Natural Intuitionistic Semantics and Generalized Beth Semantics

  • Enrico MartinoEmail author
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 42)


In this chapter, the connection between the notion of truth in a generalized Beth model and the intuitive notion of truth according to the intuitionistic meaning of logical constants is analysed.


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Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.FISPPA DepartmentUniversity of PaduaPaduaItaly

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