Advertisement

MacIntyre’s Critique of Kierkegaard

  • Rob Compaijen
Chapter

Abstract

This chapter focuses on Alasdair MacIntyre’s influential critique of Kierkegaard. It discusses his argument in After Virtue that, on Kierkegaard’s view, there are no reasons to choose to live ethically. I also reconstruct the renewed critique that he brought forward in his 2001 paper ‘Once More on Kierkegaard’. I show that his critique is grounded in a specific understanding of what it means to have a reason for action, which I reconstruct on the basis of (mainly) Dependent Rational Animals. On MacIntyre’s view, one’s reasons for action are directly determined by what is conducive to a realization of the ultimate human good.

Keywords

MacIntyre Kierkegaard Reasons for action Flourishing Ethical life 

Bibliography

  1. Aristotle. 2002. Nicomachean Ethics. Ed. and Trans. Roger Crisp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Davenport, John J., and Anthony Rudd, eds. 2001. Kierkegaard After MacIntyre. Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue. Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
  3. MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1988. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.Google Scholar
  4. MacIntyre, A. 1998. A Short History of Ethics. A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century. 2nd ed. Oxford: Routledge.Google Scholar
  5. MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1999. Dependent Rational Animals. Why Human Beings Need the Virtues. Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
  6. ———. 2001. Once More on Kierkegaard. In Kierkegaard After MacIntyre. Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue, ed. John J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd, 339–355. Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar
  7. ———. 2008. After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory. 3rd ed. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press.Google Scholar
  8. ———. 2016. Ethics in the Conflicts of Modernity: An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning, and Narrative. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Meijer, Michiel, and Rob Compaijen. 2016. What Is Distinctively Human? Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre on the Relation Between Humans and Animals. In The Animal Inside. Essays at the Intersection of Philosophical Anthropology and Animal Studies, ed. Geoffrey Dierckxsens, Rudmer Bijlsma, Michael Begun, and Thomas Kiefer, 85–101. London: Rowman and Littlefield.Google Scholar
  10. Rudd, Anthony. 2001. Reason in Ethics: MacIntyre and Kierkegaard. In Kierkegaard After MacIntyre. Essays on Freedom, Narrative, and Virtue, ed. John J. Davenport and Anthony Rudd, 131–150. Chicago: Open Court.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rob Compaijen
    • 1
  1. 1.Radboud University NijmegenNijmegenThe Netherlands

Personalised recommendations