The Bargain: How the E3/EU Came About

  • Riccardo Alcaro
Chapter
Part of the Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics book series (PSEUP)

Abstract

France, Germany and the United Kingdom (E3) profited from extraordinary circumstances—US unpreparedness to engage Iran diplomatically, the lack of consensus within the Security Council and Iran’s willingness to legitimise its nuclear activities in the eyes of the international community—to take the initiative on Iran's nuclear file. However, alone these permissive conditions do not suffice to explain the creation of the E3 group. All three countries had specific interests in the issue, as did the other member states. The association of the HR with the E3 negotiating team (E3/EU) allowed for an asymmetric accommodation of such interests.

References

  1. Adomeit, H. (2006, March). Russische Iranpolitik, SWP Aktuell, 9.Google Scholar
  2. Agence Europe. (2004, October 18). Bulleting Quotidien Europe, 8809.Google Scholar
  3. Alcaro, R. (2012). Avoiding the unnecessary war. Myths and reality of the West-Iran nuclear standoff. IAI working paper 12/10. Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali. http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/avoiding-unnecessary-war
  4. Bergenäs, J. (2010, February 10). The rise of a White Knight State: Sweden’s nonproliferation and disarmament history. Nuclear Threat Initiative. http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/swedens-nonproliferation-history/
  5. Bertram, C. (2008). Rethinking Iran: From confrontation to cooperation, Chaillot paper (Vol. 110). Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies.Google Scholar
  6. Bowen, W. Q., & Kidd, J. (2004). The Iranian nuclear challenge. International Affairs, 80, 257–274.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Bush, G. W. (2002, September 17). The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC: The White House.http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2002/
  8. Byman, D. (2008). Iran, terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31, 169–181.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Davidson, J. W., & Powers, M. J. (2005). If you want it done right, do it yourself. Nonproliferation Review, 12(3), 406–433.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. Dinmore, G. (2004, December 15). US debates military strikes on ‘nuclear Iran’. Financial Times. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eed88be8-0741-11d9-9672-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3VVGybjpN. Accessed 17 Oct 2015.
  11. Dobbins, J. (2010). Negotiating with Iran: Reflections from personal experience. The Washington Quarterly, 33(1), 149–154.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Einhorn, R. J. (2004). A transatlantic strategy on Iran’s nuclear program. The Washington Quarterly, 27(4), 21–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Ferguson, C. D., & Potter, W. C. (2004). The four faces of nuclear terrorism. Monterey: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International Studies.Google Scholar
  14. George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). Case studies and theory development in social sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar
  15. Grant, C. (2005). Germany’s foreign policy: What lessons can be learned from the Schröder’s years? London: Centre for European Reform Essays. http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2011/essay_germ_for_pol_2sep05-2154.pdf
  16. Hofmann, G., & Naumann, M. (2003, March 27). Die Krise, die Europa eint. Die Zeit. http://www.zeit.de/2003/14/Schr_9ader
  17. Hunter, S. (2014). Iran, Islam and the struggle for identity and power in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Washington, DC: Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding. http://issuu.com/georgetownsfs/docs/shireen_hunter_iran__islam__and__th
  18. International Crisis Group. (2003a, October 15). Iran: Discontent and disarray, Middle East briefing (Vol. 11). Amman/Brussels: ICG. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iran/B011-iran-discontent-and-disarray.aspx
  19. International Crisis Group. (2003b, October 27). Deal with Iran’s nuclear programme, Middle East report (Vol. 18). Amman/Brussels: ICG. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-east-north-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iran/018-dealing-with-irans-nuclear-program.aspx
  20. International Crisis Group. (2004, November 24). Iran: Where next on the nuclear standoff? Crisis group Middle East briefing (Vol. 15). Amman/Brussels: ICG. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-eastnorth-africa/iraq-iran-gulf/iran/B015-iran-where-next-on-the-nuclearstandoff.aspx
  21. International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2004). Iran’s nuclear programme. IISS Strategic Comments, 10, 9.Google Scholar
  22. Kaussler, B. (2008). European Union constructive engagement with Iran (2000–2004): An exercise in conditional human rights diplomacy. Iranian Studies, 41(3), 269–295.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Kessler, G. (2006, June 18). In 2003, US Spurned Iran’s offer of dialogue. The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061700727.html. Accessed 17 Oct 2015.
  24. Khlopkov, A., & Lutkova, A. (2010). The Bushehr NPP: Why did it take so long? Moscow: Center for Energy and Security Studies. http://www.a-pln.org/sites/default/files/apln-analysis-docs/TheBushehrNPP-WhyDidItTakeSoLong.pdf
  25. Kienzle, B. (2013). A European contribution to non-proliferation? The WMD strategy at ten. International Affairs, 89(5), 1143–1159.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Kitchen, C., & Vickers, R. (2013). Labour traditions of international order and the dilemma of action towards Iran. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 15, 299–316.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  27. Linden, R. (2006). Die Initiative der EU-3 im Iran. Ein Testfall für die europäische Sicherheitspolitik nach der Iraq-Krise? Trier: Trier University.Google Scholar
  28. Litwak, R. S. (2008). Living with ambiguity: Nuclear deals with Iran and North Korea. Survival, 50(1), 91–118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Milani, A. (2005). U.S. foreign policy and the future of democracy in Iran. The Washington Quarterly, 28(3), 41–56.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Mousavian, S. H. (2008). Iran-Europe relations. Challenges and opportunities. London: Routledge.Google Scholar
  31. Mousavian, S. H. (2012). The Iranian nuclear crisis. Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.Google Scholar
  32. Perthes, V. (2005a). The EU needs a U.S. input on Iran. European Affairs, 6(4), 17–20.Google Scholar
  33. Perthes, V. (2005b). Pride and mistrust. Internationale Politik Transatlantic Edition, 1, 17–23.Google Scholar
  34. Pollack, K. M. (2013). Unthinkable. Iran, the bomb and American strategy. New York: Simon and Schuster.Google Scholar
  35. Quille, G., & Keane, R. (2005). The EU and Iran: Towards a new political and security dialogue. In S. N. Kile (Ed.), Europe and Iran. Perspectives on non-proliferation (pp. 97–121). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  36. Samore, G. (2004). Meeting Iran’s nuclear challenge. Stockholm: The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. http://www.blixassociates.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/No21.pdf
  37. Sciolino, E. (2004, January 11). Chirac underscores differences with U.S. in new year greeting. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/11/international/europe/11FRAN.html?pagewanted=print
  38. Tarock, A. (2005). Iran’s nuclear programme and the west. Third World Quarterly, 27(4), 645–664.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. The Economist. (2003, June 12). Dealing with Iran.Google Scholar
  40. Zaborski, J. (2005). Deterring a nuclear Iran. The Washington Quarterly, 28(3), 153–167.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© The Author(s) 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Riccardo Alcaro
    • 1
  1. 1.Istituto Affari InternazionaliRomeItaly

Personalised recommendations