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Sets of Pareto–Nash Equilibria in Dyadic Two-Criterion Mixed-Strategy Games

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Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg Game and Control Theory

Part of the book series: Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies ((SIST,volume 89))

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Abstract

In this chapter, the notion of Pareto–Nash equilibrium is investigated as a continuation of the precedent chapter as well as a continuation of prior works (Sagaidac and Ungureanu, Operational research, CEP USM, Chişinău, 296 pp, 2004 (in Romanian), [1]; Ungureanu, Comp Sci J Moldova, 14(3(42)):345–365, 2006, [2]; Ungureanu, ROMAI J, 4(1):225–242, 2008, [3]). First, problems and needed basic theoretical results are exposed. The method of intersection of graphs of best response mappings presented above and initiated in Ungureanu (Comp Sci J Moldova, 14(3(42)):345–365, 2006, [2]) is applied to solve dyadic two-criterion mixed-strategy games. To avoid misunderstanding, some previous results, which are applied in this chapter, are briefly exposed, too.

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References

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Correspondence to Valeriu Ungureanu .

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Ungureanu, V. (2018). Sets of Pareto–Nash Equilibria in Dyadic Two-Criterion Mixed-Strategy Games. In: Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg Game and Control Theory. Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies, vol 89. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75151-1_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75151-1_11

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-75150-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-75151-1

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