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Illegal Drugs, Drug Trafficking and Violence in Latin America pp 43–59Cite as

The Business Structure of Illegal Drugs: Concentration-Fragmentation, Cartels, and Extreme Violence

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Abstract

This chapter develops a central hypothesis: The type of drug trafficking is producing concentration at the transporting stage of the drug business and fragmentation at the retail level. Those who control the transshipment (the kingpins and cartels) capture the lion share of the profits. It examines the question of why do drug cartels emerge and what triggers the violence in the drug business.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Section 4 of this book provides an estimate for the marijuana market in Argentina and Mexico.

  2. 2.

    These networks of fellow countrymen at the wholesale distribution phase have been observed in many countries. In terms of the importance of trust in commercial relations and the way the mafia operates, Gambetta (1990) and others have argued that the fact that there is no legal recourse in this business explains the presence of these networks: agents in drug sales must share the same “codes”—and accept the consequences of noncompliance.

  3. 3.

    According to the Chilean addiction survey in 2008, the average amount consumers paid for a gram was Ch$4530, with only 10% paying more than Ch$10,000. To see the full data, visit http://www.conace.cl/inicio/pdf/resumen_informe_VIII_estudio_drogas_poblaciongeneral_junio2009.pdf). For Buenos Aires, see the article in the daily Clarin, “Postales de un Distrito Peligroso” from January 3, 2010 at http://www.clarin.com/diario/2010/01/03/policiales/g-02112305.htm. For Chicago, see Chart 4.1.

  4. 4.

    Reguilo (2014) presents the testimony of one young man involved in the narco business imagining his death. He says, “... I hope they cut me into little pieces, to save my Mom from a painful wake... Just killing you isn’t enough in this business.” In her book/article, the author analyzes why “just killing you isn’t enough in this business.” Violence is tacitly a language of oppression and subjugation.

  5. 5.

    This is not the case, for instance, with tobacco or beer companies, whereby two or three large companies control the vast majority of the business, from production to wholesale.

  6. 6.

    See Richard Marosi’s description of the Sinaloa cartel’s trafficking methods in four LA Times pieces (July 24–28, 2011).

  7. 7.

    A detailed analysis of the Mexican war on drugs is presented in Chap. 10.

  8. 8.

    Mark Kleiman, a renowned expert in illegal drug and US public policy, has proposed a strategy based on identifying the most violent cartel and directing all of the state’s efforts to destroying it. The goal is to send out a message that violence will not be tolerated, and the “focus” of the state is whichever group is most violent. The strategy is based on the abovementioned principle of reestablishing an order or equilibrium by the state wagering on whoever is willing to reduce violence, though the trafficking business itself continues.

  9. 9.

    It is worth noting that there are other types of conflict that falls outside the scope of this book: ethnic, economic, and political conflicts which result in extreme violence because either the state was already absent or has decided to intervene to undo the existing balance.

  10. 10.

    http://www.infolatam.com/2014/07/24/la-pacificacion-de-favelas-de-rio-traslada-la-violencia-hacia-la-periferia/?utm_source=Newsletter%20de%20Infolatam&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Newsletter_24_julio_2014_Infolatam:%20Ibope%20da%20a%20Rousseff%2038%20por%20ciento%20de%20apoyo%20y%20ganar%C3%ADa%20en%20segunda%20vuelta%20a%20Neves%20y%20Campos.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Latin American Studies on Insecurity & Violence, National University of Tres de Febrero, Buenos Aires, Argentina

    Marcelo Bergman

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  1. Marcelo Bergman
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Bergman, M. (2018). The Business Structure of Illegal Drugs: Concentration-Fragmentation, Cartels, and Extreme Violence. In: Illegal Drugs, Drug Trafficking and Violence in Latin America. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73153-7_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73153-7_4

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-319-73152-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-319-73153-7

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