Advertisement

Introduction: Conceptualizing Privacy Harms and Values

  • Ann E. Cudd
  • Mark C. Navin
Chapter
Part of the AMINTAPHIL: The Philosophical Foundations of Law and Justice book series (AMIN, volume 8)

Abstract

Privacy is widely valued, especially in individualistic cultures, because people want to control access to their bodies and to information about their personal choices. Privacy can promote a variety of goods. It can protect intimacy among friends and colleagues and create trusting relations of tolerance among strangers. Privacy can promote dignity, since it can be embarrassing to disclose secret or unconsidered thoughts or opinions, or to reveal one’s naked body or other private spaces. Privacy can also contribute to our individuality, self-respect, and autonomy; and privacy can protect us from a wide array of emotional or psychological harms associated with unwanted publicity. Privacy can also further important political and legal goods, including property rights, fraud prevention, and non-discrimination.

References

  1. DeCew JW (2015) Privacy. In: Zalta EM (ed) The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/privacy/
  2. Inness JC (1992) Privacy, intimacy, and isolation. Oxford University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar
  3. MacKinnon C (1989) Toward a feminist theory of the state. Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar
  4. Prosser WL (1960) Privacy. Calif Law Rev 48:383–423CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Scanlon T (1975) Thomson on privacy. Philos Public Aff 4(4):315–322Google Scholar
  6. Thomson JJ (1975) The right to privacy. Philos Public Aff 4(4):295–314Google Scholar
  7. Warren S, Brandeis L (1890) The right to privacy. Harv Law Rev 4(5):193–220CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Boston UniversityBostonUSA
  2. 2.Oakland UniversityRochesterUSA

Personalised recommendations