Intuitionistic Proof Versus Classical Truth pp 147-156 | Cite as

The Impredicativity of the Intuitionistic Meaning of Logical Constants

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• Enrico Martino

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First Online: 24 February 2018

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Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 42)

Abstract

Dummett’s thesis that Heyting’s explanation of the meaning of logical constants is circular is discussed in this chapter. We defend Dummett’s position.

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References

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© Springer International Publishing AG 2018

Authors and Affiliations

• Enrico Martino
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1. 1.FISPPA DepartmentUniversity of PaduaPaduaItaly