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The Weaponisation of Women by Boko Haram and the Prospects of Accountability

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Boko Haram and International Law

Abstract

Boko Haram has made extensive use of women in its tactical evolution since the beginning of the current insurgency in northeast Nigeria. This chapter examines the instrumentalisation of women by Boko Haram both as direct targets of attacks and as operational deployments over the last few years. The chapter examines some of the different ways in which Boko Haram has weaponised women in its insurgency and the international legal framework protecting women in the conflict. I argue that although there exist a wide range of international legal instruments that protect women in a non-international armed conflict such as the Boko Haram conflict and thus could be used for the prosecution of violators, for a variety of reasons, the prospects of holding perpetrators of crimes against women in the Boko Haram conflict accountable are very slim even if the conflict ends. There is a general lack of interest in prosecuting crimes against women in Nigeria even in peace times. There is reluctance on the part of government to prosecute Boko Haram operatives, and the few cases of Boko Haram arrests and prosecution that have taken place so far have mainly focused on acts of terrorism and threats to national security to the neglect of abuses committed against women. I conclude that the culture of impunity in Nigeria and human rights violations will hinder efforts to hold the perpetrators of violence against women during the armed conflict to account. I then make recommendations for accomplishing this task.

This chapter draws on my presentation entitled “Non-International Armed Conflicts: Resilience of Sovereignty and the Search for Accountability: Examining the National and International Response to the Boko Haram Insurgency” (delivered at the 6th Verloren van Themaat Brownbag Lecture Series, College of Law, University of South Africa, Pretoria, 8th October 2014). I am grateful to Prof Babatunde Fagbayibo and participants at the lecture for their questions and comments.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Translated as “The Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Struggle”. See Murtada (2013). I do not address the violations committed by members of the Nigerian Security Forces.

  2. 2.

    In 2014, Boko Haram was responsible for a total of 6644 deaths. See Institute for Economics and Peace (2015), p. 14. As of the time of writing, the Boko Haram conflict has killed over 20,000 deaths. See United Nations, Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (2015).

  3. 3.

    See Institute for Economics and Peace (2015), p. 22. See generally, Amnesty International (2015b).

  4. 4.

    BBC News 24 December 2015.

  5. 5.

    Matfess et al. (21 March 2016).

  6. 6.

    Matfess et al. (21 March 2016), p. 2.

  7. 7.

    For the latest deployment of females as suicide bombers at the time of writing, see for example, Punch Newspapers (10 Jan 2017); Sahara Reporters (25 Jan 2017a); Vanguard Newspaper (25 Jan 2017b). See Human Rights Watch (29 Nov 2013).

  8. 8.

    Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 109.

  9. 9.

    Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 111.

  10. 10.

    Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 106.

  11. 11.

    Sahara Reporters (25 Jan 2017a).

  12. 12.

    Sahara Reporters (14 Dec 2016).

  13. 13.

    Alozieuwa (2012), pp. 1–8.

  14. 14.

    Ogbonnanyan and Ehigiamusoe (Summer 2013), pp. 4–5; Ayandike (2013), pp. 12–23.

  15. 15.

    See generally, Murtada (2013).

  16. 16.

    Abdullahi et al. (2014), p. 81. The authors argue that more than any other theory, a combination of economic, social, structural and organisational support, and the incidence of political opportunity structures could better explain the emergence and resilience of the Boko Haram group. See pp. 86–90. See also Thomson (Summer 2012) p. 47, arguing that the rise of Boko Haram can be traced to a combination of factors including the way and manner colonialism unsettled Islam in many parts of Africa including Nigeria.

  17. 17.

    The Chapter by Ahmed Garba in this volume supports this point in so far as it exposes the fact that State policies and laws (such as the regulation of religious preaching laws) that seek to repress the right to freedom of religion and worship of minority religious groups in favour of dominant religious groups have pushed otherwise moderate members of minority religious groups in some northern states of Nigeria to extremism and radical ideology, and greatly contributed to the rise of Boko Haram.

  18. 18.

    Okpaga et al. (April 2012), p. 83.

  19. 19.

