Abstract
The aim of this article is to identify a characteristic of delusions: that which makes them pathological. It may appear somewhat strange at first because one believes that delusions are precisely a pathological alteration of the mind. However, some authors have shown that although pathological delusions are the most studied, not all delusions have necessarily harmful consequences for the delirious subject or for others. Hence, it seems pertinent to question what makes delusions become a pathological state. Here I support the phenomenological perspective in which delusions are considered experiences. Specifically I follow Gallagher’s Multiple Realities model that holds that delusions are an alternative reality which I compare with the perspective that delusions are false beliefs. I hold that the two perspectives are not completely incompatible and that delusions are above all experiences. From this model I try to explain why delusions are not always pathological.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
For information about the history of the evolution of the concept of “schizophrenia” see Garrabé (2003).
- 2.
For a recent resume of positions see Bortolloti and Miyazono (2015).
- 3.
Regarding everyday reality Schütz (1945) states: “(1) a specific tension of consciousness, namely wide-awakeness, originating in full attention to life; (2) a specific epoché, namely suspension of doubt; (3) a prevalent form of spontaneity, namely working (a meaningful spontaneity based upon a project and characterized by the intention to bring about the projected state of affairs by bodily movements gearing into the outer world); (4) a specific form of experiencing one’s self (the working self as the total self); (5) a specific form of sociality (the common intersubjective world of communication and social action); (6) a specific time-perspective (the standard time originating in an intersection between durée and cosmic time as the universal temporal structure of the intersubjective world)” (p. 549).
- 4.
But of course this belief has an experience at its base.
- 5.
It is beyond the scope of this article to address here the difference between these lines of thought.
References
American Psychiatric Association. (2013). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (5th ed.). Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association.
Bortolloti, L. (2010). Delusions and other irrational beliefs. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bortolotti, L. (2012). In defence of modest doxasticism about delusions. Neuroethics, 5(1), 39–53.
Bortolloti, L., & Miyazono, K. (2015). Recent work on the nature and development of delusions. Philosophy Compass, 10(9), 636–645.
Gallagher, S. (2009). Delusional realities. In M. R. Broome & L. Bortolloti (Eds.), Psychiatry as cognitive neuroscience: Philosophical perspectives (pp. 245–266). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gallagher, S. (2015). Why we are not all novelists. In P. F. Bundgaard & F. Stjernfelt (Eds.), Investigations into the phenomenology and the ontology of the work of art: What are artworks and how do we experience them? (pp. 129–143). London: SpringerOpen.
Garrabé, J. (2003). La schizophrénie. Un siècle pour comprendre. Paris: Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond/Le Seuil.
Graham, G. (2010). The disordered mind. New York: Routledge.
Jackson, M. (2007). The clinician’s illusion and benign psychosis. In M. C. Chung, K. W. M. Fulford, & G. Graham (Eds.), Reconceiving schizophrenia. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ratcliffe, M. (forthcoming). Selfhood, schizophrenia, and the interpersonal regulation of experience. Academia. November 17, 2016. https://www.academia.edu/13585253/Selfhood_Schizophrenia_and_the_Interpersonal_Regulation_of_Experience
Sass, L. (1995). The paradoxes of delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the schizophrenic mind. Ithaca/New York/London: Cornell University Press.
Schütz, A. (1945). On multiple realities. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 5(4), 533–576.
Smith, M., Lewis, D., & Johnston, M. (1989). Dispositional theories of value. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 63, 89–174.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the Portuguese FCT (Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia) the Grant: SFRH/BPD/84773/2012.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Gonçalves, J. (2018). Why Are Delusions Pathological?. In: Hipólito, I., Gonçalves, J., Pereira, J. (eds) Schizophrenia and Common Sense. Studies in Brain and Mind, vol 12. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73993-9_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73993-9_10
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-73992-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-73993-9
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)