Abstract
In the preceding chapter we established that voting games resemble the well-known “tipping games” of the literature on collective action. This resemblance is hardly surprising. After all, it is possible to conceive of voting games as a more general case of tipping games, one where the threshold level is endogenously chosen by a group of players with opposing interests. This suggests that as we proceed in our analysis themes familiar from the theory of collective action will emerge. After characterizing the solutions of voting games we encountered one such theme: multiplicity of equilibria.
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Notes
- 1.
In this paragraph I have ignored Regions III and IV but this is purely for expository reasons. Later, in the fully formal analysis of stability sets we will consider the entire strategy space.
- 2.
Results of this kind are familiar in stability analysis. An example similar in spirit can be found in Jackson and Yariv (2007).
References
Harsanyi, John and Reinhardt Selten. 1988. A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Jackson, Matthew O. and Leeat Yariv. 2007. “Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network Games.” The American Economic Review 97(2):pp. 92–98.
Medina, Luis Fernando. 2005. “The Comparative Statics of Collective Action: A Pragmatic Approach to Games with Multiple Equilibria.” Rationality and Society 17(4):423–452.
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Medina Sierra, L.F. (2018). The Stability Analysis of Voting Games. In: Beyond the Turnout Paradox. SpringerBriefs in Political Science. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73948-9_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73948-9_3
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