Taxonomy of Strategic Games with Information Leaks and Corruption of Simultaneity

  • Valeriu UngureanuEmail author
Part of the Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies book series (SIST, volume 89)


In this chapter, pseudo-simultaneous normal form games are considered, i.e. strategic games with rules violated by information leaks and the corruption of simultaneity by Ungureanu (Comput Sci J Moldova 24, 1: 83–105, 2016) [1]. A classification of such games is provided. The taxonomy is constructed based on applicable fundamental solution principles. Existence conditions are highlighted, formulated and analysed.


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© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Faculty of Mathematics and Computer ScienceMoldova State UniversityChișinăuMoldova

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