Propositions and Judgements in Martin-Löf

  • Enrico MartinoEmail author
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 42)


It is considered Martin-Löf’s distinction between propositions and judgements. It is argued that propositions can be regarded as the only fundamental entities of logic, since all mathematical activity may be analysed in terms of the creation and demonstration of propositions.


Judgment Stroke sFrege Assertive Force Hypothetical Proof Evident Judgment 
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© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.FISPPA DepartmentUniversity of PaduaPaduaItaly

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