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Computing Pareto–Nash Equilibrium Sets in Finite Multi-Objective Mixed-Strategy Games

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Part of the book series: Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies ((SIST,volume 89))

Abstract

The problem of a Pareto–Nash equilibrium set computing in finite multi-objective mixed-strategy games (Pareto–Nash games) is considered in this chapter. A method for a Pareto–Nash equilibrium set computing is exposed. The method is based on the fact that the set of Pareto–Nash equilibria is identified with the intersection of the graphs of efficient response mappings.

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Correspondence to Valeriu Ungureanu .

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Ungureanu, V. (2018). Computing Pareto–Nash Equilibrium Sets in Finite Multi-Objective Mixed-Strategy Games. In: Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg Game and Control Theory. Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies, vol 89. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75151-1_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75151-1_10

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-75150-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-75151-1

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