Challenges of Major Secular Ideologies

Cliquet, Robert; Avramov, Dragana

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-73090-5_4

Challenges of Major Secular Ideologies

Robert Cliquet^3,4 &
Dragana Avramov⁵

Chapter
First Online: 12 January 2018

360 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter briefly discusses the major secular ideologies that developed in the wake of the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment: liberalism, socialism, feminism, nationalism, ecologism, and humanism. The main purpose is to look at and evaluate those secular ideologies from an evolutionary perspective and their significance for the development of evolutionary ethics. It is concluded that all of the major ideologies appear to include moral principles and practices that can be considered to be useful for evolution-based ethics. Albeit, they are only partial building stones for the design of a viable universal, evolutionarily grounded ethics in a further progressing modernisation. None of the secular ideologies have succeeded so far in elaborating a comprehensive worldview comparable to the major organised religious traditions. They excel as a result of their fragmented nature and, in most cases, short-term perspective.

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Notes

1.
Ebenstein et al. (1999).
2.
For instance, Berger and Luckmann (1966, 74), Bruce (2002, 3), Hunter (2015, 1).
3.
Cliteur (2010, 3–4).
4.
Halman and Draulans (2006), Beekman (2012).
5.
Dobbelaere (2002).
6.
Kaufmann (2011, 5).
7.
‘Apatheism’, a contraction of ‘apathy’ and ‘theism’: indifference or lack of interest towards belief or disbelief in a supernatural being.
8.
For instance, Inglehart (1990), Clark and Schellenberg (2008).
9.
Gallup Polls (1948–2008), Bruce (2002, 204ff).
10.
Zuckerman (2005, 12–15).
11.
Fundamentalism: ideological convictions in which literal beliefs in ancient myths and legends, whether religious or not, predominate (e.g. Longman 2004, xi).
12.
For instance, Berger (1999), Almond et al. (2003), Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2009).
13.
Bruce (2002), Barna (2007), Rainer (2007), Paul and Zuckerman (2007), Paul (2010), Stonawski et al. (2015), Pew Research Center (2015).
14.
Kaufmann (2011), Meisenberg (2011).
15.
Bruce (2002, 241).
16.
An example of a qualitative shift in religiosity appears from US statistics: whereas 90% of the American population believes in a personal God, only 10% of the members of the US National Academy of Sciences—who are obviously at the vanguard of modern culture creation—does so (Larson and Witham 1998).
17.
The alleged religious resurgence is due to the increased visibility of religious activities through modern means of communication, the immigration flows from developing to developed countries, and the increased vocalisation of religious authorities against the spreading secularisation (FM-2030 1989, 174).
18.
Bruce (2002, 241).
19.
The second divide is between left wing and right wing socio-economic models.
20.
For instance, Stebbing (1941), Robinson (1964).
21.
For instance, Cline (2016).
22.
Shults (2015, 726).
23.
Anthropocene is defined as the Earth’s most recent geologic time period as being human-influenced (Crutzen and Stoermer 2000, 17; Steffen et al. 2011).
24.
Locke (1690).
25.
Smith (1776), Mill (1863), see also Gray (2002).
26.
Green (1884).
27.
Harvey (2007).
28.
Harvey (2007), Duménil and Lévy (2011), Steger and Roy (2010), McQuaig and Brooks (2013).
29.
Spencer (1851), Sumner (1883).
30.
Arnhart (2010), see also the response essays of Myers (2010), Tiger (2010), Gintis (2010).
31.
See also Gintis (2010), Dilley (2013).
32.
For instance, Corning (2010).
33.
For instance, Thompson (1993).
34.
Marx (1867), Piketty (2013).
35.
See, for instance, Esping-Andersen (1990), Goodin et al. (1999), Prahalad and Hammond (2002).
36.
Piketty (2013), Izaka et al. (2015).
37.
Kortright (2008).
38.
See e.g. Hofstadter (1955), Jones (1980), De Tarde (1984), Tort (1992).
39.
Josephson (1934), Bergman (2001).
40.
Carnegie (1920).
41.
Rockefeller, quoted in Hofstadter (1955, 45), Huber (1971, 66).
42.
Rothschild (1990).
43.
Darwin (1871).
44.
Corning (2010, 5).
45.
Wilkinson (2005).
46.
Corning (2010).
47.
Sumner (1914, 90).
48.
Corning (2003, 16).
49.
Robson (2001).
50.
Corning (2010).
51.
Marx (1867).
52.
Engels (1878).
53.
Marx and Engels (1848): “Proletarians of all countries, unite!”
54.
Marx and Engels (1958).
55.
Marx (1844).
56.
“Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people”.
57.
Marx and Engels (1848).
58.
Marx (1875), Luxemburg (1918), Kautsky (1918).
59.
Engels, quoted in Zirkle (1959, 85).
60.
Marx, quoted in Zirkle (1959, 86).
61.
Marx, quoted in Zirkle (1959, 86).
62.
Zirkle (1959).
63.
Muller (1948), quoted in Zirkle (1959).
64.
Medvedev (1969), Joravsky (1970), Soyfer (1994).
65.
Sakharov (1964), quoted by Joravsky (1970).
66.
Woltmann (1899).
67.
Pinker (2002, 279–284). The blank slate view of human nature is not only a view which predominates in socialist quarters: it was the dominant theoretical approach in much of the twentieth century sociology and cultural anthropology and even today it can be perceived among many social scientists who have not succeeded in becoming acquainted with the present-day state of the art of the biological sciences, particularly evolutionary science. (For a discussion of these issues see, for instance, Van den Berghe 1990; Ellis 1996; Lopreato and Crippen 1999; Pinker 2002; Niedenzu et al. 2008; Corning 2011).
68.
Wilson (1978, 191).
69.
De Saint Simon (1819), Blanc (1840), Marx (1875).
70.
Corning (2010).
71.
A free rider is someone who enjoys the benefits of cooperation without reciprocating for its costs.
72.
Singer (1999, 5).
73.
For instance, Daly (1978), Freedman (2003, 2007).
74.
Radical feminism considers the old-time and still persisting patriarchal domination and its related male supremacy as the major and universal cause of women’s oppression (e.g. Koedt et al. 1973; Willis 1984; Radical Women 2001).
75.
Equality feminism emphasises, notwithstanding the biological differences, the strong similarity between the sexes. Human nature would be ‘androgynous, neutral and equal’ (e.g. Young 1999).
76.
Difference feminism stresses that men and women are ‘ontologically’ different versions of the human being (e.g. Zinn and Dill 1996).
77.
Socialist feminists see the cause of women's oppression to be in the capitalist system, and in order to win equality women workers must stand in solidarity with each other. Socialist feminism interprets women’s oppression as the result of the class structure in society (e.g. Bebel 1879; Boxer and Quataert 1978; Radical Women 2001).
78.
Liberal feminism pursues gender equality through political and legal reform without altering the structure of society (e.g. Wollstonecraft 1792; Friedan 1963; Walker 1996).
79.
Ecofeminists consider men’s control and destruction of the natural environment as the main cause of the oppression of women (e.g. Mies and Shiva 1993; Diamond and Orenstein 1990; Ruether 1993).
80.
Lesbian feminism focuses on the discrimination of lesbians and women in society. It refutes ‘heteronormativity’—the assumption that everyone is ‘straight’ (e.g. Faderman 1998).
81.
Individualist feminism aims at protecting individual women by legal measures that eliminate male privileges. It wants women to take full responsibility for their own lives and bodies (e.g. McElroy 2002).
82.
Gender feminism: a ‘gynocentric’ and ‘misandric’ variant of feminism (e.g. Sommers 1994).
83.
New feminism: a form of difference feminism, mainly from Catholic inspiration, that emphasises the complementarity rather than the hierarchy of men and women. It acknowledges the biological specificity of both sexes, while recognising their equal worth and dignity. It stresses women's “obligation to give birth to and raise children” (e.g. Pope John Paul II 1995). Given its ideological origin, it is understandable that bona fide feminists are quite suspicious about ‘feminist’ variants such as ‘new feminism’ or conservative feminism, albeit those variants sometimes remind us rightly of the importance of some important biological facts to be taken into account in the design of a transgenerational morale.
84.
Conservative feminism rejects a feminism that “adopts a male model of careerism and public achievement as female goals, thereby denying women's need for intimacy, family, and children.” It believes that promoting gender equality leads to the ruin of the family (e.g. Stacey 1983).
85.
Weisbord (2011).
86.
For instance, Agrippa (1529).
87.
For instance, Wollstonecraft (1792), von Hippel (1792).
88.
Jaggar (1983).
89.
De Beauvoir (1949).
90.
Friedan (1963).
91.
For instance, Heywood and Drake (1997), Baumgardner and Richards (2000), Henry (2004), Krolokke and Sorensen (2005), Gillis et al. (2007).
92.
For instance, Cott (1987), Modleski (1991), Jones (1994), McRobbie (2004).
93.
Humm (1992).
94.
Cliquet (2010, 223–238).
95.
Miller and Hoffman (1995), Whitmeyer (1998), Forthun et al. (1999), Sherkat and Ellison (1999), Stark (2002), Miller and Stark (2002), Freese (2004), Gove (1985), Udry (1988; 2000), Julian and McKenry (1989), Dabbs and Morris (1990), Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), Booth and Dabbs (1993), Collaer and Hines (1995).
96.
Sharma (1987).
97.
For instance, Geary (1998), Baron-Cohen (2003, 21ff), Jausovec and Jausovec (2005), Ellis (2011), Moir and Jessel (1992), LeVay (1994), Blum (1998), Schulte-Rüther et al. (2008).
98.
For instance, Blum (1998), Geary (1998), Mirola (1999), Baril (2006), Campbell (2008), see also DesAutels (2010).
99.
Van der Dennen (1995).
100.
Rummel (1994; 1995; 2002).
101.
Gatens (1996).
102.
Humm (1992).
103.
Zeiss (1982).
104.
Ridley (1993).
105.
For instance, Cliquet (1984; 2010), Roede (1988), Segerstraele (1988), Gowaty (1997), Vandermassen (2005), Campbell (2006).
106.
For instance, Smith (1991; 1995; 1999), Hutchinson and Smith (1995).
107.
Herder (1774–1787).
108.
Gingrich and Banks (2006).
109.
Salter (2003).
110.
The term fascism derives from fasces, the Roman symbol of collectivism and power: a tied bundle of rods with a protruding axe.
111.
Lyons and Berlet (1996), Morgan (2002), Paxton (2005).
112.
Richman (2008).
113.
Boyanowski (2002), Britt (2003), Richman (2008).
114.
Britt (2003).
115.
The so-called Aryan race is not a biological subdivision within the human species. The Aryan concept is an English language loanword derived from the Sanskrit Arya (‘Noble’), which refers to the Indo-European languages in general and their speakers. Hence, it is a cultural concept that has, in principle, nothing to do with genetic differentiation in the population. The Nazis usurped the term to identify their racial ideal, namely the ‘Nordic variant of the European racial stock’.
116.
The holy scripture of the Nazis was of course Hitler’s (1925–1926) ‘Mein Kampf’ which is, apart from its fateful ideology, a monument of incoherent, distorted, pseudoscientific semi-truths, but it is very clear in its political intentions and predictions. It is still an enigma how the German population, with its sophisticated intellectual background and rich cultural heritage in general, could have been seduced by the superficial and irrational clutter of ideas that is bundled into that writing.
117.
Gilbert (1986), Gutman (1990), Hilberg (2003).
118.
Russian Academy of Science (1995).
119.
Giustiniani (1985), Lamont (1996), Walter (1997), Norman (2004), Kurtz (2007), Pinxten (2007), Slembrouck (2010), Grayling (2014).
120.
Gasenbeek and Gogineni (2002).
121.
Teehan (2010, 218).
122.
Darwin (1859).
123.
Feuerbach (1841).
124.
Smith (1776), Mill (1859), Green (1884).
125.
Marx (1867), Engels (1878).
126.
Gogineni (2006), Grayling (2014).
127.
www.IHEU.org.
128.
Gasenbeek and Gogineni (2002).
129.
World Union of Freethinkers, WUFT (1880).
130.
International Ethical Union, IEU (1896).
131.
It is difficult to call Humanism a religion, at least when it is conceived in its present common meaning as a life stance that is rooted in rational and free thinking, understanding our universe in scientifically based naturalistic terms rather than in revealed supernatural, superstitious and pseudoscientific terms. It is exactly the opposite to religion, the specificity of which consists of the belief in super- or extra-natural phenomena. Nevertheless, some people do consider humanism a religion, probably for a variety of reasons. Indeed, humanism as understood by modern humanist organisations fulfils social roles that are similar to those performed by traditional religions. However, whenever or wherever it is necessary to refer to ideological diversity in society, it would be more respectful towards non-religious citizens to refer to, for instance, ‘religions and other philosophical convictions’, as is done in some United Nations documents.
132.
Sellars and Bragg (1933).
133.
Kurtz and Wilson (1973).
134.
American Humanist Association (2003).
135.
Kurtz (2007).
136.
For instance, Cherry and Brown (2009), Jeffrey (2011).
137.
Huxley (1942; 1957; 1964).
138.
Badmington (2000), Wolfe (2009).
139.
Decraemer et al. (2010).
140.
For instance, Tapp (2002).
141.
For instance, Cattell (1972).
142.
Whitehead and Conlan (1978).
143.
For instance, LaHaye (1980).
144.
Consult, for instance, the table of contents of the major periodic publication of the International Humanist and Ethical Union: International Humanist News.
145.
For instance, Demaerel (2015).
146.
For instance, Baxter (1999).
147.
Carson (1962).
148.
Naess (1973).
149.
Dobson (1990), Smith (1998), Baxter (1999).
150.
Blakers (2001).
151.
http://www.globalgreens.org/parties.
152.
For instance, European Greens (2006).
153.
For instance, Wall (2010).
154.
For instance, Hobgood-Oster (2005), Gaard (2011), Sturgeon (2016).
155.
For instance, Tapp (2002).
156.
Wijkman and Rockström (2011, 18).
157.
For instance, Spiro (2007), Tava (2013).
158.
IPCC (2013).
159.
Since the origin of life on Earth, life has experienced five mass extinction events, all caused by natural phenomena. The sixth extinction is the result of human interventions. It began some 100,000 years ago when the anatomical modern human emigrated from Africa and dispersed all over the planet; it accelerated about 10,000 years ago when humans developed agriculture, and has further intensified since the onset of modernisation 400–500 years ago. The biodiversity in the planet is currently being diminished at a rate that parallels the five natural extinctions of the past (see Leakey and Lewin 1995; Novacek 2001; Kolbert 2014).
160.
For instance, Chew (2001, 2008).
161.
Dobson (1990).
162.
See also, for instance, Saroglou and Muñoz-García (2008, 97), Stewart (2008).

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Anthropology and Social Biology, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Robert Cliquet
Population and Family Study Centre (CBGS), Flemish Scientific Institute, Brussels, Belgium
Robert Cliquet
Population and Social Policy Consultants (PSPC), Brussels, Belgium
Dragana Avramov

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Cliquet, R., Avramov, D. (2018). Challenges of Major Secular Ideologies. In: Evolution Science and Ethics in the Third Millennium. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73090-5_4

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-73090-5_4
Published: 12 January 2018
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