Information, Privacy, and False Light

  • Pierre Le Morvan
Part of the AMINTAPHIL: The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice book series (AMIN, volume 8)


I argue that a debate in information theory concerning whether information can be false has important implications for how we should understand the nature of informational privacy. In particular, these implications bear on whether we should understand such privacy as being restricted to facts or whether it can encompass falsehoods as well. I also argue that the stand we take on the latter issue has a significant bearing on the coherence and justification of what is known as false light privacy tort in American tort law.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.The College of New JerseyEwingUSA

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