Abstract
France, Germany and the United Kingdom (E3) profited from extraordinary circumstances—US unpreparedness to engage Iran diplomatically, the lack of consensus within the Security Council and Iran’s willingness to legitimise its nuclear activities in the eyes of the international community—to take the initiative on Iran's nuclear file. However, alone these permissive conditions do not suffice to explain the creation of the E3 group. All three countries had specific interests in the issue, as did the other member states. The association of the HR with the E3 negotiating team (E3/EU) allowed for an asymmetric accommodation of such interests.
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Notes
- 1.
Including all E3 and EU officials whom I have interviewed.
- 2.
An early mention of the May/June 2003 offer is in Samore (2004: 2). According to press reports first appeared in 2006, the offer was contained in a two-page document transmitted to the White House through the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, which performs consular tasks for the United States in Iran (Kessler 2006). European and American diplomats confirmed the news both in off-the-records exchanges (including with me) and openly (James Dobbins, the US special envoy to Afghanistan following 9/11, speaks of it in a 2010 article; see Dobbins 2010: 157).
- 3.
Interview with a former E3 foreign minister, 2 March 2009.
- 4.
The spent fuel – meaning the fuel used in reactors no longer capable of undergoing nuclear fission – is chemically recycled to produce uranium usable again in reactors as well as plutonium.
- 5.
In the words of a former E3 foreign minister, the E3/EU “has been a unique case, born under a combination of unprecedented circumstances that are unlikely to occur again” (interview by the author, 2 March 2009). Yet lead groups did occur thereafter, as the Normandy framework clearly attests to.
- 6.
Skype interview with a former E3 official, 12 February and 25 March 2015.
- 7.
Skype interview with a former E3 official, 12 February and 25 March 2015.
- 8.
Kitchen and Vickers (2013: 305–7) argue that this concern was what motivated the British Labour government to take action. German, French and EU officials whom I have interviewed concurred about the centrality of this concern, although they also emphasised other aspects. They never mentioned instead the possibility that the Iranian government could transfer nuclear technologies, know-how, materials or even a weapon to terrorist organisations (analysts tended to agree that this was a minimal or non-existent risk: Ferguson and Potter 2004: 57; Byman 2008; Pollack 2013: 68–70).
- 9.
Data on EU member states’ trade exchanges with third countries are available on the website of the European Commission, Directorate-General Trade, Export Helpdesk: http://exporthelp.europa.eu/thdapp/display.htm;jsessionid=916E3376F3D5A2C0DE69E7C25406CF48?page=st%2fst_Statistics.html&docType=main&languageId=en. British imports amounted to 43.7 million euros and exports oscillated around 685 million euros.
- 10.
In 2003 France was the only E3 country importing significant amounts of crude from Iran (worth just slightly less than 1 billion euros). German crude imports amounted to a mere 4.7 million, whereas the British did not import any hydrocarbon from Iran.
- 11.
Interview with a senior German foreign policy expert, 12 February 2009.
- 12.
Interview with a former E3 foreign minister, 2 March 2009; phone interview with a senior E3 official, 21 April 2009; written response by a senior E3 official, 31 July 2009; and Skype interview with a former E3 official, 12 February and 25 March 2015. See also Quille and Keane 2005.
- 13.
Interview with a senior German foreign policy expert, 12 February 2009.
- 14.
Israel security was a theme that surfaced in interviews with both officials and a senior member of the Bundestag (interviews by the author, 12 and 20 February 2009). See also Mousavian (2008: 62–63).
- 15.
German officials and politicians alike ridiculed the notion that Germany’s action on Iran would help its campaign to win permanent membership in the Security Council (interviews by the author, February 2009). This remained true even after the non-European UNSC permanent members joined the E3/EU in January 2006, forming the E3/EU+3 or, as it is more commonly known, the P5+1. A senior German official stated that even the idea of an informal regular association of Germany to the Security Council was out of question (interview, 12 February 2009). A senior member of the Bundestag was blunter still: “The association of Germany to the P5”, he said, “certainly benefited its international reputation, but for the Germans to see it as a bridge to a permanent seat in the Council would be delusional” (interview, 20 February 2009).
- 16.
For a critical analysis of Schröder’s foreign policy, see Grant (2005).
- 17.
Interviews with E3 officials, February and April 2009; Skype interview with a former E3 official, 12 February and 25 March 2015.
- 18.
Interviews with a former E3 foreign minister (2 March 2009) and a senior E3 official (21 April 2009). The former E3 foreign minister recalled that the possible involvement of the European Union was never raised during meetings with his counterparts. “This was not an issue”, he said.
- 19.
Phone interview with a senior E3 official, 21 April 2009.
- 20.
This point was confirmed to me by senior officials, including two former E3 political directors (interviews with the author, 21 and 23 April 2009).
- 21.
Phone interview with a senior E3 official, 21 April 2009.
- 22.
Interview with a former E3 ambassador to Iran, 7 April 2009.
- 23.
Interview with a senior E3 official, 23 April 2009.
- 24.
Interview with a senior Italian official, 24 March 2015.
- 25.
Spain’s misgivings were reported in a confidential US diplomatic cable made public by WikiLeaks (the cable is available at https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03ROME4585_a.html).
- 26.
Ibidem. The cable further reads: “The ‘EU3’, she [FM Palacio] said, doesn’t exist, so who are they representing when they sign the letter [to Iran’s President Khatami]? [Straw, de Villepin and Fischer] will have to discuss the letter with all EU members before it can be sent as an EU initiative, and no-one has discussed it with her”.
- 27.
Phone interview with an E3 official, 14 May 2009.
- 28.
Interview with a former E3 ambassador to Iran, 7 April 2009. This was also the assessment of an aide to HR Solana (interview by the author, 24 October 2008).
- 29.
The former ambassador assigned precise percentage values to each of the three reasons: he said that greater legitimacy accounted for 50–60 per cent of the E3’s decision to involve the European Union; added political weight for 30 per cent; and access to EU assets for no more than 10–20 per cent (interview, 7 April 2009).
- 30.
Phone interview with an E3 official, 14 May 2009.
- 31.
Interviews with a former E3 foreign minister (2 March 2009), senior E3 officials (21 April 2009, 12 May 2009), an aide to Solana (24 October 2008) and an HR office official (22 June 2010). The much better known troika consisting of the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the Commission would be born only years later.
- 32.
Skype interview with a former E3 official, 12 February and 15 March 2015.
- 33.
Interview with an aide to Solana, 24 October 2008.
- 34.
Interview with an aide to Solana, 24 October 2008.
- 35.
Interview with an HR office official, 23 June 2010.
- 36.
Interview with a former top EU official, 14 April 2014.
- 37.
Interview with an E3 official, 13 February 2009.
- 38.
Interview with a senior E3 official, 12 February 2009. The official went as far as to say that, over time, the attitude of the EU member states not involved in the E3/EU turned from sceptical to supportive to cooperative. This was of course before the E3 raised the prospect of adopting sanctions.
- 39.
Phone interview with an E3 official, 14 May 2009, and Skype interview with a former E3 official, 12 February and 25 March 2015. Of course, E3 officials were aware that their positive assessment of the E3/EU would hardly be shared by their colleagues from other EU countries. Several maintained that this gap in perceptions was nonetheless no good reason to question the validity of their argument. In 2004, the group’s outsiders could not achieve much else other than having HR Solana in the group.
- 40.
Italian exports amounted to circa 1.951 billion and imports (90 per cent consisting in crude) to around 1.897 billion euros. Data on EU member states’ trade exchanges with third countries are available on the website of the European Commission, Directorate-General Trade, Export Helpdesk: http://exporthelp.europa.eu/thdapp/display.htm;jsessionid=916E3376F3D5A2C0DE69E7C25406CF48?page=st%2fst_Statistics.html&docType=main&languageId=en
- 41.
Interview with a former E3 ambassador to Iran, 7 April 2009.
- 42.
Interview with a former E3 foreign minister, 2 March 2009.
- 43.
Interview with a senior Italian official, 24 March 2015.
- 44.
Interview with an aide to HR Solana, 24 October 2008.
- 45.
Interviews with E3 officials, 21 April and 14 May 2009, and with an aide to HR Solana, 24 October 2008.
- 46.
Interview with an HR office official, 23 June 2010.
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Alcaro, R. (2018). The Bargain: How the E3/EU Came About. In: Europe and Iran’s Nuclear Crisis. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74298-4_4
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