    Okpaga et al. (April 2012), p. 83.

  20. 20.

    Associated Press (2 August 2009).

  21. 21.

    Associated Press (2 August 2009).

  22. 22.

    Onuoha (2010), p. 55.

  23. 23.

    Okpaga et al. (April 2012), p. 83.

  24. 24.

    From 2010 onwards, Boko Haram’s use of IEDs became more frequent. See generally, Okpaga et al. (April 2012).

  25. 25.

    See Weeraratne (2015), p. 10.

  26. 26.

    Okpaga et al. (April 2012) p. 83. Prior to pledging allegiance to ISIS on 7 March 2015, it was widely suspected that Boko Haram was receiving support from Al Qaeda and Al Shabab. However, this would seem unlikely now since ISIS and Al Qaeda are currently locked in a supremacy battle in Africa. It should be noted that since the fragmentation of Boko Haram, there is the possibility that some factions of Boko Haram could be receiving support from Al Qaeda and Al Shabab.

  27. 27.

    Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 109.

  28. 28.

    Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 109.

  29. 29.

    With the exception of the Chibok abductions and other high-profile attacks and abductions, Boko Haram has been and still carries out attacks and abductions that do not receive media attention as a result of the remote and sometimes inaccessibility of some areas in northeast Nigeria. See All Party Parliamentary Group on Nigeria (13 May 2014), p. 4.

  30. 30.

    Mantzikos (December 2014), pp. 64–80.

  31. 31.

    United Nations (2009).

  32. 32.

    Zenn and Pearson (2014), p. 48.

  33. 33.

    Mark (2014) The Guardian Newspaper.

  34. 34.

    The Telegraph (10 June 2014).

  35. 35.

    Aljazeera (America) 24 June 2014.

  36. 36.

    BBC News 23 October 2014a.

    For a detailed chronology of abductions of women by Boko Haram, see Mickolus (2016) p. 265.

  37. 37.

    Matasu (8 Jan 2015).

  38. 38.

    Matfess (2 August 2016), p. 6.

  39. 39.

    See Matfess (2 August 2016), p. 4.

  40. 40.

    Whiting (14 April 2015).

  41. 41.

    Human Rights Watch (2014), p. 19.

  42. 42.

    Abubakar (CNN 16 April 2014).

  43. 43.

    BBC News 27 October 2014c.

  44. 44.

    Al Jazeera News (13 Oct 2016).

  45. 45.

    International Crisis Group (5 Dec 2016b), p. 6.

  46. 46.

    STRATFOR (23 October 2015).

  47. 47.

    Searcey (11 Feb 2016).

  48. 48.

    Abubakar et al. (CNN 11 February 2016).

  49. 49.

    Searcey (11 Feb 2016).

  50. 50.

    Sahara Reporters (25 Jan 2017b).

  51. 51.

    Aljazeera (17 February 2017).

  52. 52.

    Aljazeera (17 February 2017).

  53. 53.

    Amnesty International (14 April 2015a).

  54. 54.

    Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 113.

  55. 55.

    See generally, Bloom and Matfess (2016). See also, Kishi (25 Feb 2015); Raleigh et al. (2010), pp. 651–660.

  56. 56.

    Matfess (2 August 2016), p. 5.

  57. 57.

    Matfess (2 August 2016), p. 5.

  58. 58.

    UNFPA (6 May 2015).

  59. 59.

    Searcey (11 Feb 2016).

  60. 60.

    Searcey (11 Feb 2016).

  61. 61.

    Bloom et al. (2007).

  62. 62.

    Bloom et al. (2007).

  63. 63.

    Bangura (27 May 2015).

  64. 64.

    Bangura (27 May 2015).

  65. 65.

    Bangura (27 May 2015).

  66. 66.

    See for example, Nossiter (18 May 2015).

  67. 67.

    Quoted in Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 110.

  68. 68.

    Zenn and Pearson (2014), pp. 46–57.

  69. 69.

    Bangura (27 May 2015).

  70. 70.

    Nossiter (18 May 2015).

  71. 71.

    Boko Haram has successfully commoditised women not only as a recruitment strategy but also as a way to “reward and retain” fighters. See Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 120.

