Abstract
In the previous chapter, I argued that Peirce was on the right track when he approached the mind from a semiotic perspective. Having offered a primer on semiotics, I now want to use some of those helpful resources. Ned Block distinguishes access-consciousness and phenomenal-consciousness. Convinced that his distinction is a real one, Block posits a module in the brain responsible for phenomenal experiences. However, I argue that we can make better sense of Block’s distinction if we regard it as a prescissive one. In order to clarify this stance, I examine experiments conducted by George Sperling. Sperling designed tasks that let test subjects access visual experiences that they previously could not act upon. Block thinks that Sperling’s results vindicate his claims, but strictly speaking Sperling’s experiments tracked only access-consciousness. I thus conclude that, to establish that phenomenal experiences were present prior to being accessed, we must prescissively suppose the subjects’ tasks absent.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
References
Armstrong DM (1989) Universals: an opinionated introduction. Westview Press, Boulder
Bayne T (2010) The unity of consciousness. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Bayne T, Chalmers DJ (2003) What is the unity of consciousness? In: Cleeremans A (ed) The unity of consciousness: binding, integration and dissociation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 23–58
Block N (1978) Troubles with functionalism. In: Savage CW (ed) Minnesota studies in philosophy of science, vol 9. Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis, pp 261–325
Block N (1992) Begging the question against phenomenal consciousness. Behav Brain Sci 15(2):205–206
Block N (1995a) On a confusion about a function of consciousness. Behav Brain Sci 18(2):227–287
Block N (1995b) Mental paint and mental latex. In: Villanueva E (ed) Philosophical issues, vol 7. Ridgeview, Atascadero, pp 19–49
Block N (1997) On a confusion about a function of consciousness. In: Block N, Flanagan O, Güzeldere G (eds) The nature of consciousness: philosophical debates. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 375–415
Block N (1999) Ridiculing social constructivism about phenomenal consciousness. Behav Brain Sci 22(1):199–201
Block N (2000) How not to find the neural correlate of consciousness. Intellectica 2(31):125–136
Block N (2003) Mental paint. In: Hahn M, Ramberg B (eds) Reflections and replies: essays on the philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 165–200
Block N (2007) Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. Behav Brain Sci 30(5–6):481–548
Block N (2011) Perceptual consciousness overflows cognitive access. Trends Cogn Sci 15(12):567–575
Bornstein RF, Pittman TS (eds) (1992) Perception without awareness: cognitive, clinical, and social perspectives. Guilford Press, New York
Byrne A (1997) Some like it hot: consciousness and higher-order thoughts. Philos Stud 86(2):103–129
Chalmers DJ (1996) The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Chalmers DJ (1997) Availability: the cognitive basis of experience. Behav Brain Sci 20(1):148–149
Champagne M (2009) Some semiotic constraints on metarepresentational accounts of consciousness. In: Deely JN, Sbrocchi LG (eds) Semiotics 2008. Legas Press, Toronto, pp 557–564
Champagne M (2016) Diagrams of the past: how timelines can aid the growth of historical knowledge. Cogn Semiot 9(1):11–44
Churchland PM (1988) Matter and consciousness. MIT Press, Cambridge
Clark A, Chalmers DJ (1998) The extended mind. Analysis 58(1):7–19
Cohen MA, Dennett DC (2011) Consciousness cannot be separated from function. Trends Cogn Sci 15(8):358–364
Colapietro VM (1989) Peirce’s approach to the self: a semiotic perspective on human subjectivity. State University of New York Press, Albany
Coltheart M (1980) Iconic memory and visible persistence. Percept Psychophys 27(3):183–228
Crick F (1993) The astonishing hypothesis: the scientific search for the soul. Scribner’s, New York
Davidson DH (1970) Mental events. In: Foster L, Swanson JW (eds) Experience and theory. University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, pp 79–101
De Gardelle V, Sackur J, Kouider S (2009) Perceptual illusions in brief visual presentations. Conscious Cogn 18(3):569–577
Deely JN (2005) Defining the semiotic animal: how the postmodern understanding of human being supersedes the modern definition “res cogitans”. In: Deely JN, Petrilli S, Ponzio A (eds) The semiotic animal. Legas Press, Toronto, pp 145–186
Deledalle G (2000) Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy of signs: essays in comparative semiotics. Indiana University Press, Bloomington
Dennett DC (1988) Quining qualia. In: Marcel AJ, Bisiach E (eds) Consciousness in modern science. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 42–77
Dennett DC (2001) Are we explaining consciousness yet? Cognition 79(1–2):221–237
Dewey J (1896) The reflex arc concept in psychology. Psychol Rev 3(4):357–370
Dewey J (1946) Peirce’s theory of linguistic signs, thought, and meaning. J Philos 43(4):85–95
Farrell BA (1950) Experience. Mind 59(234):170–198
Flanagan O (1992) Consciousness reconsidered. MIT Press, Cambridge
Fodor JA (1974) Special sciences (or: the disunity of science as a working hypothesis). Synthese 28(2):97–115
Foulquié P, Saint-Jean R (eds) (1962) Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique. Presses Universitaires de France, Paris
Fromm H (2009) The nature of being human: from environmentalism to consciousness. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore
Gamble D (1997) P-consciousness presentation / A-consciousness representation. Behav Brain Sci 20(1):149–150
Gozzano S, Hill CS (eds) (2015) New perspectives on type identity: the mental and the physical. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Güzeldere G (1997) The many faces of consciousness: a field guide. In: Block N, Flanagan O, Güzeldere G (eds) The nature of consciousness: philosophical debates. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 1–67
Heil J (1988) Privileged access. Mind 97(386):238–251
Houser N (2010) Peirce, phenomenology and semiotics. In: Cobley P (ed) The Routledge companion to semiotics. Routledge, London, pp 89–100
Humphrey N (1992) A history of the mind: evolution and the birth of consciousness. Simon and Schuster, New York
Jack AI, Shallice T (2001) Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. Cognition 79(1–2):161–196
James W (2007) The principles of psychology, vol 1. Cosimo, New York
Kim J (1990) Supervenience as a philosophical concept. Metaphilosophy 21(1–2):1–27
Kirk R (1974) Zombies versus materialists. Proc Aristot Soc 48:135–152
Kirk R (2005) Zombies and consciousness. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Legg C (2003) This is simply what I do. Philos Phenomenol Res 66(1):58–80
Levine J (1983) Materialism and qualia: the explanatory gap. Pac Philos Q 64(4):354–361
Levine J (1997) On leaving out what it’s like. In: Block N, Flanagan O, Güzeldere G (eds) The nature of consciousness: philosophical debates. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 543–555
Locke J (1825) An essay concerning human understanding. Thomas Davison, London
Milner AD, Rugg MD (eds) (1992) The neuropsychology of consciousness. Academic Press, New York
Neisser U (1967) Cognitive psychology. Appleton Century Crofts, New York
Nelkin N (1996) Consciousness and the origins of thought. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Nöth W (1995) Handbook of semiotics. Indiana University Press, Bloomington
Nöth W (2003) Crisis of representation? Semiotica 143(1–4):9–15
Papineau D (2007) Reuniting (scene) phenomenology with (scene) access. Behav Brain Sci 30(5–6):521
Peirce CS (1931–58) The collected papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Peirce CS (1992) The essential Peirce: selected philosophical writings, vol 1. Indiana University Press, Bloomington
Peirce CS (1998) The essential Peirce: selected philosophical writings, vol 2. Indiana University Press, Bloomington
Pietarinen A-V (2006) Signs of logic: Peircean themes on the philosophy of language, games, and communication. Springer, Dordrecht
Place UT (1956) Is consciousness a brain process? Br J Psychol 47(1):44–50
Prinz JJ (2012) The conscious brain: how attention engenders experience. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Rosenthal DM (1997) A theory of consciousness. In: Block N, Flanagan O, Güzeldere G (eds) The nature of consciousness: philosophical debates. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 729–753
Rosenthal DM (2005) Consciousness and mind. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Schacter DL (1989) On the relation between memory and consciousness: dissociable interactions and conscious experience. In: Roediger HL, Craik FIM (eds) Varieties of memory and consciousness: essays in honour of Endel Tulving. Erlbaum, Hillsdale, pp 355–389
Schlicht T (2012) Phenomenal consciousness, attention and accessibility. Phenomenol Cogn Sci 11(3):309–334
Searle JR (1992) The rediscovery of the mind. MIT Press, Cambridge
Shea N (2012) Methodological encounters with the phenomenal kind. Philos Phenomenol Res 84(2):307–344
Skagestad P (1999) Peirce’s inkstand as an external embodiment of mind. Trans Charles S Peirce Soc 35(3):551–561
Sosa E (2003) Privileged access. In: Smith Q, Jokic A (eds) Consciousness: new philosophical perspectives. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 273–292
Sperling G (1960) The information available in brief visual presentations. Psychol Monogr Gen Appl 74(498):1–29
Stjernfelt F (2007) Diagrammatology: an investigation on the borderlines of phenomenology, ontology, and semiotics. Springer, Dordrecht
Stoerig P, Cowey A (1997) Blindsight in man and monkey. Brain 120(3):535–559
Tye M (1995) Blindsight, orgasm and representational overlap. Behav Brain Sci 18(2):268–269
Tye M (1996) The function of consciousness. Noûs 30(3):287–305
Weisberg J (2011) Abusing the notion of what-it’s-likeness: a response to Block. Analysis 71(3):438–443
Weiskrantz L (1986) Blindsight: a case study and implications. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Williams J (2016) A process philosophy of signs. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh
Zahavi D (2007) Killing the straw man: Dennett and phenomenology. Phenomenol Cogn Sci 6(1):21–43
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2018 Springer International Publishing AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Champagne, M. (2018). Using Prescission and the Type/Token/Tone Distinction. In: Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol 19. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73338-8_3
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73338-8_3
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-73337-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-73338-8
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)