An Intuitionistic Notion of Hypothetical Truth for Which Strong Completeness Intuitionistically Holds

  • Enrico MartinoEmail author
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 42)


An intuitionistic notion of truth under a set of hypotheses is introduced in this chapter. By means of that, intuitionistic semantics is extended to a new semantics for which validity turns out to be equivalent to generalized validity. Strong completeness is proved intuitionistically.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.FISPPA DepartmentUniversity of PaduaPaduaItaly

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