  72. 72.

    Matfess (2 August 2016), p. 4, quoting Kyari Mohammed, Head of the Peace and Security Centre, Modibbo Adama University of Technology, Yola.

  73. 73.

    Matfess (2 August 2016), p. 4.

  74. 74.

    International Crisis Group (4 May 2016a), p. 10.

  75. 75.

    Zenn and Pearson (2014), p. 50.

  76. 76.

    International Crisis Group (5 December 2016b), p. 7.

  77. 77.

    Human Rights Watch (2014), p. 3.

  78. 78.

    Human Rights Watch (2014), pp. 16–17.

  79. 79.

    Barkindo et al. (2013). See also International Crisis Group (4 May 2016a), p. 10; Zenn and Pearson (2014), p. 49.

  80. 80.

    UNICEF (12 April 2017), p. 6.

  81. 81.

    UNICEF (12 April 2017), p. 6.

  82. 82.

    See Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 106.

  83. 83.

    Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 106.

  84. 84.

    McLaughlin (2015).

  85. 85.

    McLaughlin (2015).

  86. 86.

    Matfess (2016), p. 6.

  87. 87.

    Oduah (2016).

  88. 88.

    International Crisis Group (5 Dec 2016b), p. 9.

  89. 89.

    McLaughlin (2015).

  90. 90.

    Oduah (2016).

  91. 91.

    Awford (10 Jan 2015).

  92. 92.

    Oduah (2016), quoting a Chadian official.

  93. 93.

    Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 108.

  94. 94.

    Oduah (2016).

  95. 95.

    Oduah (2016).

  96. 96.

    Oduah (2016).

  97. 97.

    See for example, Campbell (2016).

  98. 98.

    Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 109.

  99. 99.

    Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 108.

  100. 100.

    Zenn and Pearson (2014), p. 50.

  101. 101.

    BBC News (25 Dec 2014b).

  102. 102.

    Alfred (28 Feb 2015).

  103. 103.

    Matfess (2016), p. 8.

  104. 104.

    International Crisis Group (5 Dec 2016b), p. 11.

  105. 105.

    International Crisis Group (4 May 2016a), p. 11; Zenn and Pearson (2014), p. 49.

  106. 106.

    Iroegbu (4 Aug 2014).

  107. 107.

    Vanguard Newspaper (8 Feb 2017a).

  108. 108.

    Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 111.

  109. 109.

    Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 108.

  110. 110.

    Zenn and Pearson (2014), p. 50.

  111. 111.

    Zenn and Pearson (2014), p. 50.

  112. 112.

    United Nations (25 April 2014).

  113. 113.

    Zenn and Pearson (2014), pp. 50–51.

  114. 114.

    International Crisis Group (5 December 2016b), p. 6.

  115. 115.

    See generally, Barkindo et al. (2013), for a detailed account of some of these attacks.

  116. 116.

    Barkindo et al. (2013), p. 25.

  117. 117.

    Barkindo et al. (2013), p. 17.

  118. 118.

    Barkindo et al. (2013), p. 5.

  119. 119.

    See United Nations General Assembly, Violations and Abuses Committed by Boko Haram and the Impact on Human Rights in the Countries Affected A/HRC/30/67, 9 December 2015, at para 38, quoting a Boko Haram video. It is pertinent to note that because inhabitants of Southern Borno State are predominantly Christian, any attacks there by Boko Haram might be interpreted as deliberately targeting Christians, but similar attacks have also been carried out in Northern Borno State where the inhabitants are predominantly Muslim. See for example, Faul (30 April 2014). (I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for pointing out this fact). Whereas generally, Boko Haram launched indiscriminate attacks against civilians, there is evidence to show that the deliberately targeted Christians on several occasions giving them a choice to either convert to Islam or be killed. See Amnesty International (April 2015a), p. 32.

  120. 120.

    International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, International Criminal Law, aspects of International Refugee Law protect individuals during and after an armed conflict. It should be noted that Nigeria is a dualist state and a treaty is not enforceable in Nigeria unless it has been domesticated I Nigerian law by an Act of Parliament. See Section 12(1) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. Nigeria became a party to all Four Geneva Conventions by accession on 20 June 1961 and the two Additional Protocols on 10 October 1988. The Four Geneva Conventions were domesticated by the Geneva Conventions Act of 30th September 1960.

  121. 121.

    See the Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (hereafter GC 1); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85, (hereafter GC 2); Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, (hereafter GC 3); Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (hereafter GC 4); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, (Protocol I) adopted on 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereafter AP I); and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, (Protocol II) adopted on 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (hereafter AP II). See Glahn and Taulbe (2010), p. 604.

  122. 122.

    UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict, UNGA 3318 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974.

  123. 123.

    Akande (2012), p. 35. See Tadic (Appeal on Jurisdiction) Case, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY, para 127.

  124. 124.

    Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck (2004), p. xxii, suggesting that the some of the distinctions may have become blurred by state practice.

  125. 125.

    See for example, Bassiouni (2008), pp. 712–810.

  126. 126.

    See Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2013, 25 November 2013a at para 218. The ICC has stated that there is basis for concluding that as of 2013, Boko Haram committed crimes against humanity. See The Office of the Prosecutor, the International Criminal Court, Situation in Nigeria: Article 5 Report, 5 August 2013b.

  127. 127.

    See the contribution by Elijah Okebukola in this volume.

  128. 128.

    Article 13(2) the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949.

  129. 129.

    International Committee of the Red Cross (6 May 2013).

  130. 130.

    See generally, Human Rights Watch (October 2014), p. 7.

  131. 131.

    Common Article 3 of the Four GCs provides “[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions: (1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed horse de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons: a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; b) taking of hostages; c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”

  132. 132.

    See United Nations (2010), p. 36.

  133. 133.

    United Nations (2010), p. 36.

  134. 134.

    See for example, Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 16(2), 18, 26, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which though is not a binding treaty is now customary international law.

  135. 135.

    International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted on 16 Dec. 1966 and entered into force on 23 March 1976; G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI) U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Nigeria acceded to this Convention on 39 July 1993; Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment adopted 10 Dec. 1984 and entered into force on 26 June 1987, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 UN G.A.O.R, Supp. (No 51) UN Doc. A/39/51, at 197 (1984); Charter on Human and People’s Rights adopted 27 July 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted 18 Dec. 1979 and entered into force on 3 Sept. 1981, G.A. 34/180, 34 UN G.A.O.R., Supp. (No. 46), UN Doc. A/34/46, at 193 (1979), Nigeria ratified this treaty on 13 June, 1985; Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted on 20 Nov. 1989 and entered into force on 2 Sept. 1990, G.A. Res. 44/25 UN G.A.O.R., Supp. (No. 49), UN Doc. A/44/49 at 166 (1989), Nigeria ratified this treaty on 19 April 1991. In terms of Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR, the Nigerian State has an obligation to see to it that these women who have been victims of Boko Haram abuses have remedies.

  136. 136.

    International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966 and entered into force on 3 Jan. 1976, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), UN. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3. Nigeria acceded to this treaty on 29 July 1993. See also Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment adopted 10 Dec. 1984 and entered into force on 26 June 1987, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 UN G.A.O.R, Supp. (No 51) UN Doc. A/39/51, at 197 (1984).

  137. 137.

    See Articles 4, 5, 6, 8, 12, 17 of African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5; 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (hereafter the Banjul Charter). Nigeria ratified the Charter on 22 July 1983.

  138. 138.

    For other rights and protections enjoyed by the child in terms of this treaty, see for example, see Articles 9, 11, 16 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Nigeria ratified this treaty on 23 June 2001.

  139. 139.

    See Articles 27 and 29 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child CAB/LEG/153/Rev. 2, adopted by the Twenty-Sixth Session of the of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, July 1990.

  140. 140.

    See Convention on the Rights of the Child adopted by the UN General Assembly Resolution 44/25 of 20 November 1989 and entered into force on 2 September 1990.

  141. 141.

    See Articles 1,2, and 4 of the Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/RES/54/263 on 25 May 2000 and entered into force on 12 February 2002.

  142. 142.

    Bloom and Matfess (2016), p. 117.

  143. 143.

    See generally, Amnesty International (June 2015c); Human Rights Watch “Spiralling Violence: Boko Haram Attacks and Security Forces Abuses in Nigeria” (2012).

  144. 144.

    Matfess (2016), pp. 8–10.

  145. 145.

    Nigeria ratified the Rome Statute on 27 Sept. 2001.

  146. 146.

    Article 8(2)(e) of Rome Statute of the ICC.

  147. 147.

    See for example, Prosecutor v Furundzija, Case No IT-95-17/1, Judgement of 10 December 1998; Prosecutor v Nikolic, First Amended Indictment, Case No IT-94-2; Prosecutor v Jankovic and Others, Case No IT-96-23, Judgement of 22 February 2001 (appeal decision); Prosecutor v Kvocka and Others, Case No IT-98-30/1, Judgement of 2 November 2001.

  148. 148.

    See for example, Prosecutor v Furundzija, Case No IT-95-17/1, Judgement of 10 December 1998; Prosecutor v Nikolic, First Amended Indictment, Case No IT-94-2; Prosecutor v Jankovic and Others, Case No IT-96-23, Judgement of 22 February 2001 (appeal decision); Prosecutor v Kvocka and Others, Case No IT-98-30/1, Judgement of 2 November 2001.

  149. 149.

    See Prosecutor v Delalic and Others, Case No. IT-96-21, Judgement of 16 November 1998.

  150. 150.

    International Committee of the Red Cross (6 May 2013).

  151. 151.

    International Committee of the Red Cross (6 May 2013).

  152. 152.

    International Committee of the Red Cross (6 May 2013).

  153. 153.

    See Human Rights Watch (October 2014), p. 21.

  154. 154.

    See Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Nigerian Geneva Conventions Act of 30 Sept. 1960, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria (2004). Although this Act only relates to the Four Geneva Conventions (not applicable in NIAC) and not the Additional Protocols of 1977, they nevertheless provide for prosecution and punishment of grave breaches such as “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health” as well as taking of hostages. See also Gasser (2002), p. 556.

  155. 155.

    Akande (2012), pp. 41–41, 46.

  156. 156.

    See the Terrorism (Prevention) Act No 10, 2011, Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

  157. 157.

    Nigeria ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC on 27 September 2001 but is yet to domesticate the treaty and since Nigeria is a dualist country, the Rome Statute will not take effect in the country until domesticated. See Section 12 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.

  158. 158.

    See United Nations Security Council Resolutions S/RES/1325 (2000) 31 October 2000; S/RES/1888 (2009) 30 September 2009; S/RES/1889 (2009) 5 October 2009. See United Nations (2010), p. 71.

  159. 159.

    S/RES/1829 (2008) 19 June 2008, at para 4; S/RES/1888 (2009) 30 September 2009 at para 10.

  160. 160.

    S/RES/1829 (2008) 19 June 2008.

  161. 161.

    United Nations (2010), p. 71.

  162. 162.

    The ICC has stated that it has established eight possible cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Boko Haram and two cases by Nigerian Security Forces, as of 2015. See Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2015, at para 195.

  163. 163.

    Zenn and Pearson (2014), p. 48.

  164. 164.

    Zenn and Pearson (2014), p. 48.

  165. 165.

    For a detailed report on this, see for example, Amnesty International (September 2014).

  166. 166.

    Human Rights Watch (31 October 2016).

  167. 167.

    Zenn and Pearson (2014), p. 47.

  168. 168.

    Nwozor (2013), p. 14.

  169. 169.

    See for example, Ezeamalu (25 July 2016).

  170. 170.

    See for example, Amnesty International (14 May 2016).

  171. 171.

    See Section 1(2) (i) & (ii) and section 33(1)(a) of the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011.

  172. 172.

    See Ewi (24 June 2013).

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Iyi, JM. (2018). The Weaponisation of Women by Boko Haram and the Prospects of Accountability. In: Iyi, JM., Strydom, H. (eds) Boko Haram and International Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74957-0_12

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