Abstract
It is considered Martin-Löf’s distinction between propositions and judgements. It is argued that propositions can be regarded as the only fundamental entities of logic, since all mathematical activity may be analysed in terms of the creation and demonstration of propositions.
with G. Usberti
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Martino, E. (2018). Propositions and Judgements in Martin-Löf. In: Intuitionistic Proof Versus Classical Truth. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 42. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74357-8_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74357-8_9
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