Abstract
Lead groups are interest-based bargaining processes unfolding in the intersubjective normative context constituted by EU membership. As such, they are not only a theoretically consistent pattern of EU foreign policy-making but an empirically effective foreign policy practice. The experience of the E3/EU group (France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the High Representative) lends credibility to this claim. The E3/EU set up a negotiating framework that worked as a de-escalating tool, a catalyst for Security Council unity and a permanent forum for crisis management. The E3/EU inflicted pain on Iran by adopting a comprehensive sanctions regime in coordination with the United States, but did so only having pre-emptively secured US commitment to seeking a diplomatic solution. Once the deal was reached, they defended it with deeds and not only with words. If President Trump were indeed to reverse course, the EU can still defend the deal by refusing to cooperate. The E3/EU might have been supporting actors, yet their achievements were real.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
The one policy move that the Contact Group was unable to transfer into EU frameworks was the formal recognition of Kosovo ’s independence, as this decision fundamentally contrasted with the national identity of five EU member states (Cyprus , Greece , Romania , Slovakia and Spain ). This occurrence further validates the argument that the Europeanisation effected by lead groups can only advance as far as the EU-mediated interests of member states extend. The Contact Group was able to drive EU policy because it recommended policies that served the EU-mediated interest of insiders and outsiders in pacifying, stabilising and democratising the Balkans. When it came to Kosovo ’s independence, however, the national identity and ensuing interests of Spain and the others (all concerned about setting a dangerous precedent for domestic secessionist forces) prevailed over their EU identity layers.
References
Delreux, T., & Keukeleire, S. (2017). Informal division of labour in EU foreign policy-making. Journal of European Public Policy, 24(10), 1–20. Published on line on 30 September 2016.
Menon, A. (2009). Power, institutions and the limits of hierarchy: The ‘EU-3’ and Iran. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the ISA’s 50th annual convention “exploring the past, anticipating the future”, New York Marriott Marquis, New York. http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/1/3/1/8/pages313182/p313182-1.php
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 The Author(s)
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Alcaro, R. (2018). Conclusion: The E3/EU and EU Foreign Policy. In: Europe and Iran’s Nuclear Crisis. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74298-4_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74298-4_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-74297-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-74298-4
eBook Packages: Political Science and International StudiesPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)