Sets of Pareto–Nash Equilibria in Dyadic Two-Criterion Mixed-Strategy Games
In this chapter, the notion of Pareto–Nash equilibrium is investigated as a continuation of the precedent chapter as well as a continuation of prior works (Sagaidac and Ungureanu, Operational research, CEP USM, Chişinău, 296 pp, 2004 (in Romanian), ; Ungureanu, Comp Sci J Moldova, 14(3(42)):345–365, 2006, ; Ungureanu, ROMAI J, 4(1):225–242, 2008, ). First, problems and needed basic theoretical results are exposed. The method of intersection of graphs of best response mappings presented above and initiated in Ungureanu (Comp Sci J Moldova, 14(3(42)):345–365, 2006, ) is applied to solve dyadic two-criterion mixed-strategy games. To avoid misunderstanding, some previous results, which are applied in this chapter, are briefly exposed, too.
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