Abstract
Intra-EU leadership on Iran always remained the product of a bargain. France, Germany and the United Kingdom (E3) had to strike a balance between two potentially conflicting needs: first, ensure that they remained in control of the EU Iran policy; second, promote a sense of EU-wide ownership of their action. Being in the Iran group gave the E3 obvious advantages: exclusive access to Iran (at least on nuclear matters), selective intra-EU information sharing, intra-EU alliances and the endorsement of the Security Council. The E3’s policy-making capacity, however, ultimately rested on the ability to promote an EU-wide sense of ownership of their initiative, which the E3 achieved by giving the group’s outsiders a degree of participation and representation through the involvement of the High Representative in the negotiation.
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Notes
- 1.
Interview with a former E3 foreign minister, 2 March 2009.
- 2.
Skype interview with an E3 official, 12 February 2015.
- 3.
Skype interview with an E3 official, 12 February 2015.
- 4.
Interview with an E3 official, 22 April 2009.
- 5.
Interview with an E3 official, 20 February 2009.
- 6.
Interview with an E3 official, 22 April 2009.
- 7.
Interview with an E3 official, 13 February 2009.
- 8.
Interview with an E3 official, 22 April 2009.
- 9.
Ibidem.
- 10.
Interviews with an official from the HR office, 24 October 2008 and a senior E3 official, 21 April 2009.
- 11.
Interviews with officials from the HR office, 24 October 2008 and 22 June 2010.
- 12.
Skype interview with an E3 official, 12 February 2015.
- 13.
Interview with a senior Italian official, 17 March 2015. Schmid’s official position was EEAS Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs.
- 14.
I owe the ‘principals-agent’ metaphor to Bengtsson and Allen (2011). While they use it in general terms, the metaphor well captures the dynamics of E3-HR cooperation on Iran.
- 15.
Interview with a former E3 ambassador to Iran, 7 April 2009.
- 16.
Interview with an E3 official, 26 February 2009.
- 17.
Interview with an official from the HR office, 24 October 2008.
- 18.
Interview with an official from the HR office, 24 October 2008.
- 19.
Interview with an E3 official, 14 May 2009.
- 20.
Interview with an official from the HR office, 24 October 2008.
- 21.
Interviews with E3 officials, 22 April, 23 April and 14 May 2009.
- 22.
Interview with an E3 official, 14 May 2009.
- 23.
Interviews with E3 official, 20 February and 22 April 2009. An E3 official argued that Italian passivity was due to a “slight lack of interest” and “a relative scarcity of adequate resources”.
- 24.
Interview with a senior Italian official, 17 March 2015.
- 25.
Interview with an E3 official, 22 April 2009.
- 26.
Interviews with E3 officials, 13 and 20 February 2009.
- 27.
In a 2009 article, Anand Menon reported about widespread dissatisfaction in Brussels regarding the degree of participation of non-E3 states in the decision-making process (Menon 2009: 14–15). In 2010, a European Commission official expressed similar dissatisfaction about the degree of transparency, and so did a senior Italian official in 2015 (interviews, 22 June 2010 and 17 March 2015).
- 28.
Interview with a European Commission official, 22 June 2010.
- 29.
Interview with a senior Italian official, 17 March 2015.
- 30.
Interviews with E3 officials, 12 and 20 February 2009.
- 31.
Interviews with E3 officials, 12, 13, 20 and 21 February 2009; 7 and 21 April 2009 (the latter was a phone interview); and with an official from the HR office, 22 June 2010.
- 32.
Interview with an official from the HR office, 22 June 2010.
- 33.
The Iranian agent operating in the United States pleaded guilty in 2012, yet the US government was unable to determine who in Iran bore responsibility for ordering the plot (or at least it did not make it public).
- 34.
US diplomats reported as such to Washington in confidential cables dated 7 January 2009 published by WikiLeaks and available at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09STOCKHOLM5_a.html
- 35.
Skype interviews with a former E3 official, 14 February 2015.
- 36.
The quotes come from the US diplomatic cables made public by WikiLeaks.
- 37.
Frattini naively believed that the US government would support his initiative, since President Obama was at the time focussing extensively on Afghanistan’s pacification. Interview with a senior Italian official, 17 March 2015.
- 38.
The figure includes data from the 13 countries that would join the European Union after 2003.
- 39.
Data on EU member states’ trade exchanges with Iran are available on the website of the European Commission, Directorate-General Trade, Export Helpdesk: http://exporthelp.europa.eu/thdapp/display.htm;jsessionid=916E3376F3D5A2C0DE69E7C25406CF48?page=st%2fst_Statistics.html&docType=main&languageId=en (accessed on 8 March 2016).
- 40.
Interview with a European Commission official, 22 June 2010.
- 41.
Interviews with an official form the HR office, 24 October 2008, and E3 officials, 13 and 20 February 2009, 22 April 2009.
- 42.
The phrase “strategic retreat” was used by an E3 official (interview, 22 April 2009). Another E3 official stated that it was incorrect to assume that the list of new targets was decided only by the E3. Various member states contributed (interview, 26 February 2009).
- 43.
A senior Italian diplomat noticed that, from then on, sanctions were the only topic related to Iran that was formally debated in the EU Council (interview, 17 March 2015).
- 44.
Interview with a European Commission official, 22 June 2010.
- 45.
Interview with a European Commission official, 22 June 2010.
- 46.
British officials referred to the report’s findings as a ‘game changer’ (Ellner 2013: 239).
- 47.
Interview with a senior Italian official, 17 March 2015.
- 48.
Skype interview with a former E3 official, 12 February 2015. E3 and EU officials whom I have interviewed underlined the point over and over.
- 49.
Interview with an E3 official, 22 April 2009.
- 50.
Interview with an E3 official, 22 April 2009.
- 51.
Interview with an official from the HR office, 22 June 2010.
- 52.
Interview with a former US State Department official, 27 April 2009.
- 53.
A former E3 foreign minister argued that by 2006 Solana was the only senior figure involved in the 2003–5 European-Iranian talks still in office, with the exception of British Foreign Minister Straw (who left in early 2007 anyway). An element of personal continuity, he said, was necessary and Solana was perfectly suited for the job (interview, 2 March 2009). A former high-level E3 diplomat concurred that the need for continuity explained the choice of Solana as the E3/EU+3 representative (interview, 23 April 2009).
- 54.
Interviews with a former US State Department official, 27 April 2009, and an E3 official, 14 May 2009.
- 55.
Interviews with E3 officials, 22 April, 23 April, 14 May 2009. A former EU top official concurred (interview, 14 April 2014).
- 56.
Interviews with an E3 official, 13 February 2009 and with an official from the HR office, 22 June 2010.
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Alcaro, R. (2018). The Action/1: E3 Leadership and EU Ownership. In: Europe and Iran’s Nuclear Crisis. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74298-4_7
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