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Sets of Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix \(2\times 3\) Mixed-Strategy Games

  • Valeriu UngureanuEmail author
Chapter
Part of the Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies book series (SIST, volume 89)

Abstract

The results of the precedent chapter are applied to solve bimatrix \(2\times 3\) mixed-strategy games. Such games are important mainly because they admit a simple graphic representation of Nash equilibrium sets. Even though the problem of Nash equilibrium set computing is not so frequently considered in literature, compared to other problems which investigate various aspects concerning the Nash equilibrium concept, some important instances we can refer specially such as (Raghavan, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Elsevier Science B.V, North-Holland, pp. 1687–1721, 2002, [1]), (Von Stengel, Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications. Elsevier Science B.V, North-Holland, pp. 1723–1759, 2002, [2]), (Avis, Rosenberg, Savani and Von Stenghel, Economic Theory, 42:9–37, 2010, [3]), (Datta, Economic Theory, 42:55–96, 2010, [4]).

References

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    Ungureanu, V., and I. Mandric. Set of Nash Equilibria in \(2\times 3\) Mixed Extended Games, from the Wolfram Demonstrations Project, Published: April 2010. http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/SetOfNashEquilibriaIn2x3MixedExtendedGames/

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Mathematics and Computer ScienceMoldova State UniversityChișinăuMoldova

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