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Dewey, Wittgenstein, and the Primacy of Practice

  • Joacim Andersson
  • Jim Garrison
  • Leif Östman
Chapter
Part of the The Cultural and Social Foundations of Education book series (CSFE)

Abstract

This chapter explores some of the most interesting intersections between the philosophy of John Dewey and the later Ludwig Wittgenstein. Practical epistemological analysis (PEA), Situated Epistemic Relations (SER), and Situated Artistic Relations (SAR) examine learning primarily as a sociolinguistic practice. Since it is a sociolinguistic practice, much of both the product and the process of learning are plainly visible to sophisticated methodological observation. This chapter emphasizes the primacy of practice in comprehending linguistic meaning (i.e., forms of life, language-games, meaning as use, etc.), the rejection of a private language, antifoundationalism, and epistemological contextualism, action, and antirepresentationalism. It establishes the philosophical framework for our analytical method developed in Chap.  3 and assumed in Chap.  4.

Keywords

Dewey Wittgenstein Antifoundationalism Antirepresentationalism Sociolinguistics 

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Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joacim Andersson
    • 1
  • Jim Garrison
    • 2
  • Leif Östman
    • 3
  1. 1.School of Health SciencesÖrebro UniversityÖrebroSweden
  2. 2.Learning Sciences & TechVirginia TechBlacksburgUSA
  3. 3.Teacher EducationUppsala UniversityUppsalaSweden

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