Abstract
This chapter tackles the procedural issues of the general bridging clauses. This requires first to take a look at the procedural requirements that are found in Article 48(7) TEU itself. The important and most complex element is the participation of the national Parliaments. The procedure itself begins with the initiative of the European Council, followed by the period for national parliamentary veto, and the requirement of the European Parliament to give its consent. Finally, the decision to activate a bridging clause is taken by the European Council. While EU law does not make any further requirements, a number of national legal orders have installed more rigid safeguards and mandating systems for the national European Council representative. This chapter also shortly discusses similar procedural issues related to special bridging clauses.
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Notes
- 1.
Mayer (2012), p. 89 f.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
See e.g. Elgie (1999).
- 7.
Of course, there are other Member States with directly elected Heads of State, such as Poland or Bulgaria, but where the leading role in the EU policy clearly remains with the government accountable to the parliament. In Poland, the Constitutional Tribunal had to interpret that it is primarily the Prime Minister and not the President who represents the state in the European Council (Ref. No. Kpt 2/08, decision of 20 May 2009). The subsequently adopted Act of 8 October 2010 on the cooperation of the Council of Ministers with the Sejm and the Senate in matters relating to the Republic of Poland’s membership of the European Union provides that it is the President who decides on the position of the Republic of Poland in relation to the bridging clauses. However, the President acts on proposal of the Council of Ministers and with consent granted by a statute. See Sections 14 and 15 of the aforementioned act.
- 8.
Article 18 of the Act No. 373/2013 on cooperation between the Parliament and the Government in the field of European affairs.
- 9.
Cf. Articles 1809 and 18017 of the Statute of the Seimas; see also Vilpišauskas (2015), pp. 563–569.
- 10.
- 11.
In this connection the United Kingdom’s European Union Act 2011 with its numerous referendum requirements may be criticised as obstructive in its purpose. Cf. Craig (2011).
- 12.
See the detailed country reports in: European Parliament (2013), including its two annexes.
- 13.
See also Article 6 of Protocol No. 1.
- 14.
Both Article 4 of Protocol No. 1 (period between forwarding a draft legislative act to the national Parliaments and placing that draft legislative act on a provisional agenda for the Council for its adoption or for adoption of a position under a legislative procedure) and Article 6 of Protocol No. 2 (period for sending reasoned opinions regarding the principle subsidiarity by the national Parliaments) regulate the beginning of the period as the date when a draft legislative act has been made available to national Parliaments in the official languages of the Union.
- 15.
According to Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 6 of Protocol No. 2, the national Parliament has to state in its reasoned opinion why it considers that the draft legislative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Reasoned opinions without reasoning would not be counted as valid votes under the so-called early warning mechanism. Cf. Lupo, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Protocol (No. 1), para. 53 (on Article 3 of the Protocol).
- 16.
The subsidiarity procedure requires reaching a threshold of one third (yellow card) or more than a half the votes of national parliaments or individual chambers in order to trigger further procedural steps by the Commission and other institutions. An unspecified threshold of negative parliamentary votes required for vetoing the use of general bridging clause was considered during the 2003 IGC. See: CIG 52/03 ADD 1 from 25 November 2003, p. 38; See also Grard, in Burgorgue-Larsen et al. (2007), Article IV-444, para. 8. This would have been highly impractical, because it would suggest that the European Council members acting unanimously may openly disregard the will of their own parliaments. Even one or a few parliamentary vetos would have probably led to a renegotiation of the decision in order to accommodate the position of the Member States concerned or to a failure to adopt the decision.
- 17.
Not to be confused with the proposed general “red card” for national Parliaments in the EU legislative procedure that was rejected at the Convention and subsequently revived in 2016 in the draft agreement aimed at settling the requests of the United Kingdom had it not voted for leaving the EU. See Blanke and Böttner (2015), p. 261 f.
- 18.
Similarly Peers (2012), p. 78.
- 19.
Cremer, in Calliess and Ruffert (2016), Artikel 48 EUV, para. 14.
- 20.
Ohler, in Grabitz et al. (2011), Artikel 48 EUV, para. 49; Franzius, in Pechstein et al. (2017), Artikel 48 EUV, para. 58. The French Conseil Constitutionnel, in its decision on the constitutionality of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, was of a different opinion and required a revision of the French Constitution in order to allow the parliament to exercise the veto under Article 48(7) TEU. See Case no. 2004-505 DC, decision of 19 October 2004, ECLI:FR:CC:2004:2004.505.DC, para. 41: “Considérant que le droit reconnu au Parlement français de s’opposer à une modification du traité selon le mode simplifié prévu par l’article IV-444 rend nécessaire une révision de la Constitution afin de permettre l’exercice de cette prerogative.” Similarly Barrett (2013), pp. 182–183 refers to the veto right as a “facilitative invitation” to “permit national parliaments to decide on whether or not to exercise veto power over Article 48(7) Treaty amendments”, which “must be accepted by each national system” and thus “national parliaments must be enabled to exercise this discretion by the relevant national rules applying to them and by the political parties which control their operation”. In our opinion, the veto may be exercised even if it is not addressed in the national law at all. The possibility to exercise the veto does not depend on any permission by national law, same as the participation of members of a Member State’s government in the Council.
- 21.
European Court of Justice, Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, decision of 17 December 1970, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114, para. 3 f.
- 22.
The national rules addressing the procedural issues of casting the veto in Member States with unicameral parliaments are mostly limited to a reference to the competence of the plenary session to cast the veto. See e.g. Croatia: Article 12 of the Act on the Co-Operation of the Croatian Parliament and the Government of the Republic of Croatia in European Affairs; Estonia: Article 152 of the Riigikogu Rules of Procedure and Internal Rules Act, Finland: Section 30 and 32 of the Parliament’s Rules of Procedure; Hungary: Section 72 of Act XXXVI/2012 on the National Assembly and Section 144 of Resolution 10/2014 on Certain Provisions of the Rules of Procedure; Lithuania: § 1805 of the Statute of the Seimas; Sweden: Chapter 9, Article 20 of the Riksdag Act.
- 23.
These are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and the United Kingdom. Both Denmark and Sweden have abandoned bicameralism several years before their accession to the European Communities and the Union respectively.
- 24.
See the names of the chambers of the States-General in the Netherlands.
- 25.
For an overview, see Groß (2003), p. 31 f.
- 26.
- 27.
- 28.
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 7(1)(2) of Protocol No. 2.
- 29.
See also Gamper (2011), pp. 245–247 and 254–256.
- 30.
See Haas (2010), p. 3 ff.
- 31.
The same conclusion is reached by UK House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, Tenth Report (February 2008), Point 3.16; Casalena, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Protocol (No. 1), para. 95 (on Article 6 of the Protocol); Öhlinger and Potacs (2014), p. 27, Gamper (2011), p. 245. A different opinion is expressed by Peers (2012), p. 78, who deduces from the absence of an express rule for bicameral parliaments that it is up to the Member States to decide how and by which chamber the veto right should be exercised.
- 32.
This has been overlooked by Olivetti, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Article 12 TEU, para. 74, who holds that an interpretation, according to which only both chambers together can cast the veto, “could have the paradoxical consequence that the opposition of a popularly elected lower Chamber, without the consent on it of a non-elected upper Chamber […] would not satisfy the requirement established by Art. 48.7 TEU and Art. 81.3 TFEU to block the use of the ‘passerelle clause’.”
- 33.
Olivetti, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Article 12 TEU, para. 97.
- 34.
Article 154o of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly; see also Article 97 of the Constitution. The Slovenian Constitutional Court (Decision of 18.10.2012, U-I-17/11, ECLI:SI:USRS:2012:U.I.17.11) is of the opinion that EU law does not regulate how the two chambers in bicameral system should participate and cooperate and, accordingly, that this question can be answered by the national legislator.
- 35.
See e.g. Vehar (2007), p. 242 f.; Mavčič (2014), p. 1492. The very limited participation of the National Council in EU affairs extends even to the subsidiarity check, where the National Assembly assumes the right to cast both votes of the Slovenian Parliament. This has not been disputed by the European Commission despite the obvious conflict with the aforementioned rules of Article 7 of Protocol No. 2, probably due to the regard for the specific constitutional system of Slovenia. However, the prevalent opinion seems to rule out the possibility to entrust both votes in the subsidiarity check procedure to one chamber of a bicameral parliament. See. e.g. Gamper (2011), p. 247 and Kiiver (2012), pp. 64–66.
- 36.
See also Öhlinger and Potacs (2014), pp. 25–27.
- 37.
As opposed to Article 41(1) of the Constitution, according to which the Federal Council can propose domestic legislation.
- 38.
See Article 151-12 of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly and Article 73 decies of the Standing Orders of the Senate.
- 39.
- 40.
Article 3(l) in connection with Article 8 of the Law 8/1994 regulating the Joint Parliamentary European Union Committee (as amended by Law 24/2009) in connection with Article 10 of the Resolution of the Bureaus of the Congress of Deputies and the Senate of 21 September 1995 developing Law 8/1994 (as amended by Resolution of 27 May 2010).
- 41.
Cf. UK House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, Tenth Report (February 2008), Point 3.16.
- 42.
Section 10(1) of the Act on the Exercise by the Bundestag and by the Bundesrat of their Responsibility for Integration in Matters concerning the European Union.
- 43.
Article 148ca of the Standing Orders of the Sejm and Article 75f and 75g of the Rules and Regulations of the Senate.
- 44.
The so-called Lisbon Amendment to the rules of procedure of both chambers, Act No. 162/2009 Coll.
- 45.
Důvodová zpráva (explanatory memorandum) to the draft bill that ended up being adopted as the above mentioned act, Chamber of Deputies Print No. 742 from the 5th Term (2006–2010). The explanatory memorandum is ambiguous because it mixes the exercise of the veto and the previous consent, presenting the previous consent as a procedure to express the veto, and in one place even mentions that the veto would require a positive decision of both chambers, thus contradicting itself. This is probably due to the fact that the bill was drafted in cooperation of both chambers that did not always have the same views (although a good part of the provisions is materially identical in both rules of procedure). The Senate’s Permanent Commission for the Constitution of the Czech Republic and Parliamentary Procedure considered the question whether the veto right may be exercised in a bicameral system by each chamber or only by the whole parliament to be insufficiently addressed in EU law (Resolution No. 7 of 27 March 2008).
- 46.
Sections 109j and 109k (especially paragraph 4) in connection with Section 109i(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, Sections 119m and 119n (especially paragraph 4) of the Standing Rules of the Senate.
- 47.
Article 10b(3) of the Constitution.
- 48.
Barrett (2015), p. 295.
- 49.
Article 7(1) of the European Union Act 2009.
- 50.
See also Article 115 of the Standing Orders of the Dáil; Article 117 of the Standing Orders of the Seanad. See also Barrett (2013), p. 200 et seq.
- 51.
Cf. Högenauer (2015), pp. 253–254.
- 52.
Besselink and Mourik (2012), p. 31.
- 53.
As opposed to the aforementioned rules in Austria, Slovenia and Germany (in cases where only the Bundestag decides on the veto), where the national law makes it clear which chamber acts on behalf of the parliament as a whole.
- 54.
Accord de coopération entre les Chambres législatives fédérales, les parlements des Communautés et les parlements des Régions visant la mise en oeuvre du Protocole sur l’application des principes de subsidiarité et de proportionnalité, 19 December 2005.
- 55.
- 56.
See Delreux and Randour (2015), p. 155 ff.
- 57.
Granat (2016), p. 84 ff.
- 58.
On the consultation procedure, see the so called “Isoglucose” cases, European Court of Justice, Case 138/79, Roquette Frères v. Council, judgment of 29 October 1980, ECLI:EU:C:1980:249, para. 33; Case 139/79, Maizena v. Council, judgment of 29 October 1980, ECLI:EU:C:1980:250, para. 34; see also Case C-65/93, Parliament v. Council, judgment of 30 March 1995. ECLI:EU:C:1995:91, para. 21.
- 59.
Cf. European Court of Justice, Case C-65/93, Parliament v. Council, judgment of 30 March 1995. ECLI:EU:C:1995:91, para. 26 f.
- 60.
Cf. Edjaharian, in Blanke and Mangiameli (2013), Article 15 TEU, para. 62.
- 61.
Böttner (2016), p. 509.
- 62.
Cf. Wendel (2011), p. 225.
- 63.
There is, however, the risk that it leads to an opposite obstruction, because the necessity to obtain the consent of the parliament extends beyond the six-month period in Article 48(7) TEU. In order to avoid this, the motion to grant the consent should be put to vote within this time limit.
- 64.
Article 23(1) of the Basic Law reads: “With a view to establishing a united Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles, to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law. To this end the Federation may transfer sovereign powers by a law with the consent of the Bundesrat. The establishment of the European Union, as well as changes in its treaty foundations and comparable regulations that amend or supplement this Basic Law, or make such amendments or supplements possible, shall be subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 79”.
- 65.
German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 and others, Treaty of Lisbon, judgment of 30 June 2009, ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2009:es20090630.2bve000208, para. 319, 414.
- 66.
Czech Constitutional Court, Pl. US 19/08, Treaty of Lisbon I, decision of 26 November 2008, ECLI:CZ:US:2008:Pl.US.19.08.1, para. 165–166.
- 67.
Of the Member States that have no special previous consent procedure related to Article 48(7) TEU, we can mention for example Bulgaria (Article 121 and 126 of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly), Greece (Article 32A(9) of the Standing Orders of the Parliament—stressing the merely consultative nature of these deliberations), Finland (Article 96 of the Constitution) or Sweden (Chapter 7, Article 14 and other provisions of the Riksdag Act).
- 68.
For example Italy (Article 7 of the Law No. 234/2012 of 24 December 2012 on general rules on Italy’s participation in formation and implementation of EU legislation and policies); Lithuania (Article 3 of the Constitutional Act on Membership of the Republic of Lithuania in the European Union), Romania (Article 3 of the Act No. 373/2013 on cooperation between the Parliament and the Government in the field of European affairs), Slovenia (Article 10 of the Act on Cooperation between the National Assembly and the Government in EU affairs).
- 69.
For example Croatia (Article 8 of the Act on the Co-Operation of the Croatian Parliament and the Government of the Republic of Croatia in European Affairs), Hungary (Article 65 of the Act XXXVI of 2012 on the National Assembly).
- 70.
For example in Hungary: “in justified cases only” (Article 65 of Act XXXVI/2012 on the National Assembly); in Slovakia: “only in an unavoidable instance and with due consideration for the interest of the Slovak Republic” (Article 2(5) of the Constitutional Law on cooperation between the National Council of the Slovak Republic and the Government of the Slovak Republic in the affairs concerning the European Union).
- 71.
Including the possible vote on the acceptance of the justification (Article 67(2) of Act XXXVI/2012 on the National Assembly).
- 72.
Cf. Hegeland (2007).
- 73.
This is especially relevant in the many Member States where there is no express regulation regarding the parliamentary scrutiny of the European Council (as opposed to the Council). Where, on the other hand, the national rules on parliamentary scrutiny in EU affairs refer to the scrutiny of draft legal acts, the rare instances when the European Council adopts legal acts should be covered by those rules.
- 74.
Cf. Craig (2011), p. 1894 f.
- 75.
Act on the Exercise by the Bundestag and by the Bundesrat of their Responsibility for Integration in Matters concerning the European Union (Responsibility for Integration Act) of 22 September 2009, as amended by Article 1 of the Act of 1 December 2009.
- 76.
- 77.
With this remark Öhlinger and Potacs (2014), p. 26 f.
- 78.
Cf. Barrett (2013), p. 200 ff.
- 79.
See in more detail Barrett (2013), p. 200 ff.
- 80.
Cf. on this also Braune (2010), p. 442 f.
- 81.
- 82.
Gebauer (2010), p. 418 f.
- 83.
Pace (2015), p. 583.
- 84.
The “Council of Ministers” is Poland’s highest administrative body and commonly referred to as “the cabinet” (the government) and should not be confused with the “Council of Ministers” of the European Union.
- 85.
Polish Constitutional Tribunal, Ref. No. K 24/04, Sejm/Senate in the EU Legislative Process, judgment of 12 January 2005.
- 86.
Article 50 of the Constitutional Act of Denmark as well as Section 33 of the Standing Orders of the Danish Parliament.
- 87.
Article 20 of the Constitutional Act.
- 88.
Sections 109j (especially paragraph 7) and 109k in connection with Section 109i(c) of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, Sections 119m and 119n of the Standing Rules of the Senate.
- 89.
- 90.
Cf. Rensmann, in Dörr and Schmalenbach (2012), Article 46, para. 22.
- 91.
Rensmann, in Dörr and Schmalenbach (2012), Article 46, para. 39. According to Villiger (2009), Article 46. para. 16, a rule is of fundamental importance only “if it directly relates to, and provides an essential condition for, the competence to conclude a treaty”. This definition, however, is too restrictive to take account of the intention of Article 46 of the Convention.
- 92.
Rensmann, in Dörr and Schmalenbach (2012), Article 46, para. 45.
- 93.
- 94.
Austria: Article 23i(2) of the Federal Constitutional Law; Czech Republic: Section 109j (especially paragraph 7) and 109k in connection with Section 109i of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies, Section 119m and 119n of the Standing Rules of the Senate; France: Article 88-7 of the Constitution; Germany: Section 4(2) of the Act on the Exercise by the Bundestag and by the Bundesrat of their Responsibility for Integration in Matters concerning the European Union; Ireland: Article 7(2) of the European Union Act 2009; Italy: Article 11(5) of the Law No. 234/2012 of 24 December 2012 on general rules on Italy’s participation in formation and implementation of EU legislation and policies; Poland: Article 148cb of the Standing Orders of the Sejm and Article 75f and 75g of the Rules and Regulations of the Senat; Slovenia: Section 154p of the of the Rules of Procedure of the National Assembly (as opposed to the veto under the general bridging clause, the Rules of Procedure allow the final decision to be made by a committee, unless the committee or one quarter of the deputies request that the matter be decided by the plenary); Spain: Article 3(n) in connection with Article 8 of the Law 8/1994 regulating the Joint Parliamentary European Union Committee (as amended by Law 24/2009) in connection with Article 10 of the Resolution of the Bureaus of the Congress of Deputies and the Senate of 21 September 1995 developing Law of 21 September 1995 (as amended by Resolution of 27 May 2010). Further national rules expressly related to the special bridging clause of Article 81(3) TFEU only deal with the organisation of the procedure in the parliament.
- 95.
Czech Republic: prior consent of both chambers of Parliament (Section 109l of the Rules of Procedure of the Chamber of Deputies; Section 119k and 119m of the Standing Rules of the Senate); Denmark: prior consent of the Parliament applicable in general to all bridging clauses (Section 1(2) of Act No. 321 from 30 April 2008 on the Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty); Germany: prior consent of the German Bundestag and, should the decision touch upon areas related to the competence of the Länder, also of the Federal Council, applicable to all the special bridging clauses without veto as listed in Section 5 and 6 of the Act on the Exercise by the Bundestag and by the Bundesrat of their Responsibility for Integration in Matters concerning the European Union; Ireland: prior consent of both chambers of the Parliament applicable in general to all bridging clauses (Article 29(8) of the Constitution); Poland: prior consent in the form of an act, applicable to all the special bridging clauses as listed in Section 14 and 15 of the Act of 8 October 2010 on the cooperation of the Council of Ministers with the Sejm and the Senate in matters relating to the Republic of Poland’s membership of the European Union; United Kingdom: prior consent in the form of an act or by a referendum applicable to all the special bridging clauses as listed in Section 5 of the European Union Act 2011.
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Böttner, R., Grinc, J. (2018). Procedure for Activating the General Bridging Clauses. In: Bridging Clauses in European Constitutional Law. SpringerBriefs in Law. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73341-8_4
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