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Evil Twins: Handling Repetitions in Attack–Defense Trees

A Survival Guide
  • Angèle Bossuat
  • Barbara KordyEmail author
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 10744)

Abstract

Attack–defense trees are a simple but potent and efficient way to represent and evaluate security scenarios involving a malicious attacker and a defender – their adversary. The nodes of attack–defense trees are labeled with goals of the two actors, and actions that they need to execute to achieve these goals. The objective of this paper is to provide formal guidelines on how to deal with attack–defense trees where several nodes have the same label. After discussing typical issues related to such trees, we define the notion of well-formed attack–defense trees and adapt existing semantics to correctly capture the presence of repeated labels.

Notes

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank Wojciech Wideł for the very fruitful discussions on the meaning of countermeasures in ADTrees, which allowed us to improve the approach developed in this paper.

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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University Rennes 1RennesFrance
  2. 2.INSA RennesRennesFrance
  3. 3.IRISARennesFrance

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