Abstract
This chapter spells out some major epistemological implications of the truth-conditional view, which concern the relation between logical knowledge and knowledge of logical form. The interesting fact that will emerge is that the truth-conditional view provides a perspective on such relation that radically differs from the approach traditionally associated with the syntactic notion.
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Notes
- 1.
To be precise, (N1) should be phrased as the rule that distinct objects are denoted by distinct names, if denoted at all, and (N1) should be phrased as the rule that distinct names must denote distinct objects, if they denote at all. For the sake of simplicity, here and in what follows we will use the shorter formulation.
- 2.
Russsell (1998), p. 58.
- 3.
Wittgenstein (1992), 5.53.
- 4.
Boghossian (1992), pp. 20–22.
- 5.
- 6.
The book is old-fashioned because almost nobody uses the epithet ‘the Stagirite’ nowadays.
- 7.
In Wittgenstein’s words, the individual constant a is a “real” name, what ‘Aristotle’ and ‘The Stagirite’ have in common, see Wittgenstein (1992), 3.3411.
- 8.
Kripke (1979), pp. 254–265.
- 9.
Kripke (1979), p. 257.
- 10.
Kripke (1979), pp. 257–258.
- 11.
Kripke (1979), pp. 265–266.
- 12.
- 13.
According to Wittgenstein (1992), 4.243, one cannot understand two names without knowing whether they denote the same thing.
- 14.
MacFarlane (2004), p. 22, aptly suggests that the normativity of logic is consistent with the possibility that the logical form of an argument is not epistemically transparent.
- 15.
Here I follow Sainsbury and Tye (2012), p. 184.
- 16.
Here, again, I follow Sainsbury and Tye (2012), pp. 134–135.
- 17.
Boghossian (1994), p. 42.
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Iacona, A. (2018). Logical Knowledge vs Knowledge of Logical Form. In: Logical Form. Synthese Library, vol 393. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74154-3_6
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