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The Intuitionistic Meaning of Logical Constants and Fallible Models

  • Enrico MartinoEmail author
Chapter
  • 218 Downloads
Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 42)

Abstract

In this chapter, the problem of the failure of completeness of first-order predicate logic in an intuitionistic metamathematics is discussed and the philosophical significance of fallible models is analysed.

References

  1. De Swart, H. (1976). Another intuitionistic completeness proof. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 41, 644–662.Google Scholar
  2. Dummett, M. (1977). Elements of intuitionism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  3. Heyting, A. (1956). Intuitionism: An introduction. Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
  4. McCarty, D. C. (1991). Incompleteness in intuitionistic metamathematics. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 32, 323–358.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Troelstra, A., & Dalen, D. V. (1988). Constructivism in mathematics (Vol. II). Amsterdam: North-Holland.Google Scholar
  6. Veldman, W. (1976). An intuitionistic completeness theorem for intuitionistic predicate logic. Journal of Symbolic Logic, 41, 159–176.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.FISPPA DepartmentUniversity of PaduaPaduaItaly

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