES 2004. LNCS, vol. 3156, pp. 30–44. Springer, Heidelberg (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-28632-5_3
Standaert, O.X., Peeters, E., Rouvroy, G., Quisquater, J.J.: An overview of power analysis attacks against field programmable gate arrays. Proc. IEEE 94(2), 383–394 (2006)
Veyrat-Charvillon, N., Gérard, B., Standaert, F.-X.: Soft analytical side-channel attacks. In: Sarkar, P., Iwata, T. (eds.) ASIACRYPT 2014. LNCS, vol. 8873, pp. 282–296. Springer, Heidelberg (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-45611-8_15
Zhao, X., Zhang, F., Guo, S., Wang, T., Shi, Z., Liu, H., Ji, K.: MDASCA: an enhanced algebraic side-channel attack for error tolerance and new leakage model exploitation. In: Schindler, W., Huss, S.A. (eds.) COSADE 2012. LNCS, vol. 7275, pp. 231–248. Springer, Heidelberg (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29912-4_17
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature
About this paper
Cite this paper
Ma, C., Chandy, J., Michel, L., Liu, F., Cruz, W. (2018). Influence of Error on Hamming Weights for ASCA. In: Chen, X., Lin, D., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2017. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 10726. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75160-3_26
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75160-3_26
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-75159-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-75160-3
